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Abstract 
In the wake of the Cold War, a complex transition process began in Central and 
Eastern Europe that has engendered immense change not only in the political, 
economic and social situations in the countries of the region, but also in their security 
situation. The aim of the thesis is to explore the changing nature of security in post-
Cold War Central and Eastern Europe. Drawing on some pertinent features of 
traditional and new schools of thought in International Relations, it sets up an 
analytical framework, which is applied to an analysis of security in the Central and 
Eastern European region and to Hungary more particularly. The premise of the study 
is that the issue of security in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe requires the 
deployment of an analytical framework that can accommodate its multifaceted and 
multi-dimensional nature. This framework focuses on three main centres of interest: 
predicaments, perceptions and policy-responses. The thesis applies this framework to 
Central and Eastern Europe with a particular focus on Hungary. Conclusions are 
drawn both about the utility ofthe framework and about the nature of security itself 
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1 Introduction 
After the fall of the Berlin Wall and the revolutions of 1989-90 in the Central and 
Eastern European (CEEn) countries, a complex process of transition was initiated in 
the region, which is still ongoing. This process involves not only changes at the 
political, economic and societal levels, but also in issues related to foreign and 
security policies as well as defence. Most analyses of these processes concentrate on 
the political, economic and societal transformations, that is the shift from 
authoritarian systems of governance towards more democratic ones, the reform of 
post-communist economies and questions of how societies and their citizens cope 
with the pressures arising from newly established and fragile market economies, 
democratic institutions and new, more open political structures.1 
But where is security placed in this complex transition process? The aim of this thesis 
is to focus on this aspect of the transition process and to describe, to investigate and to 
explain the changing security issues confronting post-Cold War Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) in general and Hungary in particular. Thus, the work in this thesis is 
interdisciplinary in that it combines an analysis of security issues with a detailed 
comparative study focusing on the constituent states of a particular geographical 
region, that of CEE. The disciplines of International Relations (Security Studies), 
Area Studies and Comparative Politics are all relevant in this context. In pursuing this 
combined task, some fundamental developments must be considered that seem to be 
highly relevant in the CEEn security context. 
Firstly, the proximate cause of the transformation of security issues is clearly the 
collapse, after more than forty years, of communist rule behind the 'iron curtain'. The 
rapid break-up of the Soviet Union, and the consequent sudden decline of one of the 
world's superpowers, brought an end to bi-polar military confrontation and 
necessitated a re-thinking of the traditionally political-militarily dominated European 
1 RalfDahrendorfhas referred to the multiple transition in CEE as the 'double conundrum' of economic 
marketisation and political democratisation. This has been extended further by Claus Offe, who argues 
that, in addition to the political and economic issues, countries within the region face a further 
transition, that is oflate nation-building and identity related issues. See Dahrendorf, Ralf (1990) 
Reflection on the Revolution in Europe. London: Chatto and Windus; Offe, Claus (1991) "Capirtllism 
2 
security agenda.2 During the Cold War period, security was mostly defined in terms 
of the military confrontation of the two competing blocs. However, with the collapse 
of communism and the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991, less obvious and less 
tangible challenges and risks have appeared in CBE, which require a revision of 
traditional concepts of security. It is now widely accepted that security can no longer 
be defined solely in military terms. In order to do justice to the changed 
circumstances, the concept of security has to be 'widened' and 'deepened' as well as 
freed from its traditionally state-centric focus. Beside the military component of 
security, other, new factors including political, economic, societal or environmental 
indicators have to be considered. In addition, a range of new political actors has arisen 
alongside states, operating on different levels (European, regional, state, inter-state 
and individual). 
Secondly, geopolitics and identity appear to be crucial in the transition process, 
particularly in the security context. From the debris of the artificial grouping that 
comprised the Soviet Union and its satellite states in CBE, new, relatively small 
nation-states have emerged which are looking for a role in Europe and in the world. 
As regards nation building in post-communist CBE, Michael Clarke has stated that 
four states have ceased to exist, and 22 new ones have come into existence; 
the eight countries of the communist bloc have become 28, and will possibly 
become 30 if Montenegro and Chechnya gain independence. Thus a 
multiplicity of political actors has replaced the communist system. 3 
As for the definition of the CEEn region, it has to be acknowledged at the outset that 
there is no unique or straightforward geographical or political statement of where the 
boundaries of CBE lie. In contrast to Clarke's inclusive definition of CBE, some 
observers define the region in a more minimalist manner and consider only the so-
called Visegr:id-states, Poland, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary as its 
by Democratic Design? Democratic Theory Facing the Triple Transition in East Central Europe", 
Social Research, 58:4, pp. 865-892. 
2 See, for example, Buzan, Barry (1991) People, States and Fear: An Agenda for International Security 
Studies in the Post-Cold War Era. 2nd ed. Boulder: Lynne Rienner; Hemel Hempstead: Harvester 
Wheatsheaf. · 
3 Clarke, Michael (1999) "'Security between Two Worlds", Paper presented at the International 
Conference 'Ten Years after 1989: The Changing Nature of Security Relations in Central and Eastern 
Europe', University of Birmingham, 8-9 November 1999. Conference Report, p. 4 
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constituent states.4 Similarly, the Czech writer, Milan Kundera described CBE in 1984 
as "an uncertain zone of small nations between Russia and Germany".5 For the 
purpose of this thesis, we adopt an intermediate position, which corresponds with Pat 
Dunay's understanding of the region.6 Accordingly, CBE is defined as the 
conglomeration of ten countries that includes the former non-Soviet Warsaw Treaty 
Organisation (WTO) member states, the three Baltic states and Slovenia. All of these 
countries share the common feature that they are currently involved in accession 
negotiations with the European Union (EU). 
Finally, it appears to be a general phenomenon throughout the entire CEEn region that 
the development of security issues and the consequent re-formulation of the security 
and defence policies of the CEEn countries differ markedly in character from the 
transformations occurring in the political and economic spheres. Whilst political and 
academic elites were quick to devise suggestions and concepts for restructuring 
political and economic systems, their response to the new security challenges has 
been, as the thesis will demonstrate, less decisive and more ambiguous. More than a 
decade after the breakdown of communist rule and the demise of the WTO in 1991, 
new NATO (North Atlantic Treaty Organisation) member Hungary, to cite one 
example, has only recently started to reform the overall structure of its armed forces 
and to develop and enact appropriate security and defence legislation. 
In light of the fundamental developments in post-Cold War CBE, this thesis will 
attempt to analyse security in a comprehensive manner. In order to equip ourselves for 
this, chapter two reviews some pertinent theories of International Relations (IR) and 
develops the analytical framework employed in the ensuing case study chapters. This 
analytical framework is organised around three main concepts, security predicaments, 
perceptions and policy-responses, which also serve as the three distinct centres of 
gravity of the overall thesis. Chapters three, four and five utilise the analytical 
framework in the CEEn context and highlight mostly general trends with regard to 
security in the states of the region. 
4 See, for example, Hyde-Price, Adrian (1996) The International Politics of East Central Europe. 
Manchester: Manchester University Press, p. 7. 
5 Kundera, Milan (1984) "A Kidnapped West, or Culture Bows Out", Granta, 11, p. 108. 
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Thus, chapter three explores security predicaments, that is the risks and vulnerabilities 
that confront the post-Cold War CEEn region. By doing so, it attempts to delineate a 
regional security complex, in which various real and potential risks and vulnerabilities 
are systematised according to the categories set out in our analytical framework. 
Chapter four is devoted to the analysis of security perceptions and highlights the 
attitude of the CEEn publics and their political elites towards risks and vulnerabilities. 
In this vein, the chapter approaches security in a more subjective way and considers a 
number of imagined or misperceived threats that, for a variety of reasons, appear to 
perturb the publics and their politicians. It also throws light on some cognitive factors 
that contribute to the emergence of some of the security predicaments outlined in 
chapter three. 
Chapter five highlights the policy-responses of CEEn politicians that attempt to 
remedy security predicaments in a manner consistent with the security perceptions of 
the CEE publics and their elites. It has to be acknowledged that the focus here is 
mainly on the first stages of the policy-making process, that is the formulation of 
policy objectives. Detailed considerations of the implementation of individual foreign 
and security policies of single CEEn states are beyond the scope of the present study. 
Moreover, since the implementation of most policies is currently ongoing, it is too 
early for a properly considered analysis of policy-outcomes. 
Chapter six is devoted entirely to security in the case of post-Cold War Hungary. As a 
result of its history and its unique geopolitical situation close to the Balkans and 
Ukraine, Hungary offers an interesting case for the study of security in CEE. This 
chapter retains the analytical framework set out in chapter two, with its threefold 
focus on predicaments, perceptions and policy-responses, and illustrates these with 
the help of numerous concrete examples from post-communist Hungarian politics and 
with insights obtained from interviews conducted in Budapest by the author in 1998-
6 See Dunay, Pal (1995) "Whence the Threat to Peace in Europe", in Gambles, lan (ed.) A Lasting 
Peace in Central Europe? The Expansion of the European Security-community. Paris: Institute for 
Security Studies, Chaillot Paper 20, p. 40. 
5 
2000. Thus, chapter six provides both a detailed analysis of security in Hungary and 
an illustration of the framework in a narrower geographical context. 
In the concluding chapter, chapter seven, we return to the issues and questions raised 
in chapter two and attempt to evaluate the utility of our analytical framework for 
examining security in post-Cold War CEE and in particular in Hungary. We also 
collate the findings of the chapters on CEEn security with those of the case study on 
Hungary and draw some final conclusions on CEE regional security. 
It is indeed a challenging task to investigate an area as contemporaneous and as 
unsettled as post-communist CEE. It would, therefore, be misleading to claim that this 
thesis can faithfully capture all aspects of security ofthe CEEn region. What it can do, 
however, is to document some important developments that have taken place in the 
last decade and to point out some perturbing tendencies that might challenge the 
security of the region in the future. Thus, this thesis contributes to the ongoing debate 
on security in CEE and, indirectly, one hopes, makes a small contribution to 
strengthening the stability of the region. 
6 
The time has come to transcend the classical dialectic between 
Realist and Liberal theories of international politics. Each has 
something to contribute to a research program that increases our 
understanding of international behaviour. Perhaps work in the 
1990s will be able to synthesize rather than repeat the dialectic of 
the 1970s and the 1980s. 
Joseph S. Nye7 
2 Framework for Security and Foreign Policy Analysis in 
Contemporary Central and Eastern Europe: Predicaments, 
Perceptions and Policy-Responses 
This chapter aims to develop an analytical framework for investigating the process of 
security and foreign policy-making in contemporary CEE. It considers this process as 
a comprehensive one, requiring the clarification of security challenges, of their 
perception by CEEn publics and their political elites as well as of the actual policy-
response of different political actors. In order to arrive at a set of useful common 
indicators of security in the region of our concern, it is not sufficient to highlight 
current insecurities and vulnerabilities; we also have to look at the practical 
implications that is, how those issues are perceived by the public and its political elite 
and the nature of their policy-responses. 
By applying this comprehensive perspective, we will construct our analysis on a 
threefold footing: In the section on predicaments we seek to expound a 
comprehensive framework dealing with a number of factors, incorporating traditional 
as well as new dimensions of security. The second section on perceptions aims to 
highlight different theoretical approaches, which can help analyse cognitive 
processes, such . as perception/misperception as well as interpretation/ 
misinterpretation. Finally, under policy-responses we recall the main approaches of 
foreign and security policy-making, which seem to be relevant in the subsequent case 
study sections on CEE in general and on Hungary in particular. 
Each of the three sections aims to frame a number of research questions, which help 
formulate a critical method for use in the later case study and generate a more critical 
and comprehensive debate on security in practice. As the opening quotation of Joseph 
7 Nye, Joseph S. (1988) "Neorealism and Neoliberalism", World Politics, 40:2, p. 251. 
7 
S. Nye suggests, our intention is to transcend the methodological differences currently 
prevalent in the discipline of IR and to form a synthesis of those aspects of the 
existing schools of thought that, together, allow a wide analysis of current security 
issues in CEE. Thus, our intention here is to develop a tool appropriate to the analysis 
of security in post-Cold War CEE. 
2.1 Introduction 
In order to better understand security and foreign policy issues in contemporary CEE, 
it is necessary to consider some theoretical concepts, in order to analyse common 
trends and distinctive characteristics within the region. It is evident that in a 
transitional region like CEE, long established Western theoretical approaches might 
not capture international politics and security matters with the same effectiveness as 
in consolidated democracies. The region is characterised by economic, political and 
social uncertainties resulting from recent changes of regime type from authoritarian to 
democratic. Thus, states in the region clearly face different challenges to those states 
with a long established liberal democracy and market economy. 
It should also be acknowledged that since the end of the Cold War, the field of IR and 
its subfields, security and foreign policy studies, have come under immense pressure 
to rethink and reformulate some of their basic principles.8 Consequently, we have to 
question the dominance of Cold War theoretical approaches in a changed world and 
determine whether these best describe contemporary international relations in our 
specific geographical context. CEE has been experiencing fundamental structural 
changes since the end of communist rule and, as a result of an emerging new world 
order with new challenges, established IR theory has increasingly become the target 
of criticism. The disappearance of the bipolar world order has suggested the need for 
new explanatory models and has also challenged the validity of dominant constitutive 
theories. The end of the Cold War has, in fact, set off a debate in IR, which addresses 
fundamental methodological as well as substantial issues. Steve Smith has argued that 
8 Fred Halliday argues: "A new theorization oflntemational Relations may, therefore, be needed, to 
deal with what may be a long period ofintra-hegemonic peace". See Halliday, Fred (1995) "The End of 
8 
the distinction between constitutive versus explanatory theory is "the main meta-
theoretical issue facing international theory today".9 In light of these challenges to IR 
theory, the current debate between different schools of thought has focused on the 
following issues. 
Firstly, in the light of a changed world order, the epistemological foundations of the 
discipline have once again been questioned. Broadly speaking, we can distinguish 
here between established traditions (realism/neo-realism and liberalism/neo-
liberalism) and post-positivist theories (critical, post-modem, constructivist 
approaches). 10 It has to be admitted, however, that the collective term 'established 
traditions' does not imply any kind of theoretical agreement between the two 
established traditions. It is used here rather to illustrate a further dimension of the 
debate. Indeed, in general, it can be argued that the gap between realism/neo-realism 
and liberalism/neo-liberalism has deepened further in the wake of the Cold War. 11 
Secondly, leading on from the first point, in accounting for the end of the Cold War, 
the empirical validity of existing theories has come under attack, something which has 
led to a critical reassessment of the analytical content of the discipline. 12 In this 
context we can distinguish between those who are in favour of retaining a rather 
narrow perspective ofiR and Security Studies and those, who plead for an adjustment 
of the discipline to the changed conditions of post-Cold War Europe and, thus, who 
favour a wider analytical conception. This distinction is, again, very much linked to 
the Cold War and International Relations: Some Analytic and Theoretical Conclusions", in Booth, Ken 
and Steve Smith (eds.), International Relations Theory Today. Cambridge: Polity, p. 58. 
9Smith, Steve ( 1995) "The Self-Images of a Discipline", in Booth, Ken, and Steve Smith ( eds. ), 
International Relations Theory Today. Cambridge: Polity, p. 26. 
10See, for example, Jackson, Robert and Georg Sorensen (1999) Introduction to International 
Relations. Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 61. 
11It has to be mentioned, however, that there are some undertakings to bridge the gap between the two 
established traditions. Ole Waever, for instance, has argued that a "dominant neo-neo synthesis became 
the research programme of the 1980s. No longer were realism and liberalism 'incommensurable'- on 
the contrary they shared a 'rationalist' research programme, a conception of science, a shared 
willingness to operate on the premise of anarchy and investigate the evolution of co-operation and 
whether institutions matter". See Waever, Ole (1997) "Figures of International Thought: Introducing 
Persons Instead of Paradigms", in Neumann, Iver B. and Ole Waever (eds.}, The Future of 
International Relations. Masters in the Making. London: Routledge, pp. 18. ff; Sirniliarly, John R. 
Ruggie has elaborated on the 'convergence of the neos' and introduced the term 'neo-utilitarianism' 
labelling both neorealism and neoliberal institutionalism, which, in his view, "share very similar 
analytical foundations", See Ruggie, Gerard John (1998) Constructing the World. Essays on 
International Institutionalization. London and New York: Routledge, p. 9. 
12 See, for example, Gaddis, John Lewis (1992/93) "International Relations Theory and the End ofthe 
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the first point of worldviews and constitutive theories; however, it represents a 
different dimension of the debate. Since in our case study we will touch upon the 
debate between narrow and wide security conceptions on several occasions, this 
dimension will be treated in this chapter with especial attention. 
Thirdly, as already mentioned above, the current debate in IR has a clear 
methodological dimension. In the 1950s and 1960s, the methodological debate 
between behavioralism (rather scientific) and traditionalism (more humanistic) 
dominated the discipline. Since the end of the Cold War the objectivist methods of 
behavioralism (later called 'positivism') based on scientific research techniques have 
been contested by the so-called post-positivistic approach. Although this emergent 
methodology, like all theoretical approaches, consists of somewhat different 
competing and often controversial voices, its basic assumption is common: positivist 
theory is limited and cannot capture the complexity of a world made up of human 
individuals and therefore that a normative, value-based, humanistic analysis is 
required. What is the usefulness of this third dimension in our context? This question 
can be answered simply by referring back to the very nature of international politics 
during the Cold War era. Then, power politics and military confrontation based upon 
the principles of realist balance-of-power, characterised world politics and its 
analysis. Thus, positivistic principles such as data observations and mathematical 
calculations proved to be useful for describing realities and creating strategies. Since 
the end of the Cold War, the emphasis has clearly shifted from strategy and deterrence 
towards maintaining peaceful relations via cooperation, and positivist methods have 
proven to be insufficient for explaining all the new realities. Post-positivist 
approaches focus on individuals (as the smallest unit) or communities (as a larger 
unit), instead of retaining a purely state-centric focus; on the identity based 
construction of the social world; and on issues of international ethics. All these seem 
to have a striking validity in contemporary CBE, therefore they will be considered in 
the following security framework for analyses. 
The fundamental changes in world politics and IR demand a new approach to the 
analysis of security. Thus, this chapter will try to set up a model of security and 
Cold War", International Security, 17:3, p. 6. 
10 
foreign policy analysis, which can then be employed in our specific geographical 
context. Suffice it to say that the exclusive application of one approach, theory or 
methodology cannot capture the entire security complex of today's world. What we 
need is a comprehensive analytical framework that attempts to incorporate different 
schools of thought and capture as many issues as possible. Our analytical framework 
as well as the latter case study is organised around three major problematiques, which 
constitute the centres of gravity in our security analysis: Predicaments, Perceptions 
and Policy-Responses. The benefits of this comprehensive approach are that it 
transcends the pure acknowledgement of predicaments by considering some cognitive 
issues and pursues also practical issues generated by the actual policy-makers. This 
comprehensiveness in itself is less relevant in theoretical terms; however, it is highly 
relevant on analytical grounds, since our framework allows for an inclusive analytical 
perspective in our later case study. Furthermore, our analytical framework makes it 
possible to consider security and foreign policy-making as a cyclical process, rather 
than a static or horizontal one. 
The central question is how security can be defined in this changing world and what 
do the main approaches of IR contribute to our attempt to better explain and 
understand the nature of CEEn security predicaments? In this connection, the first 
part of this chapter will highlight the main trends in IR and offer a comprehensive 
framework for analysing a variety of security challenges in CEE, which then can be 
employed in the subsequent empirical study. To this end, we attempt to look for the 
strengths and weaknesses of different approaches in order to derive a more complex 
understanding of security that offers meaningful and up-to-date concepts for the 
analysis of security in contemporary CEE. 
Furthermore, to understand the complexity of security and foreign policy issues in 
general, it is not enough simply to look at security predicaments from a mainly 
abstract point of view that is, purely acknowledging the broad nature of security in 
post-Cold War CEE. Whilst the security model can describe the existing predicaments 
sufficiently accurately, it can tell one little, however, about the manner in which such 
phenomena are perceived in the minds of the public and the decision-makers 
themselves. Thus, the practitioners', the actual decision-makers' perspective ought to 
be included in the analysis. The crucial question here, therefore, is how information 
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and images of the world are perceived (or misperceived) by the public and by 
politicians, and how these processes influence the emergence of predicaments and 
policy formulations. Consequently, theories of cognitive structure, perception and 
interpretation will be at the centre of the second part of this chapter. Again, special 
attention will be paid to the fact that, in the CEEn region, we are dealing with 
transitional countries, which might show patterns different to those characteristic of 
consolidated liberal democracies. 
The last part of this chapter still deals with the 'practitioners' theory' and looks at how 
policy-responses of decision-makers to predicaments can be conceptualised best in 
the CEEn context. How does the process of foreign and security policy decision-
making (FPDM) work in this specific part of Europe? What are the main models of 
FPDM and which are the most applicable in CEE? 
2.2 Predicaments 
Following the historic patterns of change in IR theory it is not surprising that after the 
end of the Cold War, discussion among theorists has intensified with respect to the 
relevance of established schools of thought. With the decline of communism and the 
subsequent commitment of most CEEn countries to a democratic, western style of 
liberal democracy, security theorists and analysts came to realise the necessity of a 
response to these historical developments. One common characteristic can be 
observed in the immediate post-Cold War period: none of the leading theories in IR 
could adequately encompass the new challenges caused by the sudden decline of the 
bipolar world order. On the one hand, realists concentrated too heavily on the 
superpower confrontation in the past and were rather sceptical about compromising 
their basic theoretical principles. They have maintained the argument with regard to 
the validity of the Waltzian assumption, according to which bipolar systems are more 
stable and are more likely to bring order and peace than multipolar systems.13 
Prominent neo-realist John Mearsheimer, for instance, argued at the beginning of the 
1990s: 
13 Waltz, Kenneth N. (1979) Theory of International Politics. Reading, Mass.: Addison-Wesley, p. 204. 
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The West has an interest in maintaining peace in Europe. It therefore has an 
interest in maintaining the Cold War order, and hence has an interest in the 
continuation of the Cold War confrontation; developments that threaten to end 
. d 14 zt are angerous. 
On the other hand, neo-liberal institutionalists and other reformists seemed to be 
overwhelmed by the pace of change. The rather cautious euphoria of most of western 
politicians about the events in the East as well as the reserved response of several 
international organisations suggested that the idea of a united Eastern and Western 
Europe was, for many, inconceivable at the time. Beside the early eastward extension 
of the Council of Europe (CoE), the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe (OSCE, formerly CSCE), and the partial enlargement of NATO in March 
1999 (which could only be materialised under immense diplomatic pressure coming 
from the United States), the doors of important Western organisations, NATO and the 
EU, have, so far, remained closed for their Eastern European neighbours. This clearly 
suggests the limitations of institutionalist prescriptions in a pan-European context. 
However, one should admit that, at the same time, the values of neo-liberal 
institutionalism have become increasingly successful in the Western European 
integration process. This growing contrast between the deepening integration within 
Western Europe on the one hand and the disintegration and the isolation of CEE on 
the other hand poses a security challenge not only to the region but even to the entire 
continent. 
Before we proceed further it is necessary to define the concepts that underpin this 
section and the case study chapter, namely predicaments and security. The term 
predicament is not widely used in IR theory, which tends to employ terms such as 
'security vacuum' or 'security dilemma'. These terms, however, do not cover 
satisfactorily the focus of our analysis. The term 'security vacuum' is commonly used 
in the context of security alignments (or non-alignments) as a result of international 
co-operation. A 'security vacuum' can occur, when a country loses its old allies and 
does not or cannot join another alignment in order to cover its national security needs. 
The term 'security dilemma' was traditionally used in the context of the Cold War, 
where superpowers and their allies went into an arm race in a spiralling effort to 
14 Mearsheimer, John J. (1991) "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War", in Lynn-
Jones, Sean M. (eds.), The Cold War and After. Prospects for Peace. Cambridge: MTI Press, p. 188. 
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counter-balance each other's military capabilities. Some analysts employ the term 
'security dilemma' in a new analytical environment, describing something, what we 
call in our study security predicaments. In today's international politics, both 'security 
vacuum' and 'security dilemma' have become contentious due to their limitations in 
describing complex security issues (beside the military aspect of security) and also 
due to their historical legacies. While the terms 'vacuum' and 'dilemma' refer mainly 
to military-political security issues in a bipolar system of states, the word 
'predicaments' conveys the comprehensive nature of security in a multipolar world. 
This term is also intended to stipulate that security in contemporary CBE is a 
potentially problematic issue. Thus, here under security predicaments we understand 
precarious, insecure situations generated by a range of factors, which can jeopardise 
security. Security is considered here in the sense of Amold Wolfers's definition, 
according to which security, 
in an objective sense, measures the absence of threats to acquired values, in a 
subjective sense, the absence of fear that such values will be attacked. In both 
respects a nation's security can run a wide gamut from almost complete 
insecurity or sense of insecurity at one end, to almost complete security or 
absence of fear at the other. 15 
Predicaments and those factors, which generate them, are the main objects of our 
analysis and the region of CBE is our analytical category. Owing to the diverse nature 
of CBE, states in this region find themselves in a variety of situations as regards 
security and face a range of different challenges; hence the use in the plural of the 
word predicament. Mohammed Ayoob has analysed security predicaments in a 
different context, namely in that of the states forming the Third World. Ayoob has 
argued that 
The security predicaments of Third World states are generated largely by the 
twin pressures of late state making and their late entry into the system of 
states.16 
By extrapolating this observation to our specific geographical context, we recognise a 
similar pattern. Some of the CEEn states are freshly created nation-states, which were 
15 Wolfers, Amold (1962) Discord and Collaboration: Essays on International Politics. Baltimore and 
London: The John Hopkins Press, p. 150. 
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founded (or re-founded) after the end of the Cold War. The other states of CEE, 
although formally nation-states for a more extended period of time, regained their de 
facto sovereignty after the collapse of the Soviet Union as a world superpower. 
Further, the countries of CEE, although diplomatically recognised and, thus, ipso jure, 
members of the system of states, have experienced a late, or, indeed, no entry into the 
various organisations of states. In other words, the doors of significant international 
organisations have remained closed to them. In the context of political economy, 
Robert Gilpin defined the 'statehood' and the 'market' as the "two organizing 
principles of social life" .17 Predicaments can occur, when one or both of these factors 
are menaced. In other words, when a state has difficulties coming to terms with its 
identity, the translation of juridical sovereignty into effective statehood, and/or when 
it cannot integrate itself into the international market. 
This, however, is a very general survey of the circumstances that generate 
predicaments. Although it has already been implied that security predicaments can 
arise through various factors on different levels (domestic and global), little has been 
said about the specific nature of those factors. What are the other factors that 
constitute current security predicaments in CEE and how can they best be 
conceptualised? By looking at the established traditions in IR, there is one 
commonality, which strikes the observer almost immediately; none of them alone can 
describe or explain the current complex security situation. Therefore, in the following, 
we will undertake a critical reassessment of the main theories and trends of IR 
(realism, liberalism, constructivism and the 'widening' conception) with the purpose 
of picking out those elements, which can be used in our integrative model for 
describing security predicaments. This will provide a comprehensive framework, 
which will then be utilised in our general case studies on CEE and in our specific case 
study on Hungary. Admittedly, the idea of a comprehensive security framework in IR 
theory is not new. A number of researchers have raised their voices in the 1980s and 
1990s in favour of broadening the definition of security, among them Ullmann, Nye 
16 Ayoob, Mohammed (1995) The Third World Security Predicament. State Making, Regional Conflict 
and the International System. London: Lynne Rienner, p. xiii. 
17 Gilpin, Robert (1987) The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press, p. 10. 
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and Lynn-Jones, Brown, Buzan, Haftendom, Waever et al. 18 Furthermore, in 1989, an 
entire issue of Survival19 was dedicated to the subject of 'non-military aspects of 
security'. Barry Buzan and Ole Waever have offered the most thoroughly developed 
'wide' conception of security, a conception now known as the 'Copenhagen School 
Framework'.20 Thus, it can be acknowledged in anticipation that our complex security 
framework will borrow much of its ideas from Buzan and Waever. The application of 
a wide security framework can, however, run the methodological risk that the 
boundary between national security and normal day-to-day challenges or regular 
competitive interplay becomes blurred. Buzan has tried to overcome this controversy 
by concluding that the decision whether a threat is serious enough to be qualified as a 
risk to national security "is a matter of political choice rather than objective fact".21 
His statement is reinforced by Waever's definition of security, where he compared 
'security' with the linguistic theory of the 'speech act'. Waever has claimed that the 
utterance itself was the act, "by saying 'security', a state representative declares an 
emergency condition, thus claiming a right to use whatever means are necessary to 
block a threatening development".22 Similarly, Buzan has distinguished between 
vulnerabilities that are "fairly concrete" and objective or subjective threats that are 
"much harder to pin down". 23 This apparent ambivalence supplies most of the grounds 
for controversy in contemporary IR theory, which will be discussed below in separate 
sections highlighting major trends in IR. 
18 See Ullman, Richard (1983) "Redefming Security", International Security, 8:1, pp. 129-153; Nye, 
Joseph S., Jr., and Sean M. Lynn-Jones (1988) "International Security Studies: A Report of a 
Conference on the State of the Field", International Security, 12:4, pp. 5-27; Brown, Neville (1989) 
"Climate, Ecology and International Security", Survival, 31:6, pp. 519-532; Buzan (1991); Haftendorn, 
Helga (1991) "The Security Puzzle: Theory-Building and Discipline-Building in International 
Security", International Studies Quarterly, 35:1, pp. 3-17; Waever, Ole, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, 
and Pierre Lemaitre (1993) Identity, Migration and the New Security Order in Europe. London: Pinter. 
19 Survival (1989), 31:6. 
20Buzan and Waever have published their new security framework on several occasions. An extended 
and revised version appeared in a single volume in 1998. See Buzan, Barry, Ole Waever and Jaap de 
Wilde (1998) Security. A New Framework for Analysis. Boulder London: Lynne Rienner. 
21 Buzan (1991), p. 115. 
22 Buzan et al. (1998), p. 21. 
23 Buzan (1991), p. 114. 
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2.2.1 How Much Realism Do We Need? 
In IR the notion of realism can be summarised as follows: broadly speaking, realism 
is concerned first and foremost, with the military security problems of sovereign 
states as rational unitary actors in a system of international anarchy and, secondly, 
with the problem of international order. The main object of its observation is, 
therefore, the sovereign nation-state. States are independent, selfish authorities, they 
act in their own interests, without regard for normative concerns. Thus, they have to 
be handled as actors of primary importance in the international system. Based on the 
dramatic experience of two World Wars in the 20th century, realists take the view that 
there are no effective authority structures above the state, that is no effective system 
of world government. States are consequently forced to look after themselves and 
their own interests. Their conclusion is that international politics is characterised by 
'domestic order', which is embedded in a world of 'international anarchy'.24 The 
international system is a 'self-help system', where states are concerned with ensuring 
their own survival by protecting themselves against others. These factors clearly limit 
the cooperation of states. 25 International order can be best maintained via a 'balance-
of-power', the preservation of which is the absolute goal of great powers. That said, 
the 'balance-of-power' theory is probably the most disputed realist argument in 
contemporary European order. 26 What can the balance-of-power theory tell us about 
the nature of international politics after the dissolution of the Soviet Union? First of 
all, realists had to acknowledge that with the end of the Soviet Union and its alliance 
the Warsaw Treaty Organisation, one of the great powers disappeared. Yet, Waltz 
insists that "bipolarity continues because militarily Russia can take care of itself and 
because no other great powers have yet emerged".27 He also admits, however, that the 
nature of bipolarity has changed: 
With the waning of Soviet power, the United States is no longer held in check 
by any other country or combination of countries. ( ... ) Balance-of-power 
24 See Morgenthau, Hans J. (1948, 1965) Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace. 
3rd ed., New York: Alfred A. K.nopf; Waltz, Kenneth N. (1993) "The Emerging Structure of 
International Politics", International Security, 18:2, pp. 44-79; Waltz (1979); Mearsheimer (1991). 
25 Waltz (1979), p. 105. 
26 See, for example, Ray, James Lee (1995) "Promise or Peril? Neorealism, Neoliberalism and the 
Future oflnternational Politics", in Kegley, Charles W. Jr. (ed.), Controversies in International 
Relations Theory. New York: St. Martin's Press, p. 349. 
27 Waltz (1993), p. 52. 
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theory leads one to predict that other countries, alone or in concert, will try to 
bring American power into balance. 28 
When we highlight the actual security predicaments in CEE, we have to look at the 
current validity of the balance-of-power theory more closely. The most striking 
question is, whether there is an emerging great power in Europe, which might threaten 
the CEEn countries that were historically often located in a buffer zone between great 
powers? Similarly, in response to potential threats, are the CEEn states 'balancing' or 
'bandwagoning' by formulating their security and defence priorities and alliances? In 
other words, are they forming alliances in order to minimise the source of danger 
(balancing) or are they rather allying themselves with the dominant side, which poses, 
in relative terms, the biggest threat to their security (bandwagoning)?29 
This leads on to realists' rather pessimistic view of security and peace in an emerging 
new multipolar order. Mearsheimer argues that 
... the prospects for major crises and war in Europe are likely to increase 
markedly if the Cold War ends and this scenario unfolds. The next decades in 
Europe without the superpowers would probably not be as violent as the first 
45 years of this century, but would probably be substantially more prone to 
violence than the past 45 years. 30 
In the wake ofwars in the Balkans, this assertion, about the more violent nature of the 
post-bipolar world, however pessimistic, has a certain validity when applied to the 
CEEn context. With regard to military security concerns of states, the existence of a 
certain 'security vacuum' has been raised by many observers.31 To what extent this 
realist issue is a legitimate security predicament in contemporary CEE, will be 
analysed in the following chapter. 
Following on from this, realists consider the permanent possibility of war as one of 
the key issues of security. In order to avoid it, they concentrate predominantly on 
military security. In the Western European context, Charles L. Glaser distinguishes 
281bid. 
29 See Wait, Stephen M. (1985) "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power", International 
Security, 9:4, p. 4ff; Ruggie (1998), p. 144f. 
30 Mearsheimer (1991), p. 142. 
31 See Buzan, Barry (1997) "Rethinking Security after the Cold War", Cooperation and Conflict, 32:1, 
p. 8; Dunay (1995) p. 48; Hyde-Price (1996) p. 223f; Carr, Fergus (ed.) (1998) Europe: the Cold 
Divide. Basingstoke: Macrnillan, p. 161. 
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three types of current or future war the West might face. The first danger is of 
deliberate attack from a major power in the East - a resurgent Russia. The 
second is a war in the East, including wars that begin in Central Europe but 
could draw in the West. The third is war within Western Europe, possibly 
exacerbated by war in the East. 32 
One characteristic that appears to be common to all three types ofwar is the direction 
from which they draw: the East. Are certain parts of CEE really still so dangerous that 
they might draw the rest of the region and Western Europe into war? This is the 
decisive issue for many realist analysts, when they speak about dangers and crises 
stemming from the East and the solutions they offer are organised around more 
efficient military capabilities and defence strategies, preferably within the framework 
ofNATO. These analysts seem to miss, however, the very heart of the problem, that 
is, how certain crises that might lead to war can be avoided. They concentrate 
primarily on 'hard' solutions to security challenges (i.e. armed deterrence) and neglect 
other approaches, which could help avoid the appearance of crises (i.e. preventive 
diplomacy). Furthermore realism has earned a great deal of criticism for its emphasis 
on traditional causes of security predicaments and its neglect of 'soft security' issues. 
Paradoxically, in CEE both the strength and weakness of realism lies in its 
concentration on 'hard' military security issues. First, its strength is that it reminds us 
of the permanent possibility of conflict in a volatile region, regardless of the 
predominantly democratic type of the new regimes. Realists dismiss the 'liberal claim' 
that democracies do not fight democracies and remind us of the two setbacks, which 
followed previous waves of democratisation. 33 Mearsheimer develops the same 
argument further by using a more fundamental, ideological explanation and 
concluding that even democracies cannot transcend the anarchical nature of the 
international system and 
the possibility always exists that a democracy will revert to an authoritarian 
state. This threat of backsliding means that one democratic state can never be 
sure that another democratic state will not change its stripes and turn on it 
sometimes in the future. 34 
32 Glaser, Charles L. (1993) "Why NATO is Still Best: Future Security Arrangements for Europe", 
International Security, 18:1, p. 5. 
33 See Huntington, Samuel P. (1991) The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century. 
Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 
34 Mearsheimer (1991), p. 186. 
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However, realism's clear weakness lies in its neglect of issues beyond the military 
realm. Furthermore, it is a static theory emphasising the importance of maintaining 
the power of states and therefore the international status quo. Thus, it is pessimistic 
about the implications of any change in the balance of international power politics. 
Also, realism's state-centric perspective seems to be highly contentious in today's 
CBE. On the one hand, it appears to be a backward-looking view offering little 
perspective in times characterised by strong integrationist tendencies, on the other it 
proved to be highly relevant when many CEEn countries asserted their sovereignty 
after the end of the Cold War. Thus, however controversial and disputed, realism still 
seems to offer some guidance within our complex security framework. 
2.2.2 Liberalism: The Winner of the Cold War? 
In the wake of World War I and II, liberalism seemed clearly 'defeated' by the realist 
approach. However, at the end of the 20th century the international situation appears 
to provide fertile ground in which liberalism can flourish. To what extent have CEEn 
countries moved towards liberalism in their current international affairs? In other 
words, can security predicaments in the CEEn region be described generally in terms 
ofliberal values? 
To answer these questions, we need firstly to outline the core assumptions of liberal 
thinking. The most significant difference between liberalism and realism is a 
disagreement over the role of the state and international institutions as well as over the 
focus on peace and war in international politics. Liberals consider 'individuals plus 
various collectivities of individuals' as fundamental actors, first and foremost states, 
but also other smaller (e.g. corporations, interest groups) as well as larger (e.g. 
international organisations, multinational corporations) units.35 Policy-makers then 
define state preferences on behalf of a wide range of actors, 'societal ideas, interests 
35 See Jackson and Sorensen (1999), p. 136. 
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and institutions' and pursue them m world politics.36 Although contemporary 
liberalism is divided into various strands of thought (sociological liberalism, 
interdependence liberalism, institutional liberalism, republican liberalism), there are 
some common assumptions throughout these different explanations. 37 
First, they hold an optimistic view of international affairs and believe in the positive 
tendency of human nature. Therefore, they maintain that not only conflict and war, 
but also cooperation and peace can prevail in international politics. Since traditional 
liberalism grew hand in hand with the emergence of the modem liberal state, its 
theory is based upon a strong belief in the momentum of human progress within 
modem civil society and capitalist economy. 38 
Second, liberals believe in the strong power of liberal democracy and its immense 
contribution to security and peace. This view was best theorised by republican 
liberalism supported by the late eighteenth century Kantian formula, according to 
which liberal democratic states do not go to war with each other. 39 Therefore, the 
most important task for transition countries should be the consolidation of liberal 
democracy. The emphasis is here on the word 'consolidation', since liberals 
acknowledge the uncertain character of a fragile, infant democracy and plead for its 
pragmatic and rapid consolidation. 
Third, while realists consider state-centric inter-govemmentalism as the only way of 
practising international politics, liberals believe in communitarian values and in 
cooperation via international institutions. In their view, as a result of the creation of a 
web of international organisations, with sufficient influence to unify and represent 
states, the 'logic of anarchy' can be modified or even replaced by the 'logic of 
36In a somewhat individual approach, Andrew Moravcsik has recently (1997) reformulated liberal 
international relations 'in a nonideological and nonutopian form appropriate to empirical social 
science'. As Moravcsik has put it: "Liberal IR theory elaborates the insight that state-society relations-
the relationship of states to the domestic and transnational social context in which they are embedded-
have a fundamental social purpose underlying the strategic calculations of governments. For liberals, 
the configuration of state preferences matters most in world politics - not, as realists argue, the 
configuration of capabilities and not, as institutionalists (that is, functional regime theorists) maintain, 
the configuration of information and institutions". See Moravcsik, Andrew (1997) "Taking Preferences 
Seriously: A Liberal Theory oflntemational Politics", International Organization, 51:4, p. 513. 
37 See Nye (1988) 
38 See Jackson and Sorensen (1999), p. 108. 
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community'.4° Closely related to this assumption with regard to the notion of common 
security via international society, Martin Wight argued back in the 1960s that 
if there is an international society, then there is an order of some kind to be 
maintained, or even developed. It is not fallacious to speak of a collective 
interest, and security acquires a broadened meaning: it can be enjoyed or 
pursued in common. Foreign policy will take some account of the common 
interest. It becomes possible to transfer to international politics some of the 
categories of constitutionalism. 41 
Realist analysts, on the contrary, are highly critical about the role and importance of 
international institutions and cooperation in world politics. They support their 
argument by underlining the dominance of 'relative gains', which appear- for them-
as the most significant catalyst for state action.42 Liberal theorists Keohane and 
Martin, however, explain the role of 'relative gains' from a different perspective and 
conclude: 
Realists interpret the relative-gains' logic as showing that states will not 
cooperate with one another if each suspects that its potential partners are 
gaining more from cooperation than it is. However, just as institutions can 
mitigate fears of cheating and so allow cooperation to emerge, so can they 
alleviate fears of unequal gains from cooperation. Liberal theory argues that 
institutions provide valuable information, and information about the 
distribution of gains from cooperation may be especially valuable if the 
relative-gains logic is correct. Institutions can facilitate cooperation by 
helping to settle distributional conflicts and by assuring states that gains are 
evenly divided over time, for example by disclosing information about the 
military expenditures and capacities of alliance members. 43 
Today, as a result of modernisation, the process of interdependence is regarded as the 
most important driving force for this thinking, which results necessarily in the 
emergence of transnational actors and the weakening of states' power. In a world of 
39 See, for instance, Doyle, Michael W. (1986) "Liberalism in World Politics", American Political 
Science Review, 80:4, pp. 1151-1169. 
40This might be compared, for instance, with Bull, Hedley ( 1966) "Society and Anarchy in 
International Relations", in Butterfield, Herbert and Martin Wight (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations: 
Essays in the Theory of International Politics. London: George Alien & Unwin Ltd, pp. 35-50. 
41 Wight, Martin (1966) "Western Values in International Relations", in Butterfield, Herbert and Martin 
Wight (eds.), Diplomatic Investigations: Essays in the Theory of International Politics. London: 
George Alien & Unwin Ltd, p. 103. 
42 See Mearsheimer, John J. (1994/95) "The False Promise oflnternational Institutions", International 
Security, 19:3, p. 6ff. 
43 Keohane, Robert 0. and Lisa L. Martin (1995) "The Promise oflnstitutionalist Theory", 
International Security, 20:1, p. 45f. 
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'complex interdependence' the use of military force becomes less useful and the 
relevance of military security less important.44 Hence, this will produce a shift in 
international politics moving away from the 'high politics' of national security towards 
the 'low security' of welfare. Nye has summed up the concept of 'complex 
interdependence' in three points: 
(1) states are not the only significant actors - transnational actors working 
across state boundaries are also major actors; (2) force is not the only 
significant instrument - economic manipulation and the use of international 
institutions is the dominant instrument; (3) security is not the dominant goal-
welfare is the dominant goal. 45 
This concept of complex interdependence appears to be of particular relevance in the 
post-Cold War era of CEE; it reveals much about the goals of foreign and security 
policies as well as about the instruments of those policies. The establishment of 
economic and social welfare is now high on the agenda in CEE in order to leave 
behind predicaments and work towards peace, which can be utilised via transnational 
cooperation. Translating this claim into the context of security predicaments, it is a 
clear plea for the widening of the security agenda towards new, non-military issues. 
The problem today is not, as many realists still think, the threat of an external 
aggressor, but 'the new challenge oftransnational interdependence'.46 Thus, beside the 
threat of military conflict, the same degree of attention should be paid to 
environmental degradation that poses global threat to all nations' security. As a result 
of global economies, trade and environmental issues do not 'recognise' borderlines. In 
other words, national security and the factors that challenge it, must be seen in a broad 
international context. Similarly, Cooper speaks about the 'growing irrelevance of 
borders'.47 An even wider concept of security has also been developed by other 
scholars, which will be given a special treatment below. 
44 Keohane, Robert 0. and Joseph S. Nye (1989) Power and Interdependence. 2nd ed., New York: 
HarperCollins. 
45 Nye, Joseph S. (1993) Understanding International Conflict. An Introduction to Theory and History. 
New York: HarperCollins, p. 169. 
46 Nye, Joseph S. (1992) "The Misleading Metaphor of Decline", in Kegley, Charles W. Jr. and Eugene 
R. Wittkopf(eds.), The Global Agenda. 3rd ed., New York: McGraw-Hill, p. 320. 
47 Cooper, Robert (1993) "Is There a New World Order?" in Sato, Seizaburo and Trevor Taylor (eds.), 
Prospects for World Order. London: Royal Institute oflntemational Affairs, p. 18. 
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Fourth, following on from the previous points, liberals consider war as a futile policy 
instrument in current international affairs. Looking at the three classical functions of 
military confrontation, states went to war with one another to seize territory, to hold it 
or to defend it against an external aggressor.48 Today, the possibility of the first and 
the second options is limited, only the third option represents a viable utility for the 
acquisition of military power. Therefore, in the view of liberal critics, the new 
strategic and security doctrines should adapt to this fundamental change in post-Cold 
War international relations. In general, this assumption might be relevant in the 
international context, but says little about the possibility of intra-state war or civil 
war. As recent tragic events in certain parts of CEE have shown, the possibility of 
internal conflict and, indeed, intra-state war cannot be entirely excluded from our 
security framework. In a region, which is characterised by a highly mixed ethnic 
composition, the possibility of ethnic tension, especially during the post-communist 
transitional period is very much apparent. 
Finally, and connected to the historical utopian idea of morally driven foreign and 
security policy, liberal analyses suggest that liberal democracies work at preventing 
conflicts from becoming humanitarian tragedies, even if their own national security is 
not at risk. The motivation for this is twofold: on the one hand, liberal states are less 
tolerant of genocide or starvation, on the other, it is more cost effective to solve 
problems of this kind locally than to be obliged to pick up the bill for the tragic 
consequences of conflicts, for instance the influx of refugees. During the war in the 
Balkans, many CEEn states, especially those neighbouring ex-Yugoslavia, became 
asylum countries for the first time in their recent history. It is, therefore, interesting to 
look in chapter three at, how the CEEn governments and societies had coped with this 
new issue and what implications it had on their security. 
Since liberalism is a dynamic theory advocating change, modernisation and mutually 
beneficial cooperation among states, it seems to be more appropriate to describe the 
current international politics of CEE.49 By projecting liberal theory onto the current 
48 See Peterson, John (1996) Europe and America. The Prospects for Partnership. London and New 
York: Routledge, p. 156. 
49 Grudzinski and van Ham have argued similarly: " ... the Liberal-institutionalist approach is now more 
effective in grasping the key trends in European security. Although the Realist school has certainly 
been right in its scepticism about the fluffy new political post-Cold War security vocabulary( ... ), it has 
24 
CEEn debate, we can see some plausible cases. For instance, liberalism's wide 
approach to security is extremely relevant, especially its identification of a close 
connection between economic welfare and stability. In addition, the focus on actors 
below the state level can help explain certain processes in a region where, because of 
historical developments, the term state does not necessarily correspond with the term 
nation. In fact, as mentioned above, most of the CEEn states are ethnically mixed. In 
spite of repeated criticism from the realist camp, the liberal theory about the strong 
impact of democracy on security seems to have paid off in most of the countries in 
CEE. Similarly, the willingness of most of the CEEn states to join major international 
organisations even at the cost of pooling their sovereignty gives strong evidence for 
the relevance of liberal institutionalism in current international affairs. 
2.2.3 Constructivism: Critical Approach to Security Predicaments 
Within the critical, post-positivist voices ofiR theory, constructivism appears to offer 
a wealth of material for explaining certain aspects of contemporary international 
politics in CEE; thus we shall look at it here in more depth. The major difference 
between established schools of thought and constructivism is that the latter perceives 
world politics as socially structured, rather than materially constituted.50 In other 
words, constructivist theorists reject the existence of a definite, objective world, and 
propagate an intersubjective, dynamic and meaningful world of the people and for the 
proved unable to reinterpret the concept ofboundaries, the changed nature of'threats' and the 
tremendous importance of Europe's institutions in the new security environment". See Grudzinski, 
Przemyslaw and Peter van Ham (1999) A Critical Approach to European Security. Identity and 
Institutions. London and New York: Pinter, p. 145. 
50 Alexander Wendt has argued, " ... one of our main objections to neorealism is that it is not structural 
enough: that adopting the individualistic metaphors of micro-economics restricts the effects of 
structures to state behaviour, ignoring how they might also constitute state identities and interests". See 
Wendt, Alexander (1995) "Constructing International Politics", International Security, 20:1, p. 72; 
Similarly, constructivist analysts Richard Price and Christian Reus-Smit (1998:267) have stressed that 
"understanding how interests are constituted is the key to explaining a wide range of international 
phenomena that rationalists have either misunderstood or ignored. ( ... ) To explain preference 
formation, constructivists focus on actors' social identities". See Price, Richard, and Christian Reus-
Smit (1998) "Dangerous Liaisons? Critical International Theory and Constructivism", European 
Journal of International Relations, 4:3, p. 267;For further details on constructivist theory see, for 
instance, Wendt, Alexander (1992) "Anarchy Is What States Make oflt: The Social Construction of 
Power Politics", International Organization, 46:2, pp. 391-425; Wendt, Alexander (1999) Social 
Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Katzenstein, Peter J., ed. 
(1996) The Culture of National Security. Nonns and Identity in World Politics. New York: Columbia 
University Press; Finnemore, Martha (1996) National Interests in International Society. Ithaca and 
London: Cornell University Press; Ruggie (1998). 
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people, who created it for their own purposes and who can adjust it to their needs. 51 
Thus, this dynamic approach to IR allows a more up-to-date and efficient method for 
handling security challenges and tackling predicaments. Another core assumption of 
constructivist theory is that the structures of the socially constructed world and, 
consequently, of international politics "shape actors' identities and interests, rather 
than just their behaviour (a claim that opposes rationalism)".52 Those social structures 
and relationships and their constituents are the main focus of constructivism. Thus, 
the nature of the relationship of international political actors, whether cooperative or 
conflictual, is influenced by their "shared understanding, expectations, or 
know ledge". 53 
To project these constructivist assumptions onto the CEEn region, we shall have to 
address the following questions: Which are the dominant social structures that exist in 
contemporary CEE and how can they help overcome security predicaments? To what 
extent do 'shared knowledge', 'understanding' and 'common identity' play a role in 
shaping the region's international affairs? These questions seem to have particular 
relevance in understanding cooperation both within the region (regional formations) 
and outside it, i.e. the quest of CEEn governments for membership of main 
international organisations, such as NATO and the EU. The constructivist explanation 
of this issue is based on common values and interests, for which these institutions 
stand. One constructivist analyst ofNATO enlargement has argued, for example, that 
a constructivist approach - the international socialization of states to the 
basic norms of an international community of values - offers a parsimonious 
explanation of the enlargement process. 54 
It has to be mentioned, however, that there has been an extensive debate especially 
outside the Anglo-Saxon area, with regard to the negative effects of NATO 
enlargement and the values that the organisation represents. Czempiel, for one, has 
argued that the enlargement of NATO would create more problems than solutions 
51 See Finnemore (1996), p. 3f; Finnemore has argued that "rather than taking actors as given, 
constructivist approaches problematise them, treating them as the object of analysis. ( ... ) States are 
continually evolving". 
52 Wendt (1995), p. 72. 
53 Ibid, p. 73. 
54 See Schimmelfennig, Frank (1999) "NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist Explanation", Security 
Studies, 8:2/3, p. 200. 
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and, most importantly, it would not solve the core issue, namely maintaining security 
in Europe. 55 The main reason for this pessimistic view is the value system, which 
Czempiel associates with NATO. For him, and for many other observers, NATO is a 
defence community with strong self-interests and not an inclusive security community 
in the Deutschian sense. Thus there has always been and there will always be 
disagreement in the field of values and interests between states, and the constructivist 
approach will hardly be able to transcend this dichotomy in the practice of 
international politics. 
Constructivists have a fundamentally different approach to anarchy in the 
international arena than the realist school. "Anarchy is what states make of it" is an 
often-quoted statement from Alexander Wendt, which again reinforces the basic 
assumption of the social construction of world politics. 56 Anarchy is not a necessary 
feature of international relations between states, on the contrary, states' relations to 
each other depend on their interaction, thus they can influence and construct 
international anarchy. As regards actions of or interactions between CEEn states, they 
can have a great deal of impact on the security predicament, in which the countries 
find themselves. If, to give a pertinent example, some CEEn states join NATO, this 
can be perceived by others in the region as a hostile policy targeted against them. It 
can lead to the creation of a security dilemma, something that characterised the highly 
militarised years of the Cold War. This can only be overcome via mutual trust and 
actions of reassurances, which finally moves towards a security community of shared 
values and norms. 57 
Finnemore has argued that internationally approved common values and norms often 
play a more important role in defining state interests than explicit or implicit external 
threats. 58 Therefore, in order to prevail over existing security predicaments in CBE 
and to avoid future ones, we have to address the question, of how interaction can 
55 See Czempiel, Ernst-Otto (1997) "Die Neuordnung Europas: Was leisten die NATO und OSZE fiir 
die Kooperation rnit Osteuropa und RuBland?", A us Politik und Zeitgeschichte, B 1-2/97, p. 35. (The 
New Order of Europe: What is the Contribution ofNATO and the OSCE to Cooperation with Eastern 
European and Russia?) 
56 See Wendt (1992) 
57 See Adler, Emanuel and Michael N. Barnett (1996) "Governing Anarchy: A Research Agenda for the 
Study of Security Communities", Ethics & International Affairs, Vol. 10, p. 71. 
58 See Finnemore (1996), p. 3. 
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change conflictual social structures that shape actors' identities and, ultimately, their 
policies. Similarly, we will examine, how internationally held norms and values can 
change state behaviour in the context of security predicaments in contemporary CEE. 
Here, the role of history, as one of the most important generators of identity has to be 
pointed out, since it seems to have a major impact on contemporary CEEn 
international affairs. However, constructivist theory appears to be rather prescriptive 
in this matter, and offers little real solutions to the problem at stake. 
2.2.4 The 'Widening' Conception 
'Wideners', in common with the liberals, have adopted a broad definition of security 
by opening up the agenda toward new issues and, at the same time, re-formulating the 
role of the state in the international arena. These voices appeared in the early 1980s 
and became more explicit when the bipolar confrontation evaporated and new 
challenges, such as transnational crime and identity-related issues moved into the 
political spotlight. The details ofthe analysis and the schools from which the different 
researchers derived were indeed very different. Their basic assumption was, however, 
the same: security cannot be defined by realist military terms exclusively. 
'Wideners' can hardly be classified by one single philosophical trend, indeed, their 
proponents describe themselves in the most 'adventurous' ways. The two founding 
fathers ofthe so-called 'Copenhagen School', Barry Buzan and Ole Waever describe 
themselves as 'liberal realist'59 and 'post-modem realist'60 respectively. The co-author 
of Buzan's and Waever's book from 1998, Jaap de Wilde is a 'self-defined liberal-
pluralist'.61 Despite the diversity of their backgrounds, they are unified by one 
common analytical starting point, namely a desire to widen the definition of security. 
These three scholars have come up with a new security framework, which appears to 
be of particular relevance in the CEEn context and will, therefore, be considered here 
in more depth. The reasons for the particular attention given to this specific model are 
59 Tickner, J. Ann (1995) "Re-visioning Security", in Booth, Ken, and Steve Smith (eds.), International 
Relations Theory Today. Cambridge: Polity, p. 185. 
60 Buzan et al. (1998), p. 2. 
61 lbid. 
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threefold: first, this is a model that follows a comprehensive method for security 
analysis. Second, it supplies a clear, well-developed and comprehensive framework 
for security analysis, which seems to be easily applicable for analysing security 
predicaments and those factors that generate them. Third, and more fundamentally, its 
aim is clearly not another theoretical discourse on security but to support empirical 
research into security analysis. 
The most obvious new element in the Copenhagen School's approach is its revised 
definition of security: "in this approach, security is understood not as the content of a 
particular sector (military), but as a particular type of politics defined by reference to 
existential threats and calls for emergency actions in any sector". 62 Contrary to the 
claims of some critics, Buzan, as a former neorealist, did indeed worry about the 
central role of the sovereign state in the international system and, in fact, he 
maintained its dominant position. 63 On the other hand, he included new levels of 
analysis, which lie above, alongside or below the state level; thus the state is clearly 
less important in the new agenda. Some critics of the Copenhagen School have argued 
that the comprehensive security framework retains the main neorealist point, asserting 
the importance of a state-centric perspective, and thus, it fails to offer a new analytical 
basis.64 Buzan has tried to transcend this obvious controversy by reiterating the realist 
distinction between domestic order and international anarchy, however, at the same 
time, he argues that, as the system evolves and stronger states arise, the system moves 
towards a 'mature anarchy'.65 This type of stable international anarchy can then 
enhance international security as well. Stressing the ever-growing global character of 
the international system, Buzan and his colleagues speak about international security, 
instead of simply narrowing the focus to national level. 
Another new aspect in this approach is the multidimensional definition of security and 
threat: in order to do justice to the new security environment, the militarily described 
concept of threat has been replaced by a more general one and also security has been 
62 Ibid. 
63 Buzan (1991), p. 27 and 54. 
64 Bill McSweeney has argued that "not only is the state the primary object of security; the conception 
of security which drives the argument allows no place for any other (sub-state) object. They are 
relegated to the status of'conditions' for state security". See McSweeney, Bill (1999) Security, Identity 
and Interests. A Sociology of International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 55. 
65 See Buzan (1991), p. 324; Tickner (1995), p. 185. 
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defined by different sectors. This point is clearly the most contentious part of the new 
theory. Traditionalists did not wait long with their critique and accused 'wideners' 
generally and the Copenhagen School specifically of destroying the field's 'intellectual 
coherence'.66 By opening up the term security to other than military issues, 'wideners' 
run the risk of extending the term easily to any other sector. This can lead to an 
unnecessary confusion of political and military issues, or, in other words, the 
boundary between 'politicised' and 'securitised' relations will be mixed up. Liberal 
demands, for instance, in the economic sector for as little political intervention as 
possible, mean that intervention to promote economic security is destructive to the 
workings of a free market economy. But, ifwe stick to the initial definition ofBuzan 
and Waever, according to which security is a "kind of stabilisation of conflictual or 
threatening relations, often through emergency mobilization of the state", 67 it is 
obvious that they restricted the scope of observation to the 'conflictual or threatening 
situations'. The final aim is in fact, as Waever argues, to reach the process of 
'desecuritization': "the shifting of issues out of emergency mode and into the normal 
bargaining processes of the political sphere". 68 In any case, the decisive factor by the 
designation of an existential threat is, whether it requires emergency action or any 
other special countermeasures and, importantly, if the political elite and a significant 
part of the public perceive it as a threat. In this context, two different relations must be 
paid special attention. First, given the broad definition of security, what is the nature 
of security predicaments, in other words, what kind of threat or vulnerability is 
jeopardising national security? Second, from a premise that there are other levels 
beside the state, whose existence is threatened (who are the referent objects for 
security)? 
The Copenhagen School distinguishes between five different sectors of threat and 
vulnerability, which can affect the security of states, societies and individuals: the 
military, the political, the economic, the societal and the environmental. 69 This 
systematic sectoral analysis of various threats and vulnerabilities helps to define 
factors that generate predicaments, thus, it will be applied in our later case study. 
66 See, for example, Wait, Stephen M. (1991) "The Renaissance of Security Studies", International 
Studies Quarterly, 35:2, p. 212ff. 
67 Buzan (1997), p. 11. 
68 Buzan et al. (1998), p. 4. 
69 See, for example, Buzan (1991), p. 19f. 
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The military sector in the interpretation of the Copenhagen School corresponds to the 
focus of the traditionalist view of national security and concerns securing the 
sovereignty and the territorial integrity of states. Therefore, the most significant 
referent object is the state.70 Here the focus of analysis is, in the first instance, on the 
possibility of external attack, which might jeopardise the state's sovereignty and its 
citizens' survival. Because an external military attack can damage all components of 
both strong and weak states swiftly and substantially, military security is regarded as 
the principal threat to national security. 71 But unlike traditionalists, the Copenhagen 
School includes the possibility of armed attack on smaller units within states (e.g. 
armed forces or police forces in case of a coup, an armed uprising, a regional militant 
organisation within a state or an even lower level, armed criminal activity, terrorism, 
etc.), which is of particular relevance in transition countries, such as a number of 
CEEn states, which are characterised by high internal instability. They also 
acknowledge that military action does not necessarily have to do with the 
maintenance of national security (in the traditional understanding), it is increasingly 
used for peace-making and peace-keeping purposes, that is in situations, where the 
intervening country's security is not existentially threatened. The perception of 
external military threat can lead to the appearance of a severe security predicament, 
that is states get involved in disputes where the use of the armed forces are not 
excluded. Those disputes can create a great deal of uncertainty, however, they do not 
necessarily end in actual military confrontation or war. In fact, security predicaments 
caused by military insecurities can differ very much in their scale. They can occur in 
forms oftensions, crises, conflicts and indeed in wars.72 
Security predicaments can also occur in the political sector, when the sovereignty of 
political institutions is threatened. This can arise at different levels, generated by 
various factors originating either inside or outside a state. At the state level, the 
70As Buzan, Waever and de Wilde have argued: "in the military sector, the state is still the most 
important - but not the only - referent object. This situation exists not only because states generally 
command far greater military resources than other actors but also because governing elites have 
evolved legally and politically as the prime claimants of the legitimate right to use force both inside 
and outside their domain". See Buzan et al. (1998), p. 49. 
71 Buzan (1991), p. 117. 
72 See Fiilop, Imre (1997) "A Biztonsagot Veszelyezteto Tenyezok", in Csaszar, Tibor, Ferenc Fischer, 
Ferenc Gazdag, Anna Ko6s, Ott6 Szabolcs (eds.) (1997) Biztonsagpolitika. Budapest: Strategia es 
Vedelmi Kutat6intezet, p. 73. (Factors Threatening Security) 
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organisational stability of the state, the acceptance of the constitutional order by a 
broad cross-section of society guarantees national security. Political security can be 
perturbed also by outside pressure; when, for instance, states deny a country 
diplomatic recognition, they question its legitimacy and sovereignty. Consistent with 
the idea of political security, Catherine Lalumiere and Daniel Tarschys, former 
Secretary Generals of the Council of Europe, have introduced the concept of 
'democratic security'.73 They argue that stability stems from the acceptance of basic 
democratic values such as the nature of political systems; a commitment to pluralism, 
human rights and the rule of law and tolerance and respect for others. Above the state 
level, the authority and political security of supranational organisations can be 
existentially threatened as well. Looking at the different kinds of international 
organisations and their institutional mechanisms, the political unwillingness of some 
of their members to cooperate can pose an existential threat to the goals and even to 
the authority of the organisations. There are innumerable examples for this, but in the 
post-Cold War security environment, two rather impotent international organisations, 
the former Western European Union (WEU) and the Organisation for Security and 
Co-operation (OSCE) illustrate this problem best. Also below the state level there can 
be referent objects, whose security can be at stake, for example the existence of self-
governing bodies, non-governmental interest groups and so on. Trans-national crime 
also falls primarily into the political sector, since organised crime can undermine 
government authority and institutional stability, but it can also generate predicaments 
in the economic and societal sectors. Given that the entire CEEn region faces not only 
a political and societal but, at the same time, an economic transition as well, organised 
crime (e.g. corruption, Mafia activity etc.) is high on the policy agenda. 
In the economic sector the picture is certainly more complex, since there is a wide 
range of vulnerabilities that can contribute to the rise of a security predicament, each 
of which can impact on a different set of referent objects. Military confrontation is 
usually just the 'tool' of other insecurity factors; the cause for rearmament and 
declaring war is, historically speaking often the precarious economic situation of a 
state. Thus, there is a close relationship between economic stability and national 
security. Additionally, economic welfare secures high and up-to-date military 
73 See Tarschys, Daniel (1994) "Democratic Security", NATO Review, 43:1, p. 12. 
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capabilities, consequently, there is a close relationship between state power and 
economic power. 74 At the state level, the fate of national economies can depend 
crucially on the international system (e.g. exclusion from markets, trade embargo, 
access to resources etc.). The fundamental issue is, however, whether a state is able to 
provide for the basic needs of its citizens and sustain an acceptable level of welfare, 
which is essential for the survival of the population. This appears to be particularly 
relevant to transitional countries, such as the countries of CEE, where negative 
consequences of economic transition challenge democratic consolidation. Within the 
state, economic policy-makers must secure a stable working environment for firms, so 
that they are not existentially threatened by changes to the law. As the result of 
financial and economic turmoil in the past have borne witness, economic security and 
national bankruptcy are increasingly linked to the economic welfare of other states 
and must therefore be seen in a wider international context. Also in the economic 
sector, the liberal formula that 'his security is my security' has gained in importance. 
The societal sector includes, in the first instance, culture and identity related issues, 
such as "traditional patterns of language, culture and religious and national identity 
and custom", which can be threatened mostly below the state leve1.75 While military 
security is primarily concerned with the sovereignty of states, the subject matter of 
societal security is made up by the identity ofnations.76 As already mentioned in the 
case of liberalism, this is a highly relevant sector in those areas of the world, such as 
CEE, where the term 'state' does not correspond with the term 'nation'. It is seldom the 
case that a whole state's national identity is threatened by another state, except the 
argument of many who believe that the uniforming character of Western culture has a 
significant negative effect on other cultures. In the most common case, however, a 
sub-unit within the state is the referent object. The majority can threaten the existence 
of national minorities or other religious and sexual subcultures (these can be called in 
general as collective identities). As Buzan claims, the "ability to maintain and 
reproduce a language, a set of behavioural customs, or a conception of ethnic purity 
74 Buzan (1991), p. 126. 
75 See Buzan (1991), p. 19. 
76 Waever's and Buzan's concept of societal security and their approach to identity has often been the 
target of, sometimes unjustified, criticism. McSweeney has argued, for instance that "their concept of 
society loses all touch with fluidity and process, resulting in a near-positivist conception of identity". 
See McSweeney (1999), p. 70. 
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can all be cast in terms of survival".77 McSweeney has elaborated on the issue of 
distinct identities and has taken a somewhat critical position as regards identity as a 
cause of insecurity. He has come to the conclusion that the 
security problem is not there just because people have separate identities; it 
may well be the case that they have separate identities because of the security 
problem. 78 
We will look at the issues of separate identities in the contexts of security 
predicaments and perceptions in CEE, which seem to have gained in importance 
during, and, in the wake of the Yugoslavian crises. Yet, identity related tension has 
caused severe security concerns not only in ex-Yugoslavia, but in other parts of the 
region as wel1.79 With the advancement of European integration in political and 
economic areas, the need for the construction of a common European identity has 
been raised as well. Therefore, identity has increasingly become a relevant issue 
above the state level, especially in the context of globalisation and integration, which 
are seen as diluting national identities. Also, similar concerns have recently been 
discussed on different regional levels, for instance the existence of a common Central 
European identity. On the societallevel, security predicaments can also occur as a 
result of human migration, leading for instance to shift in ethnic compositions of 
states.80 
In the environmental sector a wide range of possible referent objects can be 
observed. There is substantial effort made at the global international system level to 
facilitate discussion of certain alarming environmental issues, a real presentation of 
those issues as an existential threat, requiring emergency measures (Buzan, Waever 
and de Wilde call this process 'securitization')81 has however failed so far. The 
Commission on Global Governance produced a document in 1995 for promoting 
'global security', in which it argued for the application of certain immediate global 
77 Buzan(1997),p.17. 
78 McSweeney (1999), p. 73. 
79 Jeszenszky, Geza (1997) "More Bosnias? National and Ethnical Tensions in the Post-communist 
World", East European Quarterly, 31:3, p. 285. 
8
° For more on this issue see Waever, Ole, Barry Buzan, Morten Kelstrup, and Pierre Lemaitre (1993) 
Identity, Migration and the New Security Order in Europe. London: Pinter. 
81 See Buzan et al. (1998), p. 23ff. 
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'precautionary principles' as regards ecological security. 82 The political power of the 
international environmental community is, however, limited. Thus, there is a clear 
differentiation between a scientific agenda of the environmental epistemic community 
and a political one, of how these issues will be translated into national policies. 
Hence, the crucial question is, whether the globally recognised goals will be embraced 
locally. Ecological threats can damage the territorial foundation of states and 
jeopardise societies' basis for living. Thus, the struggle of human beings against the 
power of nature can be considered as a security issue. Severe security predicaments 
can arise as a result of natural disasters and in the case study sections we will see that 
this has been the case in CEE on several occasions in recent years. Weak states with 
feeble economies face an even more serious challenge, since their resources are often 
very limited for remedying the ecological damage caused. 
The contemporary security agenda in CEE is far more complex than it was during the 
Cold War. A wide range of threats and vulnerabilities, for which classification the 
Copenhagen School offers a useful model, can cause security predicaments. As Buzan 
has concluded 
as the military security agenda has become more static, those for economics 
and the ecology have become more dynamic and more central to day -to-day 
concerns. 83 
2.2.5 Can Theories be Reconciled? 
There is anything but conceptual clarity and harmony in contemporary IR and 
Security Studies. A wide range of distinct, often fundamentally discordant 
conceptions characterise these fields, of which the most relevant trends were 
highlighted above. The aim here has been to look at the strengths and weaknesses of 
different conceptions in the contemporary CEEn security environment, and to 
formulate a set of research questions, which can then be used to rationalise the 
contextual treatment in the following chapters. In other words, our overall objective 
has been to utilise distinct theoretical approaches in order to locate factors that 
82 Our Global Neighbourhood. The Report of the Commission on Global Governance. (1995), New 
York: Oxford University Press, p. 83. 
83 Buzan (1991), p. 133. 
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contribute to the appearance of security predicaments in a specific geographical area. 
After having dealt with the different theoretical approaches, the following concluding 
issues appear to be relevant in the specific CEEn context: 
Firstly, and most obviously, clear preference has been gtven to the 'widening' 
approach, and specifically to the security concept of the Copenhagen School. 
Nevertheless, this is not meant to imply that the other approaches are considered 
redundant, nor that the wide concept captures all the issues at stake. Yet, the inclusive 
approach of Buzan and Waever is unique in its ability to capture the complex nature 
of current CEEn security predicaments, by bringing different, highly relevant trends 
together and integrating them into one single concept. Thus, one could argue that the 
realist/statist conception of the traditionalist school is covered by the military and 
political sectors of the wide concept and the critical and constructivist approaches are 
represented by its societal sector. The liberal school of thought has the most common 
grounds with the wide concept, since both adopt a comprehensive concept of security 
based upon many factors that can cause predicaments and different actors on different 
levels, who can be involved in predicaments as referent objects. This 'synthesis' of the 
different approaches in the wide concept does not, however, do full justice to the main 
features which characterise the CEEn region. Can, for instance, economic or 
environmental security be treated on an equal footing with the military sector in 
contemporary CBE? Which of the previously highlighted factors (military, political, 
economic, societal and environmental) are more likely to trigger security 
predicaments in a transitional region such as CBE? 
Secondly, as experience has shown in post-Cold War CBE, the total eradication of 
military confrontation has not taken place. The term 'geopolitics' still seems to be of 
some relevance, something, which suggests the utility of realist/statist thinking. 84 
Thus, we will examine to what extent geopolitical considerations have been trigger 
factors for security predicaments in post-Cold War CBE? 
84 The realist approach is closely linked with the term 'identity' as well, since newly founded or 're-
founded' nation-states often pursue realist steps for enforcing recognition. It has to mentioned, 
however, that 'identities' and 'interests' are the main concerns of constructivism, rather than that of 
realism. 
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Thirdly, and closely related to the prevtous argument, the strength of liberal, 
constructivist and widening theories lies in both their global and individual 
approaches towards security. Thus, these theories seem to supply a useful basis for 
answering the following questions: Can we target the focus of observation with regard 
to security predicaments exclusively at the level of nation-states in a region, where 
small states highly depend on each other (trade, economy, environment, etc.)? Also, is 
the use of the term nation-states legitimate in a region with a highly mixed ethnic 
composition? Certainly, the utility of the critical constructivist approach can and must 
be acknowledged in this context. 
Fourthly, the question remains, whether the wide approach captures the liberal view 
of international cooperation adequately? This, again, seems to be an extremely 
relevant issue in CEE, since all the states of the region have sought to integrate into 
international institutions, economically and politically as well militarily. The question 
is to what extent does a partial enlargement of relevant organisations, such as the EU 
or NATO, enhance security in the region as a whole? Does it rather contribute to the 
creation of rivalry and tension between post-communist states and thus generate new 
predicaments? Also, the liberal assumption that regime type affects the prospect of 
war and cooperation provides a handle for investigating the cases in the following 
chapters. In addition, we will analyse, what the constructivist adaptation of the 
'security community' can say about CEEn security predicaments, in other words, is 
that concept rather prescriptive than normative? Following on from this, we will 
examine which are the existing structures (security communities) that could offer a 
useful solution for overcoming current CEEn security predicaments? 
Given the ambiguous character of the term security in today's international politics in 
general, and the diversity and complexity of threats and vulnerabilities m 
contemporary CEE in particular, no adequate security analysis can be done by 
applying a single approach to the exclusion of the others. Even if mainstream IR 
theory has so far failed to develop a new paradigm to describe realities of a changing 
world order more adequately, security analysis can nonetheless prove useful by a 
'melding' of existing theories. The Copenhagen School offers the best route in this 
respect and it will be applied in chapters three and six. 
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2.3 Perceptions 
As the preceding section on predicaments has shown, an influential part of the 
academic discipline of IR is based on traditional realist/statist theories, which, to a 
great extent, ignore the social and cognitive elements of security and foreign policy-
making. Those advocating such theories construct their premises purely in rational 
terms and disregard the fact that images of other (either allied or hostile) actors of the 
international arena are actually created by human beings. Therefore, they apply an 
objective method ignoring the possibility of misperception, misinterpretation, 
distortion and subsequent error in the policy-making process. This 'vacuum' is a major 
analytical weakness. As Neta C. Crawford has argued, about the nature of threat 
perception in a recent research project on the role of emotions and emotional 
relationships in world politics, 
individuals are biased toward threat perception, whether or not a threat 
exists, though threats are also cognitively processed and their meaning is 
socially constructed. (. . .) Institutionalised tension as for example during cold 
wars and arms races, may heighten the tendency to perceive threats even 
though in the natural world some "threats" seem obvious much of what is 
considered "threatening" in the social world is cognitively processed and 
socially constructed. 85 
Moreover, many academic theories of IR give little information about the complexity 
and uncertainty of the manner in which decisions are made under real-word 
conditions. For the sake of complexity we should therefore highlight some important 
'practitioners' theories' in this section, which deal with important cognitive elements 
of perception and decision-making in the specific context of foreign and security 
policy analysis. 
One of the early attempts to incorporate a cognitive element in the analysis of foreign 
policy-making was undertaken by Sprout and Sprout. 86 They distinguished between 
the psychological and organisational environments, in which decision-makers operate 
and stressed the importance of the actors' beliefs and perceptions of conditions and 
85 Crawford, Neta C. (2000) "The Passion of World Politics: Propositions on Emotion and Emotional 
Relationships", International Security, 24:4, p. 136. 
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events. In a similar way, Robert Jervis, one of the most important scholars of the first-
generation political psychological scholarship has pointed out in his book Perception 
and Misperception in International Politics, "( ... ) it is often impossible to explain 
crucial decisions and policies without reference to the decision-makers' beliefs about 
the world and their images of others". 87 Similarly, in a more recent study, Charles S. 
Taber has come to the conclusion that "the initial problem representation strongly 
constrains subsequent behaviour". 88 In other words, errors occurring at the stage of 
cognitive processing, i.e. misperception and misinterpretation of information can 
carry over to the subsequent stages of the decision-making process. 
This section looks at the initial stages of the foreign policy-making process, namely 
how information is perceived and interpreted by political actors. It also highlights 
those factors that influence the cognitive processes of perception and interpretation. 
This short theoretical overview of the cognitive elements of foreign policy decision-
making will subsequently help in our analysis of foreign policy processes in the CEEn 
region and Hungary. Since the perception of the current international situation and the 
influence of prior knowledge can have an immense impact on the final policy-output, 
including the cognitive element in our observation appears to be highly relevant in our 
specific geographical context. The most obvious reason for the need to include these 
components in our analysis is the simple fact that most of the CEEn decision-makers 
were socialised and educated in a different political system than the one they currently 
inhabit and, therefore, acquired a different belief and value system, which cannot be 
expected to change overnight with the introduction of democracy. Experience, 
memory and prior knowledge seem to play a key role in the process of perception and 
interpretation of new information, therefore they can lead to bias in a changed 
international environment. 
86 See Vogler, John (1989) "Perspectives on the Foreign Policy System: Psychological Approaches", in 
Clarke, Michael and Brian White (eds.), Understanding Foreign Policy. The Foreign Policy Systems 
Afproach. Aldershot: Edward Elgar, p. 136. 
8 Jervis, Robert (1976) Perception and Misperception in International Politics. New Jersey: Princeton, 
fs· ~!ber, Charles S. (1998) "The Interpretation of Foreign Policy Events: A Cognitive Process Theory", 
in Sylvan, Donald A. and James F. Voss (eds.), Problem Representation in Foreign Policy Decision 
Making. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 29. 
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The cognitive perception and interpretation process takes place on different levels 
such as the individual, domestic and systemic, which all can have an impact on the 
processing of incoming information. 89 The individual level of analysis considers 
single policy-makers' way of information procession, while the domestic and the 
systemic levels refer to organisational dimensions· of perception and interpretation. 
Although bodies, such as ministries, intelligence services, security councils or 
international security organisations, are made up of individuals with different value 
systems and beliefs, these organisations can develop ingrained patterns of behaviour 
over time, which results in a kind of'organisational memory', which can determine the 
flow of information. This type of information processing is also present in the 
subsequent stages of decision-making and is often referred to in the literature as the 
'organisational process model', based on 'standard operating procedures'. 90 Given the 
complex nature of the system of decision-making, distorted information produced by 
an individual actor can often be filtered by other actors of the organisation involved. 
But this is valid in the converse sense as well: individual perception and interpretation 
can often be heavily constrained by organisational standard procedures and 
institutional pressure. 
As already mentioned above, there are two main cognitive processes in the early stage 
of policy decision-making: perception and interpretation of information. In general, in 
order to understand the external world we use two sources of information:91 either we 
receive new inputs from the environment or we work with prior knowledge and 
previous experience stored in the Long Term Memory (LTM). This process is either 
driven by top-down influences, which is a mainly conceptual process with emphasis 
on the role of stored knowledge retrieved from the LTM. Or it is a bottom-up process, 
with new, incoming data from the outside world dominating the processing. 
Therefore, the process of perception is a permanent interaction of external stimuli and 
internal knowledge, thus it is an inferential process with the possibility of error caused 
by heavy reliance on past knowledge. Consequently, inference can result in biased 
perception, especially in those cases when our prior experience is not sufficient 
89 See Jervis (1976); Taber (1998) 
90See Goldstein, Joshua S. (1994) International Relations. New York: Harper Collins, p. 99; Further 
stages of foreign policy decision-making will be treated in more detail subsequently under 'Policy-
Responses'. 
91 See Taber (1998), p. 32. 
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enough to answer new challenges in new situations, or even if our past knowledge is 
simply faulty. Misperception can also occur due to imprecise or deficient inputs, 
which can lead to inappropriate policy-outputs. This is highly relevant especially in 
those cases, when a decision has to be made promptly under time pressure and no 
multiple explanations can be constructed in advance, from which one with the 
strongest disposition will be selected. 
The actual conscious processmg occurs m the Working Memory (WM), which 
responds to external stimuli by constructing an understanding of the external world. 
The WM handles the process of interpretation in a linear way, which means that it 
relies on information stored in the L TM. This information is retrieved by the WM, 
which happens in a serial way (the data following one another sequentially). Although 
the overall process of perception and interpretation is a cyclical one, where permanent 
feedback and readjustment takes place, single transfers between the two memories 
happen linearly and slowly due to the limited capacities of our WM. 
In the context of foreign and security policy-making, prior knowledge stored in the 
LTM is linked, to a great extent, to a specific actor's beliefs and images of other 
policy-makers in particular and world issues in general.92 As these beliefs are major 
sources of policy-behaviour, they help explain and predict human action. Therefore, it 
appears to be important to analyse, how beliefs are constructed, structured and what 
their impact is on behaviour. By applying a cognitive approach, first one should focus 
on the content of individual policy-makers' beliefs. This is, to a great extent, a 
particularised matter, since different individuals have different belief systems at their 
disposals, based on their prior education, socialisation and so on. Thus, it is hardly 
possible to draw up one single pattern of constructing beliefs on the level of the 
individual. As mentioned earlier, institutions can develop certain models of response 
to predicaments, which can be quite consistent. In contrast to this, there is little 
guarantee that individuals will stick to their personal belief system in every single 
case of processing new information. Most of the cognitive theories claim that central 
beliefs are consequential, "although they differ about the level of coherence and 
92 See Rosati, Jerel A. (1995) "A Cognitive Approach to the Study of Foreign Policy", in Neack, Laura, 
Jeannne A.K. Hey and Patrick J. Haney (eds.), Foreign Policy Analysis. Continuity and Change its 
Second Generation. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice Hall, p. 60ff. 
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interconnectedness between beliefs".93 Social cognition theory and scheme theory 
tends to favour a far less coherent belief system, while cognitive consistency theory 
argues in favour of a more lucid structure of beliefs. 
Moreover, belief-analysis can adopt a narrow as well as a wide perspective. It can 
focus on an individual policy-maker's beliefs about general issues in world politics. 
This method is best described by the so-called operational code approach, which 
distinguishes between philosophical and instrumental beliefs.94 Philosophical beliefs 
are those that determine an individual's fundamental understanding of world affairs 
(historical, current, future), nature of politics, one's opponents etc., while instrumental 
beliefs affect the actual process of response (strategy, tactics, etc.), course of action 
and so. In general, philosophical beliefs deal with substantial issues stored in one's 
L TM, whereas instrumental beliefs supply the methodological information for 
information processing and response. Thus, in our context of cognitive analysis, we 
concentrate on philosophical beliefs and look at individual policy-makers' information 
processing and the impact of their philosophical beliefs on that process. The other 
type of belief analysis will be operationalised in the subsequent section (2.4), where 
actual policy-responses will be analysed. 
Another important cognitive approach in foreign and security policy analysis is the 
more traditional and historical images of the enemy method, best reflected in works of 
Ole Holsti.95 Although this concept was created in a generally hostile international 
environment during the Cold War period, it seems to have some legitimacy in the 
post-Cold War international relations of CEE as well. As described in the previous 
section, predicaments are still often driven by realist/statist approaches to security. In 
order to explain the source of this realist thinking in current world affairs in general 
and lower scale conflictual situations in contemporary CEE in particular (disputes 
between neighbouring countries, the negative image of Russia, etc.), the images of the 
enemy concept can offer some helpful explanations. Here again, the legacy of history 
93 1bid, p. 61. 
94 1bid, p. 56. 
95 Holsti, Ole R. (1962) "The Belief System and National Images", Journal of Conflict Resolution, 16, 
pp. 244-252; Holsti, Ole R. (1967) "Cognitive Dynamics and Images of the Enemy: Dulles and 
Russia", in Finlay, David, Ole Holsti and Richard Fagan (eds.), Enemies and Politics. Chicago: Rand 
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can play a determining role in shaping the picture of one's opponents and can no 
doubt lead to misperception and misinterpretation. This is certainly an important point 
in the CEEn context and can help explain the nature of specific policy-outputs. That 
said, we ought also to include policy-makers' self-images in the analysis here, since 
the understanding of others is very much influenced by one's self-understanding. In 
recent years, a new field of study has emerged, which concentrates on this 
fundamental assumption and stresses the importance of cross-cultural/inter-cultural 
communication and behaviour.96 In some academic disciplines it has already gained a 
distinct position, very much so for instance in linguistics, specifically in 
psycholinguistics and foreign language acquisition, where cognitive elements (para-
linguistic, extra-verbal factors) represent an important focus.97 
There is no doubt about the importance of cognitive approaches in foreign and 
security policy analysis. Either they are employed to explain certain patterns of 
information processing or to construct analogies, in order to better predict likely 
policy-response of individual actors. They can also say a lot about policy-makers' 
behaviour. On the individual level, belief analysis offers a good starting point for 
examining perception and interpretation, whereas on the organisational or systemic 
level, rules and institutional memory have to be considered as well. The role of prior 
knowledge, specifically historical analogies can, to a great extent, influence the 
process of perception and interpretation. The question is, therefore, whether they are 
used to shape the conscious interpretation process, or to justify certain patterns of 
behaviour in the later stages of decision-making. The process of constructing an 
understanding of the external world (in our case the perception of factors generating 
security predicaments in CEE) is a process of building a subjective understanding of 
world events. It is an inferential process, prone to error and thus, it can lead to 
misperception and misinterpretation. Some factors, however, make it difficult to apply 
a cognitive approach in policy analysis: the importance of specific situations makes it 
96 In this context, see, for example, Valerie K. Hudson's book on the impact of culture on foreign 
policy: Hudson, Valerie K. (ed.) (1997) Culture and Foreign Policy. Boulder: Lynne Rienner. 
97 For instance in the field ofpsycholinguistics in general and in foreign language acquisition analysis 
in particular, an inter/cross-cultural approach has gained in importance in the 1980s. In Germany, for 
example, a new discipline called 'Interkulturelle Kommunikation' (Intercultural Communication) was 
first institutionalised at the University of Bayreuth by Alois Wierlacher, which was followed by 
different other institutions. Their basic assumption is that, since language is a part of our culture, 
language teaching must have a distinct focus on cultural peculiarities, in order to better understand 
cultural differences and foster cross-cultural understanding. 
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almost impossible to draw any conclusions, which could be used as a recipe for future 
problem solving. Also, different individuals have diverse philosophical and 
instrumental beliefs, so they interpret similar situations differently. The consistency of 
one single individual's belief system is questionable as well, since one is always in 
process of acquiring new information that can influence previously stored knowledge 
in one's L TM. Thus, cognitive theory is not an approach, which can exclusively give 
an answer to all questions at hand, but it certainly can contribute to a more 
differentiated picture of the impact of information and how decisions are arrived at. 
In light of this discussion of perceptions, the following research questions arise 
relevant to our case study: To what extent can cognitive processes generate security 
predicaments in our specific geographical area that have no real basis in material 
reality? In other words, to what extent do biased perceptions and interpretations of 
CEEn policy-makers lead to insecurities and tension between states and within states? 
Additionally, what are the main factors (belief analysis of individuals as well as 
governments) that contribute to policy-actors' distorted perceptions? Specifically, the 
role of history will be highlighted in this context. 
2.4 Policy-Responses 
New security predicaments can occur at any time, providing fresh challenges to 
policy-makers. In the first instance, new information is processed on a cognitive level, 
where perception and interpretation take place. This, however, does not mean that the 
eventual policy-response is, in every case, based exclusively on an individual political 
actor's will. Perception and interpretation can be considered as early stages of a 
complex process of foreign and security decision-making; hence, they represent only 
one part of the entire procedure. Their analysis can help put light on the nature of 
decisions, but say little about the actual mechanism of decision-making and other 
organisational factors influencing it. 
To appreciate this complexity, it is therefore essential to look at successive stages in 
the decision-making process. How is the perceived and interpreted information 
processed and what kinds of response do they trigger? Are there any clearly definable 
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mechanisms, which can help understand policy-response in our specific geographic 
context? If so, are they different from procedures in more established democracies? 
The last question already stipulates the specific nature of the political environment, 
which is characteristic for the CEEn countries. Here we deal with relatively new 
transition countries, where the success of democratic consolidation and the durability 
of new political as well as economic structures cannot yet be reliably judged. As we 
know from previous examples of regime transition from authoritarian towards 
democratic rule, in some cases the attempted transition was followed by a setback. 
There is certainly no guarantee of the permanence of democracy in a transition 
country and this uncertainty is one factor that can have an impact on the foreign and 
security policy-making process. This will be highlighted in chapter five in more 
detail. 
Policy-response to a new situation is given life with the help of a decision. There are 
different models, which attempt to describe the way in which decisions are reached 
and implemented. One of the most prominent theorists of foreign policy decision-
making, Graham Allison distinguished between three distinct models: the rational 
actor model, the organisational process model and the government bargaining (or 
bureaucratic politics) model.98 Although Allison's main priority in 1971 was to search 
for meaningful models in order to describe the decision-making procedures during the 
Cuban missile crises, his work also offers more far reaching explanations of general 
processes in the study of foreign and security policy behaviour. 99 
The most commonly adopted model for analysing decision-making is the rational 
actor model, which derives its theoretical justification from an assumption of 
rationality in the decision process. This type of decision-making goes hand in hand 
with established realist IR theories and gives priority to the achievement of absolute 
goals and gains. In this view, rational decision-making rules out the possibility of 
choice, it only allows one possible (rational) response to challenges. At first sight, this 
98 Allison, Graham T. (1971) Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis. New York: 
HarperCollins. 
99 Smith, Steve (1989) "Perspectives on the Foreign Policy System: Bureaucratic Politics Approaches", 
in Clarke, Michael and Brian White (eds.) Understanding Foreign Policy. The Foreign Policy Systems 
Approach. Aldershot: Edward Elgar, p. 111. 
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observation somewhat contradicts the realist assumption favouring 'rational choice'. 
This is, however, purely a definitional confusion. According to realism, choice is not 
a variety of possible options, from which decision-makers will decide for one. In their 
view, there is only one possible solution for a problem and that is the rational one. 
This leads us back to the very nature of realism, which is characterised by a closed, 
statist and rational understanding of world politics, where the actors' main objective is 
to maximise power and ensure survival. By extrapolating general realist assumptions 
to the process of decision-making, rational actors "calculate the costs and benefits of 
each possible course of action, then choose the one with the highest benefits and 
lowest costs" .100 
Another important realist postulate is the state-centric nature of world politics, where 
individual members of a state's executive body act on behalf of the state, in order to 
pursue the best possible policy-response. In the context of foreign and security policy-
making, this process includes, firstly, the formulation of challenges and the 
identification of predicaments. Secondly, it involves the clarification of goals and 
alternatives, which help best remedy the predicaments, thus, achieve the goals. 
Thirdly, rational actors investigate the probable consequences of different 
alternatives, and consider possible risks. Finally, the most rational, thus, most 
beneficial alternative will be selected. It must be said, however, that the process of 
decision-making is not a linear one. It is rather a cyclical process, containing· a 
permanent possibility of steering and monitoring, according to new incoming 
information from the outside world. New challenges and new information can 
provoke an adjustment of previous decisions, and also, negative feedback of old 
decisions can lead to policy re-formulations. This is likely to happen in a situation, 
when decisions were taken under a high level of uncertainty. This might be caused by 
insufficient information about the outside world or, in a very different case, when 
decision-makers consciously accept a more risky alternative hoping that gambling 
might pay off. Beside elements like insufficient information or hardly measurable 
risks, the lack of consideration of the time factor points to the shortcomings of the 
rational actor model as well. 
100 Goldstein (1994), p. 98. 
46 
Critics have claimed that the above described model illustrates an ideal world and 
fails to consider real world situations, where decisions must often be taken promptly 
under immense time pressure.101 Since foreign and security decision-making often 
involves crisis management and conflictual situations, the rational actor model cannot 
capture the process entirely. As Zelikow has pointed out: 
Experts have concluded that the machinery does not work mechanically. 
Theorists long ago showed that decision-making processes do not match 
stylised or economic models of synoptic, efficient, and utilitarian choice. 102 
In order to gain a wider picture ofthe process of decision-making, ultimately, we need 
to consider other models, which offer a meaningful alternative to the rational actor 
model. According to Allison's classification, the organisational process model 
considers decision not as a result of rational choice, but as the product of 
organisational routines and standard operating procedures. There are undoubtedly a 
number of decisions in foreign and security affairs, which do not go through a highly 
labour intensive process of defining goals and alternative responses, but rely on a 
standard pattern. This is probably more often the case in the process of low-level day-
to-day decision-making and less for decisions taken on a higher level by top leaders. 
The organisational model was also predominant for describing foreign and security 
decision-making processes in the communist countries during the Cold War era, when 
most of the decisions were subordinated to and actually driven by single party 
interests and doctrines. In those countries, national Foreign Ministries implemented 
standardised decisions, which were in line with the policy directions dictated by the 
communist parties. The communist parties (with the exception of Romania, 
Yugoslavia and Albania) made sure that in foreign and security affairs, the hegemonic 
superpower interests of the Soviet Union enjoyed the highest priority and accepted the 
fact that in those policy areas they had to obey their Soviet colleagues entirely. 
It is interesting to look at, to what extent the decision-making mechanisms of post-
Cold War CBE are still influenced by this old fashioned thinking of standard 
operating procedure and foreign influence? We shall look at this question in chapter 
101 Ham, Christopher and Michael Hill (1993) The Policy Process in the Modern Capitalist State. 2nd 
edn, New York: Harvester Wheatsheaf, p. 82f. 
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five and examine, whether the keen willingness of the CEEn countries to integrate 
into Western organisations is, to a certain extent, to keep up the certainty of an 
external reference and a way to replace old Soviet foreign influences by the West. In 
other words, the West, giving the direction does, what the Soviet Union cannot offer 
anymore: defines key foreign and security policy objectives at a supranationallevel 
and, in return, offers 'protection' to loyal partners. The issue of an external reference 
stems mainly from policy actors' perceptions of world affairs, which is not necessarily 
a rational decision with regards their countries' interests. Therefore, we shall look at 
this particular issue, whether desired NATO and EU membership of CEE is partly 
influenced by a biased view of external reference, in our case study on perceptions. 
The government bargaining model (or bureaucratic model) offers an evocative 
alternative to both the rational actor model and the organisational process model. It 
defines the process of decision-making as a bargaining game between various 
governmental and non-governmental actors with differing interests. According to 
Allison, this model considers "no unitary actor but rather many actors as players" 
interacting with each other. 103 Hence, a decision is not the result of a rational 
monolithic process, but the product of compromise, negotiated at various bureaucratic 
levels. In this sense, foreign and security policy decision-making can be influenced by 
a number of other domestic interests. Probably the most prominent motive for 
intervention in foreign affairs is shaped by economic factors, when interests of the 
national economy interfere with political decisions. This can be best illustrated by the 
interference of an ethical dimension of foreign policy-making conflicting with the 
clear economic interests of a country's arms industry. The government bargaining 
model can certainly capture some types of decision-making more competently. It can 
be assumed that day-to-day decision-making without time pressure and little lobbying 
interest is more likely to be taken at lower levels of the bureaucratic hierarchy, where 
only a few actors are involved. 104 By contrast, important and urgent decisions made 
under crisis conditions are more likely to be dealt with at a high level with the 
involvement of various executive and advisory actors. This is certainly the case in 
well-established democracies as well as in weaker transitional countries, so it can be 
102 Zelikow, Philip (1994) "Foreign Policy Engineering. From Theory to Practice and Back Again", 
International Security, 18:4, p. 154. 
103 Allison (1971), p. 144. 
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said that in this specific situation, regime type does not seem to matter. A slightly 
different foreign policy decision-making mechanism can occur, however, in those 
countries, which have a professional diplomatic service, where well-trained 
bureaucrats are employed, and who are in the position to take more important 
decisions at a relatively lower level. Obviously, this is not yet the case in transitional 
CBE. 
During the period in which Allison analysed the foreign and security policy decision-
making process, supranational actors were of far less relevance than today. However, 
the post-Cold War situation is far more complex: it is no longer sufficient to keep the 
level of analysis at the individual and domestic levels, we have to consider 
supranational entities as well. In the context of contemporary foreign policy-making, 
we can clearly distinguish between two different levels or environments, one of which 
stands for the domestic or internal, the other one for international or external inputs.105 
Dave Alien has focused on the complex nature of the foreign policy system and 
concluded that 
although the legal distinction that marks the division between the two 
environments remains clear, it is now generally accepted that even the most 
powerful and relatively autonomous of states are vulnerable to 'penetration' of 
one sort or another from outside. In other words, the neatness and 
absoluteness of the distinction between the environments is lost because 
governments can no longer exclusively control the flow of information and the 
ideas across the boundaries that mark out their areas of authority. 106 
Ultimately, governments and other domestic actors involved in the policy-making 
process have to come to terms with the ever-growing global character of world 
politics. They are increasingly forced to cope simultaneously with issues resulting 
from globalisation and within the constraints of their own domestic environment. 
Integration into supranational organisations requires a considerable transfer of some 
104 See Rosati (1995) 
105 Robert Putnam introduced the term 'two-level game' and distinguished between inputs from the 
domestic and from the international political systems; See Putnam, Robert (1988) "Diplomacy and 
Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games", International Organization, 42:3, pp. 427-60. 
Similarly, Dave Alien (1989) makes a distinction between two environments within the foreign policy 
system: internal and external; See Alien, David (1989) "The Context of Foreign Policy Systems: The 
Contemporary International Environment", in Clarke, Michael and Brian White (eds.) Understanding 
Foreign Policy. The Foreign Policy Systems Approach. Aldershot: Edward Elgar, pp. 60-83. 
1061bid, p. 61. 
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competencies to the governing international body. In some cases this could mean that 
national governments would no longer be explicitly responsible for taking certain 
decision that might have a direct impact on their citizens. 107 In other cases, the level 
of dependence on external actors can be lower and the national veto still in place. In 
the view of the European integration process, the trend is certainly an increased co-
operation in the fields of foreign and security policy and the strengthening of the 
competencies of the EU in these two fields. This kind of co-operative foreign and 
security policy-making marks undoubtedly a new challenge for the CEEn region, 
since the prior co-operation among the CEEn countries under communism was of a 
very different character. Constructive co-operation is clearly one important feature of 
current world politics, which has to be acquired by the countries of CEE, if they want 
to become fully accepted members of the EU and other international organisations. 
Another issue, which is certainly important in the CEEn context is, who is actually 
accountable for policy-outputs? If we have a wide range of actors involved in a rather 
bureaucratic type of decision-making, can the Foreign Minister or the Prime Minister 
be held responsible for the decision made? Many critics have argued that the 
application of the bureaucratic politics approach removes responsibility and reduces 
transparency within the decision-making process, and thus weakens democratic 
accountability.108 As Krasner has put it forcefully: "if the bureaucratic machine 
escapes manipulation and direction even by highest officials, then ... elections are a 
farce" .109 This point needs certainly to be addressed in the CEEn context later on. 
What is the role of politically appointed foreign and security policy advisers attached 
to ministries and offices of prime ministers in the decision-making process? Similarly, 
the impact of regime type (presidential, semi-presidential or parliamentary) on the 
foreign and security policy decision-making process needs to be analysed. Are 
competencies of presidents and governments with regard to foreign and security 
issues clearly defined in the constitutions of CEEn states? 
107 This is already the situation in the European Union, where the so-called 'Schengen countries' have 
for instance a common visa policy. 
108 See Smith (1989), p. 118. 
109 Krasner, Stephen D. (1972) "Are Bureaucracies Important? (or Allison Wonderland)", Foreign 
Policy, 7, p. 160. 
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2.5 Conclusion 
It has become apparent throughout the analysis that none of the main existing theories 
alone can explain the issues at stake. In the part on predicaments it was obvious that 
challenges and vulnerabilities can no longer be fully captured by either neo-realist, 
neo-liberal or constructivist approaches. The application of wider approaches, 
however, runs the risk that terms like security and risk become too vague. Similarly, 
the section on policy-response has tried to point out that decision-making is more than 
rational-realist theories often describe it. Since the foreign and security decision-
making process is operated by human beings, the often-overlooked social and 
cognitive elements will enjoy a prominent position in the analysis of the ensuing case 
study. 
It has been emphasised on several occasions that the aim of this theoretical overview 
has been less to contribute to the ongoing debate on the future of IR as an academic 
discipline. In the sense of the opening quotation by Joseph S. Nye, instead of 
concentrating on major arguments between different schools of thought, we have 
rather attempted to look for features, which are complementary to each other, and to 
synthesise rather than divide existing theories. Our main objective has therefore been 
to develop a heuristic tool, which is appropriate for application in the CEEn regional 
context and the narrower Hungarian context. 
This chapter has attempted to establish an analytical framework appropriate to the 
description of security predicaments, perceptions and policy-responses in the post-
Cold War CEEn region. The next three chapters (three, four and five) are devoted to 
the application of this framework and consider the illustration of predicaments, 
perceptions and policy-responses respectively. This sub-division of the analysis has 
been adopted for the sake of the theoretical and analytical coherence of the thesis, 
though it has to be acknowledged that the three categories cannot always been 
rigorously separated. Finally, in chapter six, the thesis concludes with an in-depth 
study of the application of the framework to the case of Hungary. 
51 
3 Changing Security Predicaments in Central and Eastern Europe 
This chapter extends the typology set up in chapter two to the regional security 
complex and investigates, which risks and vulnerabilities generate security 
predicaments in contemporary CEE. The analysis will follow the five-sector security 
framework developed by the Copenhagen School, that is the division into the military, 
political, economic, societal and environmental sectors. The application of this wider 
analytical framework allows a comprehensive treatment of a set of security 
predicaments faced by the CEEn region. 
In addition, leaning on the theoretical expositions of chapter two, the current chapter 
looks at security predicaments not only beyond the military sector, but also on levels 
other than that of the nation-state. In order to be able to capture the security complex 
of the region more fully, this chapter investigates a number of risks and vulnerabilities 
on different levels, such as 'Europe as a whole', 'regional', 'state', 'sub-state' and 
'individual'. This multi-sectoral and multi-level analysis allows the incorporation of a 
set of new security issues that appear to be highly relevant in contemporary CEE. In 
addition, the analysis draws attention to the interconnectedness of many of the risks, 
sectors and levels, which allows a risk to impact across levels and sectors. 
The chapter demonstrates, through numerous concrete examples from the post-cold 
War CEEn region, the ways in which risks and vulnerabilities may ignite security 
predicaments in the five sectors and on the five levels as well as across sectors and 
levels. Selected examples show that many of the risks and vulnerabilities are indeed 
very real (that is they have already escalated into a concrete predicament), whilst 
others contribute to the emergence of predicaments latently. 
3 .1 Introduction 
The end ofthe Cold War has had a stronger impact on the security debate in CEE than 
in the West. After more than forty years of Soviet dominance, it opened up discussion 
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about national security within political and academic elites ('re-nationalisation' of 
security and defence), and this led, in turn, to calls for a new, wider and more 
inclusive concept of security. This complex picture of security in post-communist 
CEE cannot consequently be analysed simply by applying traditionalist military-
political theories. 110 Thus, this chapter extends the typology outlined in the previous 
chapter to the CEEn regional security complex and gives priority to the five-sector 
security framework (military, political, economic, societal and environmental) of 
the Copenhagen School. This differentiation appears to have a strong practical footing 
in the CEEn context, and is redolent of how CEEn politicians themselves view 
security, as we will see in the next chapter on security perceptions. 
In this chapter, the risks and vulnerabilities facing contemporary CEE will be 
highlighted in these five sectors, as these relate to different levels of the international 
order (see figure 3-1 below). The consideration oflevels, which are above, alongside 
or below the state level is in full accordance with the 'wide' security framework 
developed in the previous chapter. Thus, we distinguish between five levels of 
analysis: Europe as a whole, regional, state, sub-state and individual. 
economic 
Legend 
individual 
sub-state 
state 
regional 
Europe 
Figure 3-1 Schematic diagram of levels and sectors in the analysis of security predicaments 
110 Boguszakova, Magda, I van Gabal, Endre Hann, Piotr Starzynski and Eva Taracova (1996) "Public 
Attitudes in Four Central European Countries", in Smoke, Richard (ed.) Perceptions of Security. Public 
Opinion and Expert Assessments in Europe's New Democracies. Manchester and New York: 
Manchester University Press, p. 34. 
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The treatment of the 'Europe as a whole' level deals with the effects of all-European 
(pan-European) developments on the security ofthe CEEn region. The 'regional level' 
is concerned with the impact of risks and vulnerabilities emanating specifically from 
within the CEEn region. The analysis of the 'state level' focuses on a set of 
insecurities facing the CEEn state, including a range of traditional as well as new 
risks. The 'sub-state level' deals with risks arising from below the state level, for 
instance from certain parts of a country (e.g. regional divides, etc.) or from specific 
parts of a society (minorities, foreigners, etc.). As indicated in the preceding chapter 
(2.2.3), security in the post-Cold War environment is increasingly defined in terms of 
the subjectivity of individuals. Therefore, we include an 'individual level' of analysis, 
where we examine individuals' security concerns and their impact on the CEEn 
region's security. For a comprehensive presentation of risks and vulnerabilities see 
figure 3-2, in which we have identified the specific factors that arise at each of the 
five levels and in each of the five sectors delineated above. These factors will be 
discussed in greater detail in sections 3.2- 3.4, which follow. 
Our differentiation between traditional and new dimensions of security does not mean 
that we ignore the fact that non-military insecurities can also lead to military 
confrontations (e.g. ethnic problems). Its purpose is simply to clarify the priorities 
within the actual CEEn security debate and draw attention to the ever-growing 
challenge of non-military insecurities. 
It has to be acknowledged too, that the rigidity of our framework must be somewhat 
relaxed in order to allow for the interconnectedness between types of issues (sectors) 
and levels. In fact, some of the factors generating security predicaments can crop up 
in more than one sector with diverse destabilising effects. As figure 3-3 shows below, 
as an example, minority problems (figure 3-3, risk A) can lead to instability equally in 
the political, military or societal sectors. Other risks, for instance environmental 
disasters may arise initially in one sector (in this case in the environmental one), but 
their consequences subsequently spill over into others. This kind of serial propagation 
of insecurity across sectoral boundaries is shown in figure 3-3 (risk B). 
Sectors: 
Levels: 
Europe 
as a whole 
Regional 
State 
Sub-state 
Individual 
Military 
Limited cooperation 
(East-West) 
Slow integration 
Hegemonic interests 
Border disputes 
Minority problems 
Strengthening of 
nation states 
Lack of cooperation 
Ethnic tensions 
Weak defence forces 
Lack of strategy 
Invasion/division 
Delayed reform 
Internal instability 
Militant separatism 
Development gap 
Armed criminal 
Activity (Mafia) 
Personal insecurity 
Victim of armed 
criminal activity 
Political 
Limited cooperation 
(East-West) 
Slow integration 
'Fortress Europe' 
weak political 
cooperation 
Instability in 
neighbouring states 
Influx of refugees 
Weak institutions 
Constitutional 
ambiguity 
Strengthening of 
extremist parties 
Minority separatism 
Political extremism 
Disillusionment with 
democratisation 
Organised crime 
Economic 
Economic gap (East-
West), Globalisation 
Slow integration 
Restricted market 
access, Migration 
Weak cooperation 
Negative effects 
of Balkan wars 
Isolation 
Technology gap 
Dependent economies 
Corruption 
Lack of public 
resources 
Bankruptcy 
Growing gap between 
public-private 
sector 
Lack of participation Financial 
Disillusionment insecurity 
Lack of opportunity 
Unemployment 
Societal 
Migration 
Influx of refugees 
Globalisation 
Europeanisation 
Religious conflict 
Minority and ethnic 
conflict 
severe historic 
legacies 
Weak civil societies 
search for identity 
Minority discrimination 
Human rights violations 
Intolerance 
Extremism 
Xenophobic tendencies 
Weak personal 
autonomy, high suicide rate 
Weak articulation 
Environmental 
Energy Crisis 
Environmental disasters 
Problem of nuclear waste 
Ecosystem crisis, Climate change 
Food safety problems 
Transborder disasters 
Pollution of air, rivers 
Environmental disasters 
Pollution of air, water, soil 
Unsafe nuclear power stations 
Tight environmental budgets 
Decaying infrastructure 
Lack of environmental concepts 
Decaying infrastructure 
Lack of environmental 
awareness 
Little environmental friendly 
technology 
Little individual environmental 
awareness 
Food and health problems 
Economic 
sector 
Figure 3-3 Examples for interconnectedness between risks and sectors 
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In addition, some factors can arise on different levels, as for instance organised crime 
can be regarded as a factor generating security predicaments on almost all five levels 
(see figure 3-4, risk C), or political extremism can crop up on both state and sub-state 
levels (figure 3-4, risk D). Furthermore, environmental issues are intrinsically difficult 
to apply to levels in a clear-cut manner, given that the environment is an essentially 
borderless matter. 
Europe as a 
whole 
Regional 
State 
Sub-state 
Individual 
Figure 3-4 Examples for interconnectedness between risks and levels 
As a result of this interconnectedness between different sectors and levels, some 
overlaps and recurrences are unavoidable in our subsequent analysis. In order to keep 
these overlaps and recurrences on a minimum level, factors that can crop up on 
different levels will be considered together (e.g. minority problems, environmental 
issues etc.), followed by the discussion of factors that occur on one level only (e.g. 
division/invasion). 
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3.2 Traditional Dimension of Security: Military Sector 
Challenges resulting from external military aggression have declined significantly in 
post-Cold War CEE. When the Brezhnev doctrine was overturned, the CEEn 
governments' interest was no longer the defence of the unity of the 'communist camp' 
and the maintenance of its ideological and military unity, but rather the rapid build-up 
of national sovereign structures. This included the reorganisation of armies as well as 
the reformulation of national security and defence doctrines. Political sovereignty, as 
the most elementary national interest, became after 1989/90 the most widely accepted 
principle in terms of international relations in the CEEn region. During the communist 
period, the CEEn countries' ally was the Soviet Union, even if this was not a free 
choice and not an equal partnership. Paradoxically, however, the Soviet Union posed 
at the same time the biggest threat to CEE in military terms. The brutal Soviet-led 
military interventions in the 1956 Hungarian and the 1968 Czechoslovakian 
revolutions cost those countries more suffering and human lives than the entire Cold 
War military confrontation. These memories are still alive in CEE and attitudes 
towards Russia are still determined, to a great extent, by this negative historical 
experience. This rather sentimental element has to be considered in any analysis of the 
military component of CEEn security and will be discussed in more detail in the 
following chapter on perceptions. 
In general, it can be argued that the danger of an external military threat has declined 
significantly and has been, to great extent, supplanted by threats stemming from 
conflicts within states. An OSCE document of 1999, the Charter for European 
Security has defined the sources of military threats in a similar manner: "threats to our 
[OSCE area] security can stem from conflict within States as well as from conflicts 
between States" .1 
As to specific risks and vulnerabilities in the military sector, we identify the lack of 
cooperation or limited cooperation. exclusion and slow integration on both 'Europe as 
1 Charter for European Security, Organisation for Security and Co-operation, SUM.DOC/1/99/Corr., 
Istanbul, 19 November 1999, p. 1. 
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a whole' level as well as on the 'regional' level as potential factors generating security 
predicaments in CEE. In the post-Cold War era the emerging security vacuum in CEE 
has not, or only partially been filled by international security organisations. In terms 
of military security, the major issue for CEE appears to be a rather realist one, namely 
the defence of the state via security guarantees. For various reasons, the OSCE could 
not offer and NATO and the WEU appeared reluctant to offer any real security 
guarantees to the CEEn region (except to the three new members of NATO after 
March 1999). With regard to the WEU, as Hyde-Price summed it up, it is "in no 
position to offer credible security guarantees",2 thus it is unable to solve the CEEn 
countries' security predicaments (since November 2000 WEU is defunct). Similarly, 
CEEn politicians consider the OSCE with its concepts of 'cooperative security' and 
'comprehensive membership' a rather weak body without real power and security 
guarantees. Although NATO granted membership to three former Warsaw Pact 
countries and has developed some structures for cooperation with the CEEn countries, 
at present, it has not extended any security guarantees to its other partner countries. 
Instead, in order to appease inpatient applicant partner countries, NATO officials 
speak about security assurances.3 The selective nature of NATO's eastward 
enlargement has inevitably generated a deep existential fear in some countries and the 
feeling of exclusion has increased further. 4 As a Bulgarian commentator has put it, 
the Madrid Summit divided the applying countries among four major groups: 
the "invited" (Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic): the "considered" 
(Romania and Slovenia); the "mentioned" (the Baltic Republics); and the 
"unmentioned" (among them Bulgaria). This classification of the applicants, 
correct or not, has contributed to an increasing sense of uncertainty and 
insecurity, especially in the last group of countries. 5 
It has to be acknowledged, however, that in the wake ofNATO's intervention in the 
Kosovo crisis in 1999, there is some hope for non-NATO member CEEn states that 
2 Hyde-Price (1996), p. 256. 
3 For instance, Klaus Wittmann, a member of the German NATO representation, acknowledges 
NATO's duty to enter consultation with any of its active PfP partners, in case their territorial integrity, 
political autonomy or security is under threat; See Wittmann, Klaus (1999) "Gewandeltes 
Selbstverstandnis und Erweitertes Aufgabenspektrum: Der Weg zum neuen Strategischen Konzept der 
NATO", Europiiische Sicherheit, 8/99, p. 17. (Changing Self-understanding and Broadened Spectrum 
of Tasks: Route to the New Strategic Concept of NATO) 
4 See Czempiel (1997), p. 37. 
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the Alliance would stand up for their national security, should it come under external 
threat. As Latvian President Vaira Vike-Freiberga put it, 
Kosovo is not a member of the NATO alliance, and yet the alliance was able to 
take action when it felt that, according to the principles on which it is founded, 
action and intervention [were] necessary. ( .. .)I would expect it to do no less 
anywhere else in Europe. 6 
This assumption however is a further element that contributes to current CEEn 
security predicaments, especially with regard to Russia, which is rather nervous about 
any involvement and role ofNATO in Russia's former sphere of interest. 
Similarly, on the 'regional' level, the lack of powerful region-wide military 
organisations or cooperation and the lack of political will among the CEEn elites to 
embark upon such projects, contribute to the uncertainty and support the endurance of 
a widely perceived security vacuum. Although, as we will see in the later analysis of 
policy-responses there are some sub-regional initiatives, these are by no means well 
equipped to solve the hard security predicaments of the countries involved. 
In addition to the above described limited cooperation and slow process of 
integration, we define the potential of hegemonic interests as a further cause of 
security predicaments on the 'Europe as a whole' and, to some extent, on the 
'regional' levels. Although the likelihood that a country could rise and threaten the 
continent's security, is today very slim, the possibility cannot be excluded entirely. 
The 20th century produced two major world wars and a long lasting highly 
confrontational Cold War, all of which originated from and were played out mainly in 
Europe. Indeed, as we will see in the next chapter on security perceptions, there is still 
a great deal of anxiety among Europeans concerning the possibility of an emerging 
hostile entity. 
Equally on the 'regional', 'state' and 'sub-state' levels, minority related problems 
appear to represent major risks and vulnerabilities that can possibly escalate into 
5 Krastev, lvan (1997) "Illuminating the "Grey Zone": Bulgaria's Case", in Illuminating the "Gray 
Zone". A Conference on NATO Enlargement, Conference Proceedings; 11-12 December 1997, 
Washington: The Woodrow Wilson International Centre for Scholars, The Hudson Institute, p. 17. 
6 See RFEIRL News line, 9/11/2000. 
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military conflicts, as it had happened in former Yugoslavia. These include border 
disputes. strengthening of nation-states. ethnic tensions. internal instability and 
possible ethnic militant separatism. These issues are not new to CEE, since as a result 
of the post-First and Second World War settlements, borders in CEE were redrawn 
and nations torn apart. Nationalistic sentiments and revanchistic politics were kept 
under control in the communist era, during which 'communist internationalism' tried 
to create a uniform society regardless of nationality and ethnic origin. Although 
minority problems did exist during Communism, they were not allowed to be openly 
articulated. Similarly, the repressive communist system cemented the existing borders 
in CEE and rejected any consideration of adjustment. However, in the post-
communist period, issues such as the rightness of borders and the treatment of 
minorities have become highly explosive in many regions of CEE. 7 The notion of the 
strengthening of the nation-state has proved increasingly incompatible with liberal 
rights for national and ethnic minorities that could, in the eyes of many nationalistic 
CEEn politicians, jeopardise national unity. As a possible consequence of this, one 
observer from the region has asked the following question: 
What would have happened if Yeltsin, imitating Milosevic, had said that 'all 
Russian must be kept united in one state', or, worse, if a victorious 2.juganov 
[the leader of the Russian Communist Party] would adopt such a line? 
Border disputes, minority problems as well as the desire to strengthen nation-states in 
CEE could be counterbalanced via regional cooperation. Yet, as described above, 
there is only a limited number of regional formations, and most of them are rather 
weak. Additionally, these initiatives do not comprise cooperation in defence and 
security matters; these issues are covered through bilateral agreements between 
individual countries of the region, without the inclusion of mutual defence.9 
The concern that ethnic tensions can be a source of security predicaments can also 
materialise at the 'state' level. As various examples have shown, minority conflict is a 
7 See Hyde-Price, Adrian (1998) "Patterns oflntemational Politics", in White, Stephen, Judy Batt and 
Paul G. Lewis (eds.), Developments in Central and East European Politics 2. Basingstoke: Macmillan, 
p. 260. 
8 See Jeszenszky, Geza (1997) "More Bosnias? National and Ethnical Tensions in the Post-Communist 
World", East European Quarterly, 31:3, p. 290. 
9 See Hyde-Price (1996), p. 237. 
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very real threat, which can easily escalate into an armed military crisis or even a civil 
war. As one analyst from the region has argued: 
There was also a fear of the Balkan crzsls multiplying when almost 
simultaneously with that two other federations, Czechoslovakia and the Soviet 
Union, came to disintegrate. (. . .) Unfortunately, there are many more fires 
burning in the formerly communist-ruled countries, and so far all of them had 
been ignited by national or ethnic conflicts. (. . .) Undoubtedly the components 
for new Bosnias exist in even more places: wherever there are ethnically-
varied and mixed populations, unscrupulous politicians and the legacy of a 
communist dictatorship. 10 
On the 'sub-state' level, all countries with a great proportion of national or ethnic 
minorities, such as Romania, Slovakia and all successor states of the Soviet Union 
and Yugoslavia face the possibility of internal instability and the emergence of 
militant sub-regional or sub-state separatism (in a manner analogous to the rise of the 
militant Basque separatist movement ETA), even if these do not always end in 
military conflict. In general it can be argued that the more stable a democracy is, the 
more minority rights are respected by the majority, the less the likelihood of the 
emergence of militant separatism is. As Jeszenszky summed up the main reason for 
the war in the Balkans: "the war was caused by majorities bullying minorities, who 
then took up arms against the intolerant majority" .11 
Additionally, on the 'state' level, security predicaments can be triggered in the military 
sector by the following factors: invasion/division. weak and under-funded defence 
forces. lack of strategy and delayed reforms. Invasion and division are still fears 
causing some insecurity in CBE. It is hardly surprising that countries, which have 
been victims of foreign invasion and division on several occasions throughout their 
history, cannot free themselves from these risks and vulnerabilities easily. This is, 
what Grudzinski and van Ham call the 'TYM syndrome': "In most Central European 
countries, the ghosts of 'Trianon', 'Y alta' and 'Munich' still haunt the political elite" .12 
Whether these fears are objective or rather legacies of history will be analysed in the 
next chapter on security perceptions. 
10 See Jeszenszky (1997), p. 285ff. 
11 Ibid, p. 288. 
12 Grudzinski and van Ham (1999), p. 64. 
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The rather poor material, financial and moral state of the armed forces throughout the 
entire CEEn region can trigger security predicaments as well. These problems have to 
do with the general economic hardship and scarce resources in all former Warsaw 
Pact countries. 13 Posts in CEE armed forces cannot offer competitive salaries and 
modem working conditions. This has a twofold effect on the military profession. 
First, it is hard-pressed to attract young well-trained individuals with sufficient 
competencies in Western languages that would be inevitable for both taking parts in 
NATO operations via PfP as well as preparing for NATO membership, where the 
command language is English. One of the recommendations of a study, prepared for 
the NATO Parliamentary Assembly on the three new members of the Alliance in 
1999 has acknowledged the importance ofthis issue and concluded: 
To attract the right young people for the military service and retain them in 
the military profession, it is of utmost importance to improve the quality of life 
of the soldiers as well as their reputation in society. ( .. .) Young officers must 
be provided with clear and reasonable career prospects. 14 
Second, low salaries and sometimes also their delayed payment demoralise members 
ofthe armed forces. This is, in turn, translated into a disappointment with democratic 
development and thus into discontent within the military leadership, which can pose a 
real threat to the stability of a country, if it leads to the military's interference in 
everyday politics. As the Spanish example of the failed military coup of February 
1981 has shown, the consequences of slow reform of the armed forces, the survival of 
numerous military appointees of the previous regime and serious financial difficulties 
can limit political sovereignty.15 So, for instance, the establishment of the National 
Association of the Romanian Military (ANMR) in early November 2000 has caused 
much turmoil in the country's military political sphere, since this association of 
mainly retired, but also partly still serving officers has proclaimed to deal directly 
with issues which, in their view, have an impact on the nation. Members of the 
13 See Jo6, Rudolf{1996) The Democratic Control of Armed Forces. The Experience of Hungary. 
Paris: Institute of Security Studies of Western European Union, Chaillot paper No. 23, p. 25. 
14 Forcieri, Lorenzo (1999) The New Allies: The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland Entering NATO. 
NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Report of the Defence and Security Committee, Sub-committee on 
the future of the armed forces, Source: http://www.nato-pa.int/publications/comrep/1999/as254dscaf-
e.html [10/10/2000], p. 9. 
15 Boyd, Carolyn P. and James M. Boyden (1985) "The Armed Forces and the Transition to Democracy 
in Spain", in Lancaster, Thomas D. and Gary Prevost (eds.) Politics of Change in Spain. New York and 
London: Praeger Publishers, p. 104f. 
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ANMR have claimed in a memorandum that "military personnel cannot and must not 
indifferently witness the humiliation or ignorance of the national values or the 
continuous decay of living standards". 16 Additionally, Romanian army Chief of Staff, 
General Mircea Chelaru, made public political statements about potential threats to 
the country's security and unity and urged for rapid response. 17 After his sweeping 
political statements Chelaru, under pressure from domestic political parties and from 
the critical international reaction, in particular from NATO, had no option other than 
to resign. After his resignation, the freshly formed ANMR nominated Chelaru as its 
honorary president. This Romanian example illustrates the widespread 
disappointment within the armed forces in the entire region and the lack of confidence 
of the citizens and parts of the political elite in the military. 18 
Despite the fact that after 1989/90 most of the CEEn countries reformulated their 
national security and defence principles, the lack of a military strategy, i.e. the 
codification of the role and size of and control over the armed forces has mainly 
remained a factor causing insecurity. Outstanding issues, such as cuts in personnel 
and the closure of army camps, coupled with a lack of long-term transparent and 
secure financial guarantees, have often been subject of party politics and election 
campaigns. This has led to the postponement of unpopular, but urgent decisions. 
Delayed reform of the armed forces, lack of strategy and, as a result of serious under-
investment, the miserable state of military equipment all complicate CEEn security 
predicaments. 
Although on the 'sub-state' and 'individual' levels the majority of risks and 
vulnerabilities are of a non-military nature, there are few factors causing security 
predicaments that fall into the military sector. Accordingly, the appearance of armed 
criminal activity (M:afia) and the consequences of the widening development gap can 
be identified here. 
16 Central Europe Review on Romania, 6/1112000, Source: http://www.ce-review.org [10/1112000]. 
17 See RFEIRL Newsline, 111112000; HVG, 1111112000, p. 20ff. 
18 See Manig, Wolfgang (1997) "Problems of Transformation of the Defence Establishments in Central 
and Eastern Europe", in Bredow, Wilfried von, Thomas Jager and Gerhard Kiimmel (eds.), European 
Security. Basingstoke: Macmillan, p. 35. 
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Criminal (Mafia) activity within one state is a challenge that, because of its methods, 
often takes a militant form, even if it remains usually on a lower scale. Nevertheless, 
certain criminal groups have a wide range of weaponry at their disposal, which they 
are ready to employ when their 'business interests' are threatened. Bloody score 
settling between various Mafia groups are a part of many CEEn countries' everyday 
life that can not only undermine the constitutional order, but also create an ongoing 
instability and personal insecurity on the 'individual' level, as ordinary citizens often 
become victims of armed criminal activity. The Polish Central Bureau of 
Investigation (CBI), a special police unit for combating organised crime claimed to 
have liquidated the so-called Pruszkow Mafia (a large mafia group active in Poland) 
in September 2000. But, as RFEIRL Newsline reported, the same day the "gangsters 
have issued death sentences for some CBI officers involved in the clampdown on the 
group".I9 
Although less likely to escalate into a military problem, the consequences arising 
from the widening development gap within the state cannot always be predicted. The 
impoverishment of certain parts of the population, for example people working in the 
drastically declining agricultural sector, are contrasted with a powerful 'minority' of 
the so called 'new rich'. Similarly, countries that are unable or unwilling to pay 
salaries to public sector employees for months face the possibility of some sort of 
spontaneous armed uprising, if not a civil war. And violent protest against economic 
and political mismanagement is not unprecedented in the CEEn region, since in some 
countries the in 1989/90 overthrown communist governments faced mass militant 
protest, which often started as regional protests, but escalated into revolutions, e.g. in 
Romania in winter 1989. There are some more recent examples in CEE for this kind 
of security predicament: following a period of peaceful protest in Bulgaria in late 
1996 and early 1997, hundreds of demonstrators stormed the Socialist-led national 
parliament in Sofia and threatened to overthrow the post-communist government. The 
situation got out of control and escalated into a violent siege, with hundreds of 
protestors and MPs injured. Finally, the police and other armed forces of the Interior 
Ministry managed to break up the demonstration with the use of excessive violence 
and restored constitutional order. The chief of Bulgaria's General Staff ruled out the 
19 RFEIRL News line, 9/9/2000. 
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involvement of the military in the conflict, since, according to the constitution, the 
military is not entitled to take part in the settlement of internal problems. One 
opposition politician described the events of January 1997 "as being provoked by the 
deep economic crisis and the despair of people brought to total impoverishment".20 In 
the wake of the constitutional crisis, the President and the Speaker of the Parliament 
had to announce early elections. As another example, Albania in 1997 faced similar 
nation-wide uprisings expressing widespread discontent about the economic hardship 
of the majority of the population. Similarly, the removal of Yugoslav President 
Slobodan Milosevic in October 2000 was a result of popular, partly militant protest, 
also generated by the impoverishment oflarge parts of Serbian society. 
3.3 New Dimensions of Security 
3.3.1 The Political Sector 
In the political sector, limited cooperation. slow integration and as a result. the 
exclusion of CEEn countries of Western European institutions can generate security 
predicaments on the 'Europe as a whole' as well as on the 'regional' levels. In 
particular, two major organisations' involvement in the CEEn region will be 
considered here, although it has to be acknowledged that a clear cut division between 
military and political sectors is impossible, since some organisations are actively 
involved in various fields. Therefore, we do not disregard the fact that, for instance, 
NATO or OSCE membership does contribute to the political stability of a country, or, 
even if not implicitly, to the strengthening of economies (it can boost foreign 
investors' confidence). However NATO's primary goal is to integrate the countries' 
militaries in a supranational body and to provide security via military means. 
Similarly, the OSCE is an organisation that can help defuse security predicaments in 
various sectors beside the military one, yet, its primary goals are security related, such 
as early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management. In the political sector 
two main organisations on the system level ('Europe as a whole~ have been playing 
major roles in securing post-Second World War Europe; The Council of Europe 
20 Bulgarian Telegraph Agency, 13/0111997, Source: http://www.hri.org/news/balkans/bta/97-01-
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(CoE) and the EU. Whilst the CoE opened up its doors for new members from CEE 
swiftly after the end of the Cold War, the EU has remained cautious with regard to 
admitting new post-communist countries. The CoE's contribution to stabilising and 
securing the continent should not be underestimated; however, its impact is limited to 
only certain areas (e.g. advice in political and human rights issues), which do not 
include any kind of formal security guarantee. As suggested in chapter two, the CoE 
focuses mainly on the establishment of 'democratic security'. That is assistance via 
political advice in specific matters (e.g. advice on democratising administrations; 
formulating new laws; settling disputes between neighbouring states; etc.), in order to 
help build and strengthen democratic institutions and the rule of law. Thus, through its 
inclusive policy, the CoE has played a major role in securing post-communist CEE.21 
The European Union has established numerous bilateral agreements with most of the 
CEEn countries, in order to regulate political as well as economic relations. These 
relations have deepened since 1990. However, in specific areas the EU has remained 
highly exclusive. It has also appeared extremely reluctant to open up its organisation 
for new members from the CEEn region. The main argument is that the EU requires 
such a high level of economic competitiveness from its members that insufficiently 
prepared countries' economies would not be able to stand the pressure. Over and 
above the economic issue, the EU has always been an important stabilising agency in 
the political field throughout its history. Thus, its reluctant and cautious handling of 
the issue of eastward enlargement is a factor that can generate political insecurity, 
whose impact on the continent's security is widely overlooked. The EU has tried to 
exert a stabilising political influence in the CEEn region through the accession criteria 
laid down at the Copenhagen European Council in 1993 (hence the designation 
'Copenhagen accession criteria'), yet, only one of the four criteria actually addresses 
the issue of political requirements of membership. According to the first point, 
candidate countries need to develop stable political institutions before qualifying for 
membership, that is the guarantee of democracy, rule of law, human rights and 
3.bta.html [10/11/2000]. 
21 Croft, Stuart, John Redmond, G. Wyn Rees and Mark Webber (1999) The Enlargement of Europe. 
Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, p. 158. 
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minority rights.22 The other three criteria deal with various aspects of the candidate 
countries' economies and their state of readiness for the Common Market as well as 
with the adoption of the EU's acquis communaitaire. As the current status of the 
enlargement process shows, for most of the candidates the fulfilment of the minimal 
political conditions has been much more readily achieved than overcoming the EU's 
procrastination over specifics of the economic conditions. In other words, the future 
of the enlargement process seems to hang on economic rather than political 
conditions, which clearly casts doubt on the EU's commitment for furthering stability 
and peace in CEE. 
On the 'regional level', despite some initiatives, such as the Council of the Baltic Sea 
States (CBSS), the Central European Initiative (CEI), and the Central European Free 
Trade Agreement (CEFTA, based on the Visegn1d initiative), there is a lack of 
powerful organisations, that are aimed at strengthening CEEn political security. As in 
the regional military sector, this shortcoming is primarily to be blamed on the lack of 
interest in most of the CEEn countries and their clear preference for EU and NATO 
membership, instead of deep regional integration. 
Political instability in neighbouring countries is a factor that has contributed to a great 
extent to security predicaments on the 'regional level' in post-Cold War CEE. As 
former Hungarian Foreign Minister Laszl6 Kovacs has argued "instability in any 
country in Europe can destabilize not only its own environment but also the region 
and Europe as a whole". 23 As the 'domino effect' swept through CEE in 1989 and 
helped trigger popular protest against communist rule even in the most hard-line states 
(e.g. in Romania and East Germany), political instability in post-communist CEE 
could spill over to neighbouring countries in a similar way. As a result of military, 
political and economic instability in parts of CEE, migration has become a burning 
issue and during the wars in the Balkans, an influx of refugees in neighbouring 
countries reached critical dimensions. These countries feared that a suddenly 
unbalanced ethnic composition could pose a threat to national security, as well as 
22 See Sedelmeier, Ulrich and Helen Wallace (1996) "Policies towards Central and Eastern Europe", in 
Wallace, Helen and William Wallace (eds.) Policy-making in the European Union. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, p. 374. 
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imposing a financial burden upon deprived transition economies. There have been 
some examples of fights between refugee groups from different ethnic backgrounds, 
destabilising the receiving countries' security, as for example in Macedonia in 1999. 
In Toro's view, the possibility that initially domestic conflicts of both political and 
military nature, can spread over to neighbouring countries, is even higher, when, for 
instance, the neighbouring countries have a strong interest in supporting their national 
minorities, e.g. Hungary or Russia.24 This support can take various forms, the 
participation of volunteers and strong political and moral support in national media 
and in various international fora. 
On the 'state level', weak institutions. constitutional ambiguity and the strengthening 
of extremist parties can generate security predicaments in the political sector. 
With the exception of Hungary, all CEEn states have seen immediate post-communist 
governments collapse prematurely, before reaching the end of their elected terms. 
This political disruption is different from the political instabilities evident in well-
established liberal democracies, which is contained within reliable constitutional 
parameters. In CEE, the legal framework of democratic political institutions, liberal 
economies and open societies has had to be established anew. There are numerous 
examples of weak institutions or constitutional ambiguity creating security 
predicaments in CEEn politics. One often cited example is the power struggle that 
took place between former Polish President Lech Walesa, the parliament (especially 
the lower house the 'Sejm') and Polish governments, which could not be entirely 
resolved until after the adoption of the new constitution in 1997.25 But also in 
countries with a stronger parliamentarian system and prime minister and weaker 
president, the occurrence of a power struggle has not always been avoided. For 
instance, relations between former Slovak Prime Minister Vladimar Meciar and 
former President Michal Kovac were constantly strained, and culminated in 1997 in a 
23 Kovacs, Laszl6 (1996) "Central Europe's Emerging Security Environment: A Hungarian View", 
Speech at the XIIIth NATO Workshop On Political-military Decision Making, Warsaw, Poland 19-23 
June 1996, Source: http://www.csdr.org/96Book!K.ovacs.htrn [15/1112000]. 
24 Toro, Csaba (2000) "Konfliktusok Rendezese Egyetemes Ertekek Kikenyszeritesevel, avagy 
Megengedheto-e a Humanitarius Intervenci6?", Pro Minoritate, Spring/2000, p. 65f. (The Settlement 
of Conflicts via Enforcement of Universal Values, or are Humanitarian Interventions Permissible?) 
25 See Holmes, Leslie (1997) Post-Communism. An Introduction. Durham: Duke University Press, p. 
180ff. 
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constitutional crisis, when, after Kovac's end of office, the Parliament failed to elect a 
new president. In fact, during the ongoing absence of a president, Meciar and his 
allies tried to abuse the authority temporarily transferred to them by the constitution 
and appointed their proteges to key positions. For instance, in 1998 Meciar and his 
close ally the speaker of the Slovak Parliament I van Gasparovic replaced the army's 
Chief of Staff by his candidate, by ignoring the candidate of the then Defense 
Minister (who was a member of a junior coalition partner). This was regarded as an 
attempt by Prime Minister Meciar to control the army.26 
Also, the strengthening of extremist parties can contribute to security predicaments in 
the political sector on both 'state' and 'sub-state' levels. As the results of elections in 
Romania in November/December 2000 have shown, ultra national and ex-communist 
parties can exploit the serious difficulties that result from multiple transition 
processes. The ultra-nationalist Romania Mare (PRM-Greater Romania) headed by 
Comeliu Vadim Tudor gained a large proportion of the votes of angry, increasingly 
impoverished masses, so that it has became an important force in Romanian political 
life, even if it is not a part of the coalition government. As Traian Basescu, the mayor 
of Bucharest has commented: "This is the vote of empty stomachs" .27 Tudor's 
statements, such as "Romania can only be run with machine-guns", and "traitors who 
must be liquidated" contribute to political insecurity in the entire CEEn region.28 
Similarly, political extremism in parts of a country can trigger political insecurity and, 
in more severe cases, undermine the constitutional order. 
The issue of ethnic and national minorities related conflict, already mentioned, is an 
example for the interconnectedness between various risks, sectors and levels. It can 
also crop up in the political sector on the state and sub-state levels, not necessarily in 
a form of violent conflict, but more as an internal risk challenging the political 
legitimacy as well as the constitutional and geographical sovereignty of states. 
Minority separatism can destabilise a state politically, especially if demands aim to 
undermining the territorial integrity of the state. Normally, if minorities enjoy all 
rights to exercise their cultural autonomy with regard to the use of their language in 
26 See RFEIRL Newsline, 14/07/1997. 
27 See Central Europe Online, 28/1112000, Source: http://www.centraleurope.com 
28 Ibid. 
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everyday life and education, receive public money to maintain their cultural heritage 
and are represented in national and local governments, they do not seek political 
autonomy. If, however, the majority violates these rights, minority separatism 
increases too. It is therefore in the interest of any CEEn countries to comply with 
international norms regarding the protection of ethnic minorities, in order to maintain 
peaceful co-existence between the majority and minority. The proportionally high 
Roma population in many CEEn countries can pose a threat to national security, if 
governments fail to integrate them into the economic and social system of the states. 
At present, they are not adequately represented in national politics, but once they get 
organised, they may pose a challenge to the states. 
In addition, disillusionment with democratisation. lack of participation and organised 
crime can be identified as factors triggering security predicaments on both 'sub-state' 
and 'individual' levels in the political sector. 
Disillusionment with the process of democratisation is a major political destabilising 
factor in contemporary CEE. The switch from a communist centrally planned 
economy toward a liberal market economy has inevitably generated inequalities 
within society, and as a result of this transformation process some parts of society 
have been on the losing side. Mass disappointment and disillusionment within 
significant parts of society can not only pose a risk to the state, but also question the 
legitimacy of democracy as a fundamental value. Furthermore, the lack of political 
participation can be identified as a factor triggering political insecurity. The fact that 
many people do not participate in elections and referenda shows that many societies 
still suffer from the effect of the 'de-politicised' communist past, or are disillusioned 
and use non-participation as political protest. 29 
Like minority conflict, organised crime is another factor that can crop up in more than 
one sector and on more than one level and can pose insecurity in many distinct ways. 
As it has been mentioned above, in its more extreme form, it can pose a threat to the 
existence of individuals. In the political sector, organised crime has been brought into 
connection with the political leadership of many CEEn countries. This kind of 
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political and economic corruption seems to be far greater than in established market 
economies. This is partly because of the massive privatisation programmes that have 
been taking place in post-communist CEE, where some people became extremely 
wealthy and powerful overnight. 
3.3.2 The Economic Sector 
On the level of 'Europe as a whole~ the most urgent risk in the economic sector is that 
of the tremendous gap in economic development between Western and Eastern 
Europe. Additionally, economic development in CEE shows varying results. While 
Central Europe seems to have overcome the worst economic impediments, some 
Eastern and South Eastern European countries still find themselves in serious 
difficulties. Novak has pointed out that a partial enlargement of the EU would widen 
the gap between developed and less developed countries in CEE. 30 The economic 
dissimilarities in CEE and the emergence of a 'multi-speed' Europe, and within that a 
'multi-speed' CEE, can be obvious sources of tensions and instability. 
Under the current circumstances, it is inconceivable that any parts of CEE could catch 
up economically with Western Europe. As Dunay has pointed out, even if the average 
annual growth of the GDP in CEE is at present the double of the EU average, the gap 
between CEE - EU economic development is growing, simply because the basis of 
the growth in the EU is more than the double of that in CEE.31 It is very unlikely that 
this economic insecurity will diminish without substantial international assistance in 
the short or medium term. As a recent report produced by the Commission of the EU 
suggests, the economic and social cohesion of the twelve candidate countries with the 
average level ofthe EU member states would take at least twenty to thirty years. 32 
29 See Nagle, D. John and Alison Mahr (1999) Democracy and Democratization. Post-communist 
Europe in Comparative Perspective. London: Sage, p. 217ff. 
30 Novak, Tamas (2000) "A Gazdasagi Transzformaci6 Tiz Evenek Merlege a Visegradi Orszagokban 
es a Balkanon", Pro Minoritate, Spring/2000, p. 8f. (The Balance Sheet of the First Ten Years of 
Economic Transition in the Visegrad Countries and in the Balkans) 
31 See HVG, 7/10/2000, p. 59. 
32 See RFEIRL Newsline, 7/2/2001. 
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Other phenomena within the economic sector that can contribute to the emergence of 
security predicaments on the level of 'Europe as a whole' are the negative effects of 
globalisation. slow economic integration and restricted market access for CEE in 
Western Europe. and economic migration. Whilst the process of globalisation can 
create a range of business opportunities, it also challenges all economies of the world; 
yet, weaker, less developed systems, such as the CEEn ones, are more vulnerable to 
this challenge. This is underpinned further by partial unavailability of extensive 
markets in Western Europe, those which are protected by the shield of the EU's 
borders. The economic hardship in CEE in general has triggered a migration process, 
whereby many highly qualified and talented professionals leave their countries for 
better pay, high-tech working environment and higher living standards. 
Weak cooperation also appears on the 'regional level' as one of the main factors 
triggering economic insecurity. In general, CEEn governments often consider regional 
economic cooperation, such as CEFTA counter-productive to their efforts of joining 
the EU. However, some less developed CEEn countries consider CEFTA a 
provisional test of cooperation, which can help prepare them for EU membership. 
Bulgarian President Petar Stojanov has argued in 1997, a year before Bulgaria's 
admission to the organisation that "CEFTA membership is our nation's current 
strategic goal, a milestone on its road towards the European Union".33 For those CEEn 
countries, who are likely to be become members of the EU, CEFTA is designed to 
offer a forum for coordinating their policies to the EU and lobby the organisation 
jointly. This, however, has proven illusionary, since CEEn governments prefer to 
handle the issue oftheir EU integration strictly in a bilateral manner. 
Beside insufficient cooperation, factors, such as the negative effect of the wars in the 
Balkans. the isolation of some countries and the technology gap have fed regional 
security predicaments in the economic sector. During and after the wars in the 
Balkans, neighbouring countries, especially those, for whose trade-arrangements 
Yugoslavia has been an important transit country, have suffered severe economic 
losses. According to indicators of the Romanian Foreign Ministry, losses to the 
Romanian economy during the eleven-week NATO bombing campaign against 
33 Cited in Grudzinski and van Ham (1999), p. 70. 
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Serbian targets amounted to $245 million and, by the end of 1999, total losses did rise 
to some $915 million.34 A more detailed analysis conducted for the NATO 
Parliamentary Assembly in 1999 has revealed even more devastating facts: 
Expected growth rates in six countries surrounding the Federal Republic of 
Yugoslavia (Bulgaria, Romania, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 
Bosnia, Croatia, and Albania) have been reduced by 3-4 percentage points 
this year as a direct and indirect consequence of the conflict. This has 
increased these countries' combined balance of payments shortfalls by $1 
billion, of which the financing for an estimated $450 million remains to be 
found. One estimate is that the war will shave almost $8 billion, or 5.4% off 
the Balkan region's GDP in 1999. A 1. 6% growth rate for the region was 
forecast prior to the war. 35 
An additional problem has been the barring of the Danube by bridges destroyed by 
NATO bombing. Romania and Bulgaria in particular have suffered from an inability 
to transport goods to key markets in Western Europe and other countries in the region 
cannot send goods by river in the other direction. Yugoslavia under President 
Milosevic refused to remove the debris after the war, unless other countries, 
especially those that conducted the air raids, would rebuild them. As a result, many 
Romanian and Bulgarian shipping businesses went bankrupt. Bulgarian Prime 
Minister I van Kostov urged the Budapest meeting of CEFTA leaders in October 1999 
to set up a special CEFT A committee to coordinate talks between the eleven states 
through which the Danube flows. 36 Indeed, all CEFTA leaders signed a joint 
declaration, demanding the earliest possible solution of the problem. 
On the 'state' level, individual countries face a range of economic factors that can 
have an impact on their national security. Weak, fragile and highly dependent 
economies, as most of the CEEn economies are to varying degrees, have little 
freedom in economic and financial issues and are strongly influenced by foreign 
credit institutions and investors. Thus CEEn national economies operate under a dual 
pressure. First, they suffer from serious difficulties arising from the economic 
transition process. Second, as a result of their relative weakness and lack of 
34 See Reuters, 1417/1999. 
35 See Cohen, Harry (1999) The Economic Consequences of the War and Reconstruction in South-
Eastern Europe. NATO Parliamentary Assembly, Special Report of the Economic Committee, Sub-
committee on East-West economic cooperation and convergence, Source: http://www.nato-
pa.int/publications/cornrep/ 1999/as269ecew-e.html [ 10/1 0/2000]. 
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autonomy, they are vulnerable and often defenceless in the face of global 
challenges.37 Furthermore, as a consequence of a lack of domestic resources after 
1990, significant parts of the national economies of CEE were sold to foreign 
investors during the privatisation process. This included key sectors, such as 
telecommunication and energy. While the flow of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
initially helped to consolidate highly indebted national budgets, a reverse trend, that 
is, the profit repatriation of multinational companies from CEEn countries back to the 
country of origin or new target countries has now begun. Additionally, large-scale 
corruption cases in numerous CEEn countries trigger economic insecurities as, for 
instance, they affect foreign investors' confidence. 
On the 'sub-state' level, the following factors can generate insecurity in the economic 
sector: The growing gap between the public and private sectors and the consequences 
of bankruptcies. There is a growing gap between public and private sector salaries, 
which the rather poor CEEn treasuries cannot close. As a consequence, the major 
parts of CEEn populations employed in the public sector (teachers, nurses, social 
workers, etc.) live below the official level of minimum subsistence. As it has been 
illustrated through examples from CEE in the military and political sectors, 
impoverishment of large parts of the populations can have an immediate effect on a 
country's security. Furthermore, it can also have serious medium and long-term 
consequences. Underpaid public sector employment opportunities are not attractive 
for young people, thus certain professions will experience serious labour shortage, 
once the older labour forces retire. 
On the 'individual' level, three main causes of security predicaments can be identified 
that fall in the economic sector: unemployment, financial insecurity and lack of or 
unequal access to opportunities. The latter one is nothing out of the ordinary in a 
capitalist society, where not everybody can benefit from economic success and not all 
citizens have equal access to capital. In CEEn transition economies, these inequalities 
have intensified further through a lack of adequate industrial relations, coupled with 
an underdeveloped business culture and poor civil society. Financial insecurity of 
36 See M!pszabadsag, 21/10/1999. 
37 Balazs, Judit ( 1997) A Gazdasagi Biztonsagr61. Budapest: Strategiai es V edelmi Kutat6intezet. 
Vedelmi tanulmanyok No. 16., p. 44. (On Economic Security) 
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individuals is not found uniquely in CEE, but all over Europe and the world. 
Nonetheless, defects resulting from the economic transition can worsen this 
predicament. For instance the unexpected bankruptcy of some already privatised 
banks in CEE has deprived thousands of people of their savings. Moreover, although 
on a slow downward trend, high inflation rates keep many CEEn societies in 
permanent financial insecurity. 
Unemployment was virtually non-existent in centrally planned command economies. 
This was less a victory of the employment policies of the communist countries, than a 
consequence of wasteful economic mismanagement, which resulted by the late 1980s 
in all countries of the region facing total economic and financial collapse. After 1990, 
unemployment has risen significantly across the region. Certain parts of individual 
countries have been hit more, especially those, where heavy industry and mining were 
concentrated. Also, significant parts of the CEEn population, who were employed by 
state-organised agricultural associations, have been made redundant. 
3.3.3 The Societal Sector 
As noted in chapter two, various identity related issues are considered to fall within 
the societal sector. This again, can relate to different levels, i.e. it spans issues 
affecting and sometimes threatening the existence of collective identities (e.g. 
European, Central European or Baltic identities) as well as smaller units, such as state, 
sub-state and individual identities. It has also been pointed out that some risks and 
vulnerabilities can equally arise in different sectors and this is clearly valid for matters 
related to various forms of identity. While in the military and political sectors our 
analysis has focused mainly on the effects of minority related tensions on the military 
security and political stability and integrity of nation-states, here we will consider, 
how current trends can affect the existence of nations (not states) and other smaller 
collective identities. 
On the 'Europe as a whole' level, factors, such as migration. influx of refugees. 
globalisation and Europanisation can be identified as vulnerabilities effecting identity. 
It is estimated that post-Cold War CEE generates up to one million illegal migrants a 
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year,38 of whom some 400,000-500,000 people have Western Europe as their 
destination.39 With the abolition of travel restrictions to Western Europe by CEEn 
governments and the easing of Western Europe's visa policies towards many CEEn 
states, mobility has increased in Europe. Massive flows of migrants from CEE to 
Western Europe, forecasted in the early 1990s, however, did not occur. In a similar 
vein, the improving economic conditions in CEE attract thousands of illegal 
immigrants from the Soviet successor states and the Far East. In addition, 
globalisation in the cultural field that is the rapid expansion of mainly North 
American popular cultural and language poses a real challenge to smaller nations. 
Moreover, it is feared in the European context that with the advancement of the 
European integration process, national identities and smaller European languages will 
be diluted. 
Minority and ethnic related risks and vulnerabilities are perhaps the most pertinent 
societal challenges that post-Cold War CEE face. They can appear on 'regional~ 
'state' and 'sub-state' levels and can, as for instance the wars in the Balkans have 
proved, easily spill over into the political and military sectors. In addition, an initially 
sub-state (local) societal problem can ignite a chain reaction and expand to a state 
wide or even regional conflict. Religious and ethnic motivated tensions might lead to 
the rivalry and clash of different religious communities and identities, which is also 
aggravated by the burden of similar historical events in CEE. 
The fact of CEE's highly mixed ethnic composition has already been noted. In today's 
CEE, there are many people living outside of the country whose language and 
traditions they share. Following the break-up of the Soviet Union, some 27 million 
Russians live outside the borders of the Russian Federation: nine per cent of the 
population of Lithuania belongs to the Russian minority, and 30 per cent of Estonia's 
and 33 per cent of Latvia's population are Russians.40 The disintegration of 
Yugoslavia also contributed to the creation of new, ethnically diverse nation-states as 
38 See Rees, G. Wyn (1999) "Organised Crime", Paper Presented at the International Conference 'Ten 
years after 1989: The Changing Nature of Security Relations in Central and Eastern Europe', University 
ofBirrningham, 8-9 November 1999. Conference Report, p. 31. 
39 See Strategic Survey 1999/2000 (2000), The International Institute for Strategic Studies. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, p. 97. 
40 Steen, Anton (2000) "Ethnic Relations, Elites and Democracy in the Baltic States", Journal of 
Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 16:4, p. 72. 
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m Bosnia. The key issue that can contribute to the emergence of security 
predicaments, is, how the majority treats minorities, so that their cultural survival is 
secured. Discriminatory laws with regard to language and education (including the 
right to record names in birth registries in the minority language and the right to 
bilingual signs of town and village names), as well as laws regulating questions of 
nationality and citizenship in many CEEn countries (e.g. Baltic states, Romania and 
Slovakia) have threatened the existence of national and ethnic minorities.41 Thus, 
despite the fact that, for instance, Latvia adopted a more liberal language law in 
September 2000, it remains reluctant to allow the use of Russian in public.42 This is 
partly a consequence of the country's struggle to come to terms with its Soviet legacy 
and current identity as well as the consolidation of its regained sovereignty and 
independence. It appears to be a general phenomenon in CEE that minority rights are 
further undermined by a rather weak civil society. 
On the 'state' level, factors, such as the declining number of the population. search for 
identity. weak civil societies can be identified as causes of security predicaments in 
the societal sector. Mainly as a consequence of economic and social hardship and 
large-scale migration, there is a general decreasing trend in the size of CEEn 
populations. Although in the short term it does not represent a main challenge to the 
survival of the nations, it can have serious long-term consequences. Most shockingly, 
in Latvia, official figures from November 2000 revealed a ten per cent drop in the 
country's population over the last decade.43 Similarly, Bulgaria has experienced a 
continuously declining trend in the number of its population: 
From a high of more than 8.9 million in 1985, the Bulgarian population 
(following the forced, mass exodus of more than 300,000 ethnic Turks in 
1989) fell to 8.3 million at the end of 1996 and is projected to decline to 8 
million by the year 2000, to 7. 5 million by 2010, and to as few as 6. 8 million 
by 2020.44 
41 See Fisher, Sharon (1995) "Treaty Fails to End Squabbles Over Hungarian Relations", Transition, 
1:9, p. 3. 
42 See RFEIRL News line, 7/9/2000. 
43 See RFEIRL Newsline, 9/10/2000. 
44 Waters, Trevor (1999) Bulgaria- Now On Track for a Secure Future? Sandhurst: Conflict Studies 
Research Centre, No: G69, Source: http://www.ppc.pims.org/Projects/csrc/G69-trw.htrn [15/12/2000]. 
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On the 'sub-state' level, the following factors in the societal sector contribute to 
security predicaments: human rights violations. intolerance. extremism. and 
xenophobic tendencies. There is a close relationship between these four issues; in fact 
the latter three phenomena are often to be blamed for human rights violations. The 
U.S. Department of State's Bureau ofDemocracy found various cases ofhuman rights 
violations in CEE in its '1999 Country Reports on Human Rights Practices'.45 In its 
studies on Bulgaria, Romania, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Poland and 
Hungary large-scale discrimination against women, the disabled and religious 
minorities were noted. Moreover, in some CEEn countries, some anti-Semitic 
incidents occurred, including the vandalism of graves in Jewish cemeteries. It is true 
that these kinds of incidents take place also in Western Europe, yet, CEEn societies 
and governments seem in general to be less tolerant toward ethnic, religious or sexual 
subcultures. Since the victims of human rights violations, intolerance, extremism and 
xenophobic tendencies are often members of (national, ethnic, religious or sexual) 
minority groups, their existence and survival is directly threatened. For example the 
exclusion and oppression of the Roma population in many CEEn countries by the 
majority puts the cultural survival and the national identity of a large ethnic group at 
serious risk.46 
On the 'individual' level, the following factors occur as potential threats to security in 
the societal sector: weak personal autonomy. weak articulation and high suicide rates. 
Although generally, personal autonomy and personal articulation are protected by the 
constitutions, in practice there is still little practice of them. This is partly due to the 
legacies of the communist past, where individualism was suppressed by collectivism 
and its articulation subjugated to the needs of the communist party. Another factor 
that shows alarming trends regarding personal insecurity among CEEn individuals, is 
the relatively high number of suicide cases throughout the region. The suicide rates, 
especially among males in Hungary (51.1 per 100,000), Estonia (59.4), Latvia (59.8) 
45 The U.S. Department of State's Bureau ofDemocracy, 1999 Country Reports on Human Rights 
Practices, Source: http:/ /www.state.gov/www/globallhuman _ rights/1999 _ hrp _report/99hrp _ eur.html 
[25/11/2000]. 
46 Wootliff-Bitusikova, Alexandra (2000) "The Roma in Central Europe: The Case ofSlovakia", 
Focus:Balkans, Issue 5 -September 2000, Source: http://www.oneworld.org/voice/woote2.html 
[10/12/2000]. 
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Lithuania (73.7) compared to Sweden (20.0), Austria (30.0) or the United Kingdom 
(11.0), are shockingly high.47 
3.3.4 The Environmental Sector 
Following a dramatic appeal by the then UN Secretary General U Thant in 1969, 
which drew the world's attention to the rapidly declining state of the environment, the 
issue of environmental security has gained more and more importance. As a 
consequence of his appeal, the first UN environmental conference took place in 
Stockholm. It has easily been acknowledged that the pollution of the environment is 
not an issue that can be confined within a nation's borders, since it can cross 
boundaries in the air or in rivers. Thus, to some extent, environmental protection has 
become an issue of foreign and security politics, since it can be carried out best in the 
form of coordinated international action.48 As noted above, environmental issues are 
inherently problematic to apply to levels of analysis, given their essentially borderless 
nature. Although most of the factors generating security predicaments in the 
environmental sector relate equally to different levels across the board (e.g. air 
pollution threatens Europe's, the CEEn region's, CEEn states' as well as individuals' 
existence), we attempt a more specific categorisation of issues on various levels. 
On both 'Europe as a whole' and 'regional' levels, we identify the following factors 
that can effect environmental security: energy crisis. environmental disasters. 
transborder disasters. pollution of air and rivers. problem of nuclear waste. ecosystem 
crisis. climate change as well as food safety problems. The last issue, for instance, has 
gained in importance in the late 1990s, with the outbreak of the BSE crisis. The crisis 
of the ecosystem and the climate change causes extreme weather conditions, e.g. the 
flooding of rivers in various parts of Europe. The Chemobyl disaster in April 1986 
has also illustrated how geographically widespread is the impact of nuclear disasters 
and has pointed to the catastrophic state of nuclear power stations in CEE. In addition, 
47 World Health Organisation (WHO), Geneva, Source: 
http://www. who.int/mental_ healthffopic _Suicide/suicide _rates.html [2511112000]. 
48 See Damjanovich, Imre and Lajos Radv{myi (1997) A Magyar Koztarsastig Kornyezeti Biztonstiga, 
Budapest: Strategiai es Vedelmi Kutat6intezet. Vedelmi tanulmanyok No. 15, p. 27ff. (The 
Environmental Security of the Republic of Hungary) 
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the use of nuclear power stations unavoidably produces radioactive waste that is 
increasingly difficult to be disposed safely. 
On both 'state' and 'sub-state' levels, factors like the pollution of soil. unsafe nuclear 
power stations. decaying infrastructure. lack of environmental concepts. tight budgets 
and little environmental friendly technology can contribute to the emergence of 
predicaments in the environmental sector. In the CEEn context, a lack of resources to 
rehabilitate closed-down industrial areas (e.g. former communist heavy industries, 
mines etc.) and former military sites has created precarious ecological situations. In 
general, CEEn countries lack environmental concepts, action plans and Green parties 
are virtually non-existent. Without increased spending in the environmental sector as 
well as foreign assistance, the gap between the ecologically conscious Western 
European states and the weak CEEn states will widen further. 
Furthermore, the introduction of environmentally friendly technology, again, requires 
matching funding that is not always available in CEE. For instance in the case of 
waste disposal, the employment of environmentally friendly technologies has been 
rare. This is partly caused by the lack of resources at local level (counties and towns), 
but also by the lack of an environmental awareness among the CEEn populations. 
This latter factor is also valid for the 'individual' level. There is far too little individual 
environmental awareness present in most of the CEEn populations. On the one hand, 
CEEn societies seem to be willing to mobilise protest against larger issues affecting 
their environmental security, as they did, for instance, in Hungary in 1988 over the 
issue of the building of a Danube dam, or, more recently, over the issue of cyanide 
pollution. On the other they seem to care less about environmental issues in their 
everyday life. The already mentioned problem of weak and underdeveloped civil 
societies coupled with scarce resources in CEE contributes to the marginalisation of 
the environmental agenda further. As Adam Fagin has noted with regard to 
predicaments faced by Czech environmental civil organisations, 
by far the greatest constraint on the development and efficacy of 
environmental associations throughout the entire post-communist period has 
been the absence of sufficient funding. (. .. ) Local environmental associations, 
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campaigning on a more radical agenda will simply find it impossible to attract 
the funding necessary to maintain their campaigns. 49 
Additional factors that can trigger predicaments in the environmental sector are food 
and health related issues, e.g. health risks caused by the poor quality of food 
production. 
3 .4 Conclusion 
This chapter has extended the typology developed in the previous chapter to the CEEn 
regional security complex, that is the five-sector security framework of the 
Copenhagen School. The clear advantage of this framework is that it allows a 
comprehensive analysis of contemporary security predicaments, i.e. the risks and 
vulnerabilities that generate them. Firstly, through its sectoral approach, it offers a 
useful analytical reference for classifying risks and vulnerabilities beyond the 
traditional military sector (political, economic, societal and environmental). Secondly, 
it extends the traditional state-centric security analysis to other levels of the system, 
such as 'Europe as a whole', 'regional', 'sub-state' and 'individual' ones. The weakness 
of this framework is that it seems to disregard the fact that some risks and 
vulnerabilities may crop up in more than one sector or on more than one level. In 
order to resolve this analytical gap, this chapter has supplemented the Copenhagen 
framework with the presumption of interconnectedness between risks/vulnerabilities, 
sectors and levels (see figures 3-3 and 3-4 above). This interconnectedness accounts 
for the fact that some risks/vulnerabilities arise in more than one sector or on more 
than one level as well as the fact that some might propagate in a serial manner across 
sectoral boundaries. 
In constructing a cross-sectoral and multi-level synthesis of the findings of this 
chapter, the following conclusions can be drawn: 
In general, it can be argued that in the wake of the Cold War, CEE faces a widened set 
of security predicaments. The widening of the security agenda is in part the result of 
49 Fagin, Adam (1999) "The Development of Civil Society in the Czech Republic: the Environmental 
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the disappearance of the authoritarian communist control over various aspects of life, 
including politics (foreign and domestic), the economy and the societies. 
Additionally, the multiple transition process towards political democracy, market 
economy and open society has ignited a number of processes, which can contribute to 
the emergence of security predicaments. 
The majority of risks/vulnerabilities discussed in this chapter do not cause an 
imminent military threat to the region, to its states or to its publics. They rather pose a 
latent insecurity to various aspects of the functioning, existence or even survival of 
states, societies, collective identities and individuals. Thus, it would be either 
insufficient to relate security in contemporary CEE exclusively to the level of the 
nation-states, or it would be inadequate to narrow down its content to the military 
sector. 
With regard to the essence of security predicaments, they can be generated by a 
variety of external and domestic risks/vulnerabilities, whereby the dimension of 
domestic sources of insecurity clearly extends beyond the external ones. 
With regard to external factors, issues, such as the exclusion from major international 
organisations (mainly NATO and the EU), slow integration into these institutions and 
instability in neighbouring countries play a more prominent role in the emergence of 
security predicaments than actual external military threats (for instance 
invasion/division). In addition, the ever-expanding gap in economic development 
between Western, Central and Eastern regions of Europe and the challenge of 
globalisation may contribute to the exacerbating of security predicaments. 
As regards domestic factors, ethnic or minority related conflict represents one of the 
most pertinent insecurities in CEE that has, for various mainly historic reasons, 
challenged the region's security for centuries. As numerous regional examples cited 
above have shown, this type of conflict can crop up in the political, military or in the 
societal sectors and can indeed cross boundaries by spilling over from sub-state to 
state and to regional levels. Thus, the issue of 'identity', whether it is related to the 
Sector as a Measure of Associational Activity", Journal of European Area Studies, 7:1, p. 104ff. 
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region, the nation-state, sub-state units (ethnic or national minorities, religious groups 
etc.) or individuals continues to be a major generator of security predicaments in CEE 
across all these levels. 
Furthermore, various types of criminal activity can generate security predicaments on 
different levels in CEE, from which probably the newly emerged organised crime 
poses the greatest challenge to the region and its states. Like ethnic conflict, organised 
crime can arise in more than one sector and can pose a threat to various aspects of 
security, including the political, economic or even the military ones. 
Additionally, CEE's security is further challenged by factors arising from the complex 
transition process that the entire region is currently undergoing. These factors can 
emerge in various sectors, such as the political, economic, societal or the military. 
Clearly, there is a close interconnectedness between transitional risks/vulnerabilities 
and sectors, as some of the factors may arise initially in one sector, but may 
subsequently spill over to others. This serial propagation of risks/vulnerabilities bears 
a further challenge, as it makes risks/vulnerabilities difficult to forecast and address, 
as will be shown in chapter five. 
Finally, as the above examples in CEE have shown, ecological issues can generate 
very real security predicaments in some parts of the region. However, given the 
borderless nature of environmental risks/challenges, they are essentially less suited to 
a single-level analysis. 
To what extent does the CEEn public at large and its political elite perceive ecological 
challenges as insecurities? This and the perceptions of many other risks and 
challenges will be the subject of the next chapter. 
4 Security Perceptions of Central and Eastern European Publics 
and their Political Elites 
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This chapter analyses attitudes of CEEn publics and their political elites towards risks 
and vulnerabilities. The main focus is on objective and subjective factors, that is, on 
real and imagined factors that cause insecurity among the public at large and the 
political elite. Thus, this chapter covers a range of insecurities that are perceived by 
the CEEn populations, regardless of whether they pose an imminent threat or a remote 
one. 
The first part of the chapter concentrates on perceptions of external military threats, 
which appear to be generated by a combination of cognitive and concrete factors. As 
it has been argued in chapter two, cognitive factors, such as the belief systems of 
individuals, how they view the world and classify their partners/enemies, the role of 
historical analogies and nations' self-understanding can have an impact on secunty 
perceptions. These factors appear to be highly influential in the ways, in which CEEn 
populations perceive external military threats, for instance those engendered by 
Russia and Germany. 
Meanwhile, the second part focuses on the perception of new, non-military risks and 
vulnerabilities (in accordance with the typology of the previous chapter, political, 
economic, societal and environmental). Here, attention will be paid to four major 
types of threat that, to varying degrees, seem to be judged significant by the CEEn 
populations and their elites. First, attitudes towards risks generated by the complex 
transition proc~ss (political and economic) will be highlighted, which prove to cause 
much apprehension in the region. Second, the public's and their political elite's 
perception of conflict related to minority and ethnic groups (societal) will be 
analysed, wherein special attention will be given to cognitive factors, such as the 
importance of national identity in shaping hostile public and elite attitudes towards 
minorities. Third, the more recent issue of escalating migration (societal) will be 
highlighted in the context of security perceptions, which seem to concern large parts 
of the CEEn populations and their elites. Finally, the extent to which ecological 
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factors (environmental) are perceived as risks and vulnerabilities to security will be 
examined. 
4.1 Introduction 
As outlined in chapter two, cognitive processes, such as perceptions and the 
interpretation of security and foreign policy related issues can have an impact on the 
emergence of security predicaments. Exactly which factors the political elite and the 
public at large perceive as challenges to their country's or to their individual security, 
can be greatly influenced by beliefs, i.e. how people understand world affairs, how 
they classify their opponents, enemies, etc. Chapter two also suggested that the role of 
prior knowledge in CBE, especially the role of history and historical analogies can 
shape the images policy-makers and the public at large hold of the contemporary 
world and, in turn, can result in misperceptions. It is shown that biased security 
perceptions can generate tensions and insecure situations between countries of the 
CEEn region. Since here we are dealing with countries with relatively recently 
regained sovereignty (political, economic, military and cultural), we will consider the 
political elites' and the populations' self-understanding in our analysis, and examine, 
how their national identity and self-perception influence their understanding of other 
nations and their relations with neighbours. 
As suggested in chapter two, some, mainly realist, analysts argue that many perceived 
risks and vulnerabilities do not represent an imminent danger to the 'hard' security of 
states, and thus are not true causes of insecurity. Here, on the contrary, it is argued 
that all factors, which are conceived by the public and the political elite as risks and 
vulnerabilities, have to be taken into consideration, regardless of their nature, and 
whether objective or subjective. 5° If they are subjects of public and elite concern, they 
need to be identified, addressed and finally resolved. It has to be acknowledged, 
however, that these kinds of perceived, as opposed to concrete, threats require very 
different remedies than real risks and vulnerabilities. For instance, notwithstanding 
50 See Zedner, Lucia (2000) "The Pursuit of Security", in Hope, Tim and Richard Sparks ( eds. ), Crime, 
Risk and Insecurity. Law and Order in Everyday Life and Political Discourse. London and New York: 
Routledge, p. 202. 
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the obvious difference in scale, the rather subjective perception of Russia as a major 
source of external threat that is still prevalent in CEE, needs to be approached in a 
different way from concrete security predicaments, such as, for example, the spill-
over of ethnic war from Kosovo to the territory of neighbouring countries. In both 
cases, however, the crucial issue is, how policy-makers can improve public security 
perceptions. This will be considered in our subsequent chapter on policy-responses. 
In the following, we will examine post-Cold War security perceptions in CEE. More 
specifically we will concentrate on threats and risks, which, to a large extent, manifest 
themselves through biased prior knowledge (e.g. history), organisational memory, 
distorted information and subjective self-understanding. 
Firstly, we will analyse the potential source and nature of external military threats 
perceived in post-Cold War CEE. Leaning on the findings of a cross-national research 
project on 'Public Perceptions of Threats to Security in Post-communist Europe' in 
1997 by Christian Haerpfer, Claire Wallace and Richard Rose and the updated version 
'Old and New Security Issues in Post-Communist Eastern Europe: Results of an 11 
Nation Study' in 1999, perceived external threats can be classified first as traditional 
ones. Here, the label 'external' refers to the source or direction of threat, implying that 
it stems from a foreign entity, while the term 'traditional' indicates that these threats 
have already been experienced by a significant portion of the population of CEE in 
living memory.51 Thus, we will concentrate on the question of how contemporary 
CEEn countries perceive Russia, Germany and the United States as potential sources 
of insecurity. We will also address the question of how the political elite perceives 
security threats and risks. This can be answered by analysing basic documents, such 
as national security and defence doctrines of individual CEEn countries and other 
official publications. Furthermore, we will highlight perceptions of neighbouring 
countries as external sources of threat. For many, this constitutes a continuing military 
threat across CEE, even if its perception shows a steadily declining trend. 
51 See Haerpfer, Christian, Cezary Milosinski and Claire Wallace (1999) "Old and New Security Issues 
in Post-communist Eastern Europe: Result of an 11 Nation Study", Europe-Asia Studies, 51:6, pp. 989-
1011. 
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Secondly, we will highlight the public's and the elite's perception of new non-
military threats to security. These more recent sources of threat seem to concern both 
the public at large and the elite to a greater extent than external threats. As Haerpfer et 
al. have concluded, "internal sources of threat are increasing whilst external ones have 
declined". 52 In the context of internal threats, perceptions seem to be shaped by 
concerns arising from the severe economic and political difficulties and their social 
consequences. minorities and ethnic groups. escalating migration and - mainly local -
ecological issues. 53 
In a study on CEEn security perceptions, GieBmann uses different classifications for 
similar processes. 54 He distinguishes between two major groups of risks: structural 
and regional risks to stability. In general, structural risks correspond to the 
aforementioned internal risks, i.e. predicaments generated by the political 
consequences of the socio-economic crisis. This can lead to the decline of the 
legitimacy of state authority, but in more severe cases, it can also cause the collapse 
of internal national security (which is what happened in ex-Yugoslavia). Perceived 
regional risks on the other hand, are those, which mainly stem from recent alarming 
economic and political developments in Russia and other Soviet successor states. 
Furthermore, many CEEn citizens have perceived the developments in the Balkans as 
risks pertinent to their national security. This perception of danger has intensified 
through the cautious and manoeuvring approach of various international organisations 
and states to the bloodshed in ex-Yugoslavia and recalled deep-seated historic 
misgivings. Perceptions in CEE are still conditioned by vivid memories of events in 
the countries' recent history, in which Western European governments gave their 
blessing to major decisions about the fate of CEEn countries against their will (e.g. 
during and after WW2), or declined to help, when it was specifically requested (e.g. 
52 !bid, p. 1007. 
53 See Smoke, Richard (ed.) (1996) Perceptions of Security. Public Opinion and Expert Assessments in 
Europe's New Democracies. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press; Haerpfer, 
Christian, Claire Wallace and Richard Rose (1997) Public Perceptions of Threats to Security in Post-
communist Europe. Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, Studies in Public Policy No. 293; 
Haerpfer et al. (1999); Blasek, Roman (1998) "Perception of Security Risks by the Population of the 
Czech Republic", The Journal ofSlavic Military Studies, 11:3, pp. 89-96; Stojanovits, Gabor (2001) 
"Perceptions of New Security Risks by Central and Eastern European Populations and their Political 
Elites", The Journal ofSlavic Military Studies, 14:3, pp. 1-12. 
54 GieBmann, Hans-Joachirn (1995) Sicherheitspolitik in Mittel- und Osteuropa. Probleme- Konzepte-
Perspektiven. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Bd. 98, p. 30ff. (Security Policy in Central and Eastern Europe: 
Problems, Concepts, Perspectives) 
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Hungary 1956 or Czechoslovakia 1968).55 Huge majorities in the Baltic countries 
(Estonia: 7 6%, Latvia: 81% and Lithuania: 72%) believe that they could not defend 
themselves effectively in the event of an external military aggression and they also 
think that "the West would be unlikely to help them in the event of such an attack". 56 
4.2 The Phantom of an External Military Threat? 
The question mark already indicates the ambiguity of the term 'external military 
threat'. There is a basic question, as to whether in post-Cold War CEE it is still 
relevant to speak about perceptions of inter-state military threats. This question affects 
the discourse concerning NATO enlargement and the overall future of European 
security provision. Are there any existential military threats in contemporary CEE 
perceived by the public at large, or are they purely products of the imagination of a 
military-political and academic elite? 
As we have implied earlier, threat perceptions can be objective as well as subjective, 
thus the perceived risks do not necessarily pose an imminent danger to the security of 
a country and its citizens. As a result of this ambiguity, threat perception can also be 
the subject of manipulation. Politicians draw a picture of threats and insecurities, 
depending on which groups' interest they intend to attract. As one observer has stated, 
it is easy to get the impression that different threats are presented to different 
audiences, depending on the circumstances. One day the audience is 
confronted with a vision of domestic anarchy and foreign aggression. Another 
day the same politicians describe their country as exceptionally stable and 
surrounded by peaceful neighbours (. .. ) the latter vision is usually presented to 
Western bankers and investors; the former to security experts. 57 
This ambiguous relationship is particularly apparent in the area of external military 
risk perceptions. Although all studies and opinion polls on CEEn security perceptions 
emphasise that immediate inter-state military threats are virtually non-existent in the 
55 !bid, p. 37. 
56 See Goble, Paul (1998) "Divided on Security", RFEIRL Newsline, 27/08/1998, End Note. 
57 See Zielonka, Jan (1992) "Security in Central Europe", Adelphi Paper, No. 272, London: 
International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 33f. 
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region, they also register the perception of some latent or potential external risks.58 
Thus, the public, when asked about current security priorities in general terms, seems 
to register little concern about military security issues. This position is supported by 
the findings of an empirical study conducted in the Czech Republic in 1995, which 
showed the population to be far more worried about other security related issues (e.g. 
personal security issues, social security or ecological security etc.) than any external 
military threat such as that posed by Russia.59 In this study, respondents classified 
military security as a matter of low importance, ranking it seventh out of eight issues 
considered. 60 When, however, people are asked about their perception of particular 
external risks (originating, for example, from Russia, Germany or conflicts in nearby 
countries) they seem to hold more apprehensive views. 
CEEn political and military elites perceive the potential of a major inter-state military 
conflict as highly unlikely, which is expressed most apparently in the countries' post-
1990 security doctrines and military strategies. At the same time, they perceive the 
possibility of local crises and conflicts that could pose potential risks to their 
respective countries' national security. For instance, a Polish document acknowledges 
that the country "is not jeopardised by direct military aggression" and stresses the 
importance of NATO membership that "has diminished the threat of aggression 
against our country [Poland] chiefly by multiplying the deterrence factor".61 The same 
document, however, expresses concerns about the likelihood of local conflicts in 
Poland's 'close vicinity'. In addition, the document articulates worries about 
neighbouring countries stationing considerable military potential near the Polish 
border, especially the excessive military concentration in the Russian enclave of 
Kaliningrad (that might have a direct impact on the country's national security). As it 
states, "in a deteriorating situation they could constitute a threat to Poland's security, 
not necessarily in the form of organised aggression".62 Romania's Strategy ofNational 
Security also recognises that "the danger of a major military confrontation has been 
58 See Boguszakova et al. (1996), p. 34; Haerpfer et al. (1999), p. 1009; Blasek (1998), p. 91; Goble 
(1998). 
59 See Blasek (1998), p. 90f. 
60 Ibid, p. 91. 
61 Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland adopted at the Meeting of the Council of Ministers on 4 
January 2000, Source: http://www.msz.gov.pllenglish/polzagr/security/ [1 0/1112000], section 2. 1. 
62 Ibid, section 2. 3. 
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considerably reduced".63 At the same time, however, it stresses the existence of 
"tensions and military conflicts that may spread". Similarly, the Security Strategy of 
the Czech Republic appreciates the "considerable reduction in the possibility of a 
global war breaking out".64 Furthermore, it also acknowledges that "the potential has 
increased of certain partial risks and low-intensity risks to materialise, which, 
however, may transform into a massive threat when combined".65 
Although all these documents perceive the likelihood of potential threats to individual 
countries, none of them specifies the nature or direction of these threats in greater 
detail. The reasons for this are twofold. Firstly, these documents deal not only with 
concrete and imminent risks but also with potential threats and, secondly, they are 
drafted in the general terms appropriate for their intended long-term application and 
not as a response to particular situations at specific times. Also, one could argue that it 
could be diplomatically unwise and indeed counter-productive if the political elite 
codified potential external security risks in publicly accessible documents. Thus, 
while the public's perceptions of external risks to national security cover a range of 
potential issues, the political elite tends to avoid debating specific latent risks. 
4.2.1 The Perception of the Russian Threat 
The perception of Russia as a potential source of insecurity is highly contentious 
among the CEEn political and academic elite. On the one hand the majority of the 
CEEn population and elite believes that Russia does not pose an immediate military 
threat to their countries, whilst, on the other, the same people fear the possibility of 
some kind of instability emanating from Russia. They do so despite the fact that, with 
the exception of the Baltics and, to a limited extent, Poland, which has a border with 
the highly militarised Russian enclave of Kaliningrad, CEEn states no longer border 
directly on Russia. A Hungarian observer has summed up the nature of the Russian 
threat in the following way: 
63 Romania's Strategy ofNational Security, June 1999, Source: 
http://www.mapn.ro/englishlmapn/National%20strategy.htrn [01/1112000] 
64 Security Strategy of the Republic ofPoland (2000), section I. 1. 
65 Ibid. 
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Contrary to the generally held perceptions, the real threat may come not from 
a strong fundamentalist leadership (in the context of security, the concrete 
forms, directions, ideologies and slogans of fundamentalism are irrelevant) 
but from the lack, or shortcomings of, a stable state structure and from a 
weakening discipline of the armed forces. 66 
As far as Soviet!Russian domestic political and economic developments are 
concerned, the CEEn countries' trust has been heavily shaken by a series of events. 
The Soviet coup in August 1991 showed that the central government's and the 
military's power can be overthrown overnight. The electoral success of the leader of 
the extreme nationalist Liberal Democratic Party Vladimir Zhirinovsky in the 
December 1993 parliamentary elections increased the power of radical political actors 
and made Russian foreign policy more unpredictable. For instance in Poland, in the 
wake of Zhirinovsky's electoral success, the number of people who perceived a threat 
to their country's independence from Russia, increased from 22 per cent in June 1993 
to nearly 40 per cent in February 1994.67 As Haerpfer et al. have concluded: 
Although Russians themselves may be unwilling to re-create the military 
ambitions of the former Soviet Union, demagogic politicians such as 
Zhirinovsky have the power to stir up popular feelings. 68 
Russia's struggle to achieve stability as a democracy and as a market economy has 
proven to be extremely difficult since 1991 and there can be no assurance that it will 
not revert to an imperial and expansionist state. 69 The Russian claim to have some 
exclusive rights to police conflicts in the post-Soviet space (the concept of 'near 
abroad' - 'bliznie zaruzhznie'), was perceived in Poland in the context of Russian veto 
to NATO's eastward enlargement as a kind of 'Pax Russica' for continuing influence 
in CEE.70 The major dilemma that CEEn countries face, IS, as former advisor to 
Czech President Vaclav Ravel, Jacques Rupnik has put it: 
66 Balogh, Andras (1997) "The Atlantic Dimension of Central European Security", Foreign Policy: The 
Quarterly of the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, Vol. 3, special edition, p. 20. 
67 See Starzynski, Piotr (1996) "Poland", in Smoke, Richard (ed.) Perceptions of Security. Public 
Opinion and Expert Assessments in Europe's New Democracies. Manchester and New York: 
Manchester University Press, p. 62. 
68 Haerpfer et al. (1999), p. 996. 
69 See Alexandrova, Olga (1997) "The Russian Threat- Real or Imaginary?", in Bredow, Wilfried von, 
Thomas Jager and Gerhard Kiimmel (eds.), European Security, Basingstoke: Macmillan, p. 43. 
70 See GieBmann (1995), p. 45; Stankevicius, Ceslovas V. (1996) "NATO Enlargement and the 
Indivisibility of Security in Europe: A View from Lithuania", NATO Review, 44:5, September, p. 21. 
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What is Russia without an empire? This is the first element of the Russian 
apprehension of the idea of Central Europe. This is the origin of the feeling of 
insecurity that is not shared by the West, especially in France, but which is felt 
in Central Europe, not only because of the local experiences, but also because 
of the weat uncertainty that looms over the very future of post-imperial 
Russia. 1 
Indeed, the view held by the top political and military leadership in Russia, that 
NATO enlargement is aimed against Russia and its national interests, was received in 
CBE with great reservations.72 Events, like the brutal handling of the ongoing 
Chechnyan problem or the attempt to exert military-political pressure in areas of the 
'near abroad' (Georgia, Moldova, Tajikistan) have intensified the suspicion among the 
CEEn public and elite of the intentions of the Russian government. As an example, 
Czech politicians also expressed their concern regarding the possibility of a new 
Russian threat to the CEEn region. As President Vaclav Havel suggested it in 1995: 
... we have already lived through one Soviet occupation. As a result of this 
experience it is natural that we react to certain alarming signals sensitively, 
which appear in current Russian politics and which could lead to the return of 
old times in a somewhat more modern form. This is valid, for instance, for the 
attempt to bind us into the concept of 'near abroad'. 73 
Ravel's concern articulates adroitly the complex nature of the Russian threat as 
perceived by a large proportion of CEEn populations. On the one hand, it draws 
attention to the seriousness of certain 'alarming' processes in post-communist Russia. 
On the other, it also acknowledges the existence of a substantial cognitive element 
that shapes the perception of Russia as a threat in contemporary CEE, namely the role 
of negative historic experience with Soviet-Russia after WW2. Owing to its temporal 
proximity, the majority of the CEEn population has enduring memories of the period 
of Soviet domination of the region. People and governments blame the more than 40 
years of Soviet rule for the economic misery that is currently prevalent in their 
countries. This, largely negative, historic image has a damaging impact on the 
perception of post-Cold War Russia. 
71 Rupnik, Jacques (2000) "In Search of East-Central Europe: Ten Years After", in Gardner, Hall (ed.), 
Central and Southeastern Europe in Transition- Perspectives on Success and Failure since 1989. 
Westport and London: Praeger, p. 14. 
72 See Cimoszewicz, Wlodzimierz (1996) "Building Poland's Security: Membership ofNATO a Key 
Objective", NATO Review, 44:3, May, p. 6; Parkhalina, Tatjana (1997) "Of Myths and Illusions: 
Russian Perceptions of NATO Enlargement", NATO Review, 45:3, May-June, p. 12. 
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Another factor that is often perceived in CEE and in Western countries as potentially 
dangerous, is the apparently lax control and security of the nuclear arsenal of 
Russia.74 Though Russia might have declined as a political and ideological 
superpower, it continues to be a nuclear superpower. Uncertainties stemming from 
possible breakdowns of control systems, as a result of political disputes or the lack of 
available resources, are concerns not only of the neighbouring CEEn states, but of the 
entire world. Dunay has concluded as regards the nature of the Russian threat 
perceived by the CEEn countries as follows: 
In general the Central Europeans do not perceive a concrete military threat 
but rather an abstract danger with military component. The real fear is that 
the West will give in, and recognise certain special Russian prerogatives in 
Central European affairs.75 
For all these reasons, it is not surprising that in 1998 Russia was perceived by 62 per 
cent of Poles, 48 per cent of Czechs, 45 per cent of Slovaks, 42 per cent of Romanians 
and 13 per cent of Hungarians as a threat to peace and security (see figure 4-1).76 
Although the overall trend since 1990 in CEE has shown a slightly declining 
tendency, in some countries the fear of Russia has increased during the last decade. 
So, for instance in the Czech Republic it increased from 39 per cent in 1992 to 48 per 
cent in 1998 and, likewise, in the traditionally Russian-friendly Slovak Republic the 
fear coefficient grew from 26 per cent to 45 per cent over the same period. 77 
73 Cited in GieBmann (1995), p. 125. (quotation translated from the German by the author) 
74 See Alexandrova (1997), p. 41. 
75 Dunay (1995), p. 47. 
76 See Haerpfer et al. (1999), p. 1001. 
77 !bid, p. lOOOf 
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More differentiated surveys conducted in the three Baltic states between 1995 and 
2000 have revealed deep anxieties among the countries' populations with regard to 
Russia as a source of threat. In 1995, 32 per cent of Estonia's indigenous population 
considered that the Russian state was 'definitely'78 a threat to peace and security of the 
country, while 49 per cent of the population believed that such a threat was 'possible', 
as opposed to barely 15 per cent of the population, who regarded the level of threat 
rather 'improbable'. In Latvia and Lithuania, the number of those who regard Russia 
as a definite threat was somewhat lower, 16 and 15 per cent of the respondents, 
respectively. However, the number of those, who believed Russia posed a possible 
threat to peace and security was very high in both countries, 54 per cent in Latvia and 
53 per cent in Lithuania, whilst only 18 per cent of respondents in both countries 
considered such a threat 'improbable'.79 A more recent survey conducted in 2000 
showed that there has been little change in the Baltic populations' perception of 
Russia as a threat since 1995. 33 per cent of respondents in Estonia consider Russia a 
'definite' threat, 45 per cent a 'possible' threat and 20 per cent an 'improbable' threat. 
78 Underlined terms are those used to characterise the different perceived levels of threat in the surveys 
carried out by Rose; See Rose, Richard (1995) New Baltics Barometer!!. A Survey Study. Glasgow: 
Centre for the Study of Public Policy, Studies in Public Policy No. 251; Rose, Richard (1997) New 
Baltics Barometer Ill A Survey Study. Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, Studies in 
Public Policy No. 251; Rose, Richard (2000) New Baltic Barometer IV. A Survey Study. Glasgow: 
Centre for the Study of Public Policy, Studies in Public Policy No. 338. 
79 See Rose (1995), p. 34. 
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For Latvia in 2000, the corresponding figures were 19 per cent, 47 per cent and 20 per 
cent respectively. Lithuania represents the exception under the Baltic states, as it is 
the only country, whose population has developed a less fearful attitude towards 
Russia by 2000 (12 per cent: definitely, 38 per cent possibly, 34 probably not and 17 
per cent: definitely not). 80 The most obvious explanation for this trend is offered by 
the fact that Lithuania (unlike Latvia and Estonia) no longer shares borders with 
mainland Russia, with the exception of the Kaliningrad enclave in the southwest. 
The same surveys conducted in the Baltic states revealed some deep anxieties among 
the populations over hardline nationalist politicians in Russia. Whilst in 1995,81 only 7 
per cent of indigenous respondents in Estonia, 7 per cent in Latvia and 9 per cent in 
Lithuania thought that hardline nationalist politicians in Russia definitely posed a 
threat to peace and security of their respective countries, answers to the same question 
in 2000 showed a much deeper level of concern, 33, 23 and 23 per cent respectively. 82 
4.2.2 The Perception of the German and the US Threats 
The perception of contemporary Germany as a potential risk to CEEn military 
security appears to be another example of the strong influence of historical images 
and prejudices in the region. This is particularly apparent in Poland and, to a lesser 
extent, in the Czech Republic, where the negative perceptions of Germany as a 
potential military threat are far higher than in the rest of CEE, where these attitudes 
are generally low (see figure 4-2).83 
80 See Rose (2000), p. 36. 
81 See Rose (1995), p. 34. 
82 See Rose (2000), p. 37. 
83 See Boguszakova et al. (1996), p. 46. 
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In 1998, 42 per cent of Poles and 37 per cent of Czechs expressed some anxiety of a 
Germany threat. 84 These results, compared with relatively low indicators measured in 
Romania and Hungary, where only 14 as well as 3 per cent of the populations 
expressed some fear of Germany respectively, seem to mirror old historic analogies 
and sentiments, rather than any real military threat. As Starzynski explains 
many Poles are familiar with the German phrase 'Drang nach Os ten' and do 
not believe that German people have abandoned a desire that they have shown 
repeatedly over centuries. 85 
However, in Poland, the 1998 figure of 42 per cent compared with 70 per cent in 1992 
shows a significant decline of the perceived German threat. 86 The reasons for this lie 
first in the weakening of old forms of historic threats, and second, and perhaps more 
importantly, in the improvement of the relationship between post-Cold War Germany 
and Poland, culminating in the recognition of the Oder-Neisse border line. 
Furthermore, Polish and Czech membership ofNATO as well as the advancement of 
EU accession negotiations may have helped to overcome old historic grievances. 
German financial support and massive German investment in CEE contributes further 
to the alteration of the country's perception in the region. 
84 See Haerpfer et al. (1999), lOOOf. 
85 Strarzynski (1996), p. 55. 
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The generally rather positive perception of Germany is characteristic of all three 
Baltic states as well. In 2000, the overwhelming majority of respondents thought that 
Germany posed definitely no or probably no threat to their respective countries peace 
and security (Lithuania 95 per cent, Latvia 89 per cent and Estonia 94 per cent) and 
only a small minority believed in the possibility of such a threat ( 4, 3 and 5 per cent 
respectively). 87 
In addition, the CEEn political elite's attitude towards contemporary Germany is 
generally positive. While post-1991 Russian foreign policy in general and Russian 
reaction to NATO enlargement in particular, has provoked some concern among 
CEEn politicians, no evidence can be found among the CEEn elite for a perception of 
Germany as an external military threat. 
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The public's perception of threat from the USA is relatively low in the entire CEEn 
region (see figure 4-3). Yugoslavia represents a clear exception here, since the image 
of the USA held by the population suffered tremendously during the NATO air 
strikes. In 1998, 85 per cent of the population in Yugoslavia believed that the USA 
86 See Haerpfer et al. (1999), p. 1002. 
87 See Rose (2000), p. 36. 
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posed a threat to peace and security, compared to 7 per cent in Bulgaria, 13 per cent in 
Romania, 4 per cent in Hungary, 15 per cent in Poland and 16 per cent in the Czech 
Republic. 88 In a similar vein, only a minority of the populations of the Baltic states 
perceive the possibility of a threat posed by the USA (Lithuania 5 per cent, Latvia 3 
per cent and Estonia 6 per cent).89 These figures are very low, considering the fact 
that until1990, the USA was projected by the Soviet-influenced CEEn governments 
as the number one enemy and chief threat to national security. 
4.2.3 The Perception of Threat from Neighbouring Countries 
Neighbouring countries seem to be perceived by parts of the CEEn population as a 
threat to their respective country's security. The extent, to which people feel 
threatened by one or more of their neighbours, however, differs markedly from 
country to country. Thus, it cannot be interpreted as an alarming region-wide 
phenomenon. Opinion polls reveal that in 1998, 30 per cent of the population of 
Slovakia, 27 per cent of that ofRomania, 23 per cent of that of Hungary, 20 per cent 
of that of Poland, 19 per cent of that of Bulgaria, 11 per cent of that of Slovenia and 8 
per cent of that of the Czech Republic perceives some threat from their neighbouring 
countries (see figure 4-4).90 Again, it has to be acknowledged that the figures from 
1998 show in all countries, with the exception of the Balkans, which were then 
engaged in conflict, a significant decline compared to those of earlier polls in 1992 
and 1996. 
The reasons for the perception of neighbouring countries as potential sources of 
military threat vary from county to country. In countries neighbouring former 
Yugoslavia, this threat perception has been largely generated by the war that took 
place on their doorstep. The fear that the war could spread was felt by substantial 
parts ofthe neighbouring countries' populations. 
88 See Haerpfer et al. (1999), p. 1003. 
89 See Rose (2000), p. 36. 
90 See Haerpfer et al. (1999), 1004. 
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The perceived threat of the hostile neighbour in Slovakia, Romania and Hungary is 
mainly a product of negative past experiences, coupled with more contemporary 
clashes over the treatment of national minorities. Both issues seem to have declined in 
importance with the settling of neighbourly relations via basic treaties between the 
respective countries, which recognise the inviolability of existing borders and regulate 
the rights of national minorities. In addition, favourable political processes in 
Slovakia and in Romania (except for some extremists tendencies discussed in chapter 
three) and the strengthening of democracy in all three countries in the late 1990s have 
contributed to the more positive attitude of the population to their neighbouring 
countries. Indeed, the perception of this risk has dropped significantly during the 
1990s in all these countries (in Slovakia from 46 per cent in 1992 to 30 per cent in 
1998, in Romania from 67 per cent in 1992 to 27 per cent in 1998 and in Hungary 
from 64 per cent in 1992 to 23 per cent in 1998).91 
Whilst some parts of the public remain worried about the possibility of a threat 
emanating from a neighbouring country, the political elite seems to be less concerned. 
The most plausible explanation for this is that the political elite is far more aware of 
the significance of diplomatic achievements and favourable processes in the region's 
91 Ibid. 
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international politics than the public at large. All CEEn countries cooperate with each 
other in various international and regional organisations and NATO's PfP programme 
and seek membership in the EU and NATO: Poland, the Czech Republic and Hungary 
became members of NATO in March 1999, nine countries have applications pending 
for NATO and ten CEEn countries are involved in accession negotiations with the 
EU. Therefore, the CEEn political elite knows that any kind of armed conflict would 
go against their countries' vital national interests, consequently, cooperation with their 
neighbours has no alternative. In addition, most CEEn countries do not have sufficient 
military capabilities at their disposal either to initiate a war or alone to deter an 
external aggressor.92 The national security doctrines of CEEn countries reflect this 
view, i.e. they do not consider any of the countries' neighbours as a threat to national 
security. 
4.3 The Perception of New Non-military Threats 
Although most internal issues that are perceived by the population as risks do not 
present a direct military threat to the state, they can have a negative effect on 
individuals' security and welfare. There is a wide range of mainly 'new' internal risks 
that are perceived by the public and the political elite in CEE. In chapter three, we 
have categorised these non-military threats as political, economic, societal and 
environmental. Here, we will look at threat perceptions in selected issue areas, which, 
mainly correspond with the sectoral analysis of the previous chapter. Thus, in the 
following, we will concentrate on four major issues that seem to be uppermost in the 
concerns of the public and the political elite. First, we will look at the perception of 
vulnerabilities generated by the difficult political, economic and societal transition 
processes, including the rise of petty as well as large-scale organised criminal activity. 
Second, we will highlight public and elite attitudes towards national as well as ethnic 
minorities. Third, we will concentrate on risk perceptions generated mainly by the 
escalating migration in the region. Finally, we will analyse, how important ecological 
risk perceptions are in contemporary CEE. 
92 See GieBmann (1995), p. 89. 
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4.3.1 Risks Generated by the Complex Transition Process 
The public at large and the political elite alike are worried about possible political and 
societal insecurities emanating from the transitional nature of their political systems, 
economies and societies. For example, as Blasek has stated in the context of the 
Czech Republic, "a majority of the Czech population consider social and economic 
risks (threats) as priority concerns in the security field". 93 This is not necessarily of 
serious concern in countries, which face a complex transition process, on condition 
that the majority of their populations believe in the rightfulness of the existing 
democratic constitutional order. However, this is where opinion polls reveal some 
worrying attitudes of the public in many CEEn countries. According to the 'Central 
and Eastern Eurobarometer' published by the European Commission, only 42 per cent 
of respondents in the countries seeking EU membership are satisfied with the way 
democracy is developing and working in their countries.94 This survey also exhibits 
substantial regional variations in CEE, including Poland with the highest result of 54 
per cent and Bulgaria with 21 per cent only (see figure 4-5). 
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The more recent 'Gallup International Millennium Survey' shows that only 12 per cent 
of Eastern Europeans believe their countries are governed by the will of the people, 
which is the lowest response in the world (compared to, for instance, 3 7.5 per cent in 
Western Europe).95 The same survey reveals even more alarming disparities between 
attitudes of the population in Eastern and Western Europe. It suggests that only 25.8 
per cent of Eastern Europeans think elections in their countries are free and fair, 
compared to 73.3 per cent in Western Europe. 
Even if it can be said that the negative response of the majority of the CEEn 
population is often the result of transient political events and harsh transitional 
economic and social conditions in their respective countries, the general trend of 
widespread dissatisfaction with democracy and the way in which politics is run in the 
region raises some serious security concerns. These concerns are also perceived by 
the political elites in CBE and are articulated in most national security 
concepts/strategies. 'Romania's Strategy ofNational Security' states, for instance, that 
"the prolongation of domestic economic, financial and social difficulties that critically 
and vitally affect the functioning of the Romanian society" poses a risk to national 
security.96 In a similar vein, the 'National Security Concept of the Republic of 
Bulgaria' reveals similar concerns with regard to risks generated by the county's 
difficult transition process, as it states: 
The economic factor is decisive for the guarantee of national security. Only 
the stabilisation, re-establishment and growth of Bulgarian economy are in a 
position to satisfy the interests of the Bulgarian citizens, society and state, to 
solve the problems concerning the deficiency of resources, to improve the 
living standard and increase the degree of social protection. 97 
Similarly, 'The National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia' acknowledges 
in a section on 'new security threats' that 
a number of factors with a potential to influence Estonia's domestic security 
stem from the great economic and social transformation that the region is 
95 Gallup International Millennium Survey (2000) Source: 
http:/ /www.gallup-intemational.com/surveys.htm [ 10/0112001 ]. 
96 See Romania's Strategy of National Security (1999) 
97 See National Security Concept of the Republic of Bulgaria, approved by the National Assembly in 
April 1998, Source: http:/ /www.md.govemment.bg/ _en _/national_ security_ concept.html [0 111112000]. 
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undergoing. The speedy pace of change brings with it the danger of a 
widening socio-economic g~J{ This, in turn, increases social problems such as 
crime and substance abuse. 9 
This observation already highlights the close relationship that exists between socio-
economic difficulties and the rise of criminal activity in post-communist CBE. 
Furthermore, the level of crime influences the perceived social and economic security 
of the population.99 Whether it is concerned with petty crime, such as burglaries, 
thefts or larger scale organised crime, including Mafia activity in the trafficking of 
drugs, weapons or humans, there is a "mounting public anxiety" in CEE.100 It is feared 
in many states of the region that their strategic position as transit countries between 
East and West and also between North and South, could make them the favoured 
targets of international organised criminal activity.101 As Boguszakova et al. have 
noted, the CEEn public also fears that the police and border guards are neither 
sufficiently well trained nor suitably equipped, nor have they adequate experience for 
combating organised criminals. 102 This again shows some considerable difference in 
the public's attitude in Eastern and Western Europe. According to the 'Gallup 
International Millennium Survey' already quoted above, 86 per cent of the 
respondents in Eastern Europe believed that their government did not handle crime 
well and only 10 per cent believed that the government tackled crime wel1. 103 In 
Western Europe, on the contrary, 29 per cent of the respondents believed that their 
government handled crime well, while 67 per cent thought that it did not. 
Similarly, the political elite in CBE seems to percetve cnme m general and 
international organised crime in particular as newly arising matters that pose a serious 
challenge to the countries' national security. All CEEn states' national security 
concepts/strategies point out the seriousness of risks stemming from all kinds of 
criminal activity. The Polish national security document notes that "the threat of 
terrorist acts against citizens and institutions in Poland is increasing" .104 The 
98 National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia, adopted by Estonia's Parliament in 2000, 
Source: http://www.vm.ee/eng/policy/security/ [01111/2000], section 1. 4. 
99 See Blasek (1998), p. 94. 
100 See Boguszakova et al. (1996), p. 37. 
101 See GieBmann (1995), p. 58; Starzynski (1996), p. 126. 
102 See Boguszakova et al. (1996), p. 37. 
103 See Gallup International Millennium Survey (2000) 
104 See Security Strategy ofthe Republic of Poland (2000), section 2. 9. 
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Romanian security strategy, meanwhile, reveals an even more comprehensive elite-
perception of crime as a security risk: 
the expansion of terrorist networks and activities, of trans-national organised 
crime (economic-financial crime, illegal cross-border trafficking of persons, 
drugs, radioactive and strategic materials, weaponry and ammunition etc.). 105 
4.3.2 Minorities and Ethnic Groups 
The public in CEE perceives national and ethnic minorities as sources of potential 
destabilisation of their national security and unity. However, according to Haerpfer et 
al., this kind of risk perception has experienced a notable decline since 1992 (see 
figure 4-6). 106 Whilst in 1992, 40 per cent of the population of all eleven CEEn 
countries on average expressed a fear of minorities and ethnic groups, this figure 
dropped in 1998 to 29 per cent. But when the findings for individual countries are 
inspected, the data suggests some considerable differences. Large parts of the 
populations of Slovakia, Romania and Bulgaria (43, 32 and 29 per cent respectively) 
seem to express serious concerns about minorities and ethnic groups. 107 All three 
countries' populations have comparatively large proportions of national minorities 
('dominant minorities'), in Slovakia and Romania the Hungarians and the Romany and 
in Bulgaria the Turks and the Romany. Mainly as a consequence of this mixed ethnic 
composition, all countries have recently been involved in conflicts with their 
neighbours, the scale of which has ranged from all-out war in the Balkans to serious 
diplomatic disputes between the other countries. This can explain the population's 
subjective anxieties about risks engendered in the existence of dominant national and 
ethnic minorities. 
105 See Romania's Strategy of National Security 
106 Haerpfer et al. (1999), p. 1003. 
107 1bid, p. 1005. 
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Surveys of public attitudes conducted in Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania show similar 
trends. In 1994, 46 per cent of the Latvian population and 42 per cent of the 
Lithuanian saw a 'possible future conflict between ethnic groups' in their respective 
countries, while as many as 69 per cent of Estonians regarded such an event as being 
possible. 108 Meanwhile, other studies have found that the Russian-speaking minorities 
in the three Baltic countries are less oriented towards conflict than the indigenous 
populations.109 The difference between Russophones and Estonians is the greatest 
with 31 per cent, compared with 12 per cent in Latvia and 19 per cent in Lithuania. As 
more recent surveys have revealed, Estonians are becoming less conflict oriented, 
however, as regards this issue, the difference between Estonia and the other two 
Baltic states is still considerable. 110 
In many countries of Eastern and Western Europe, the public at large perceives that, 
to some extent, the Romany minorities pose a danger to the majority. In CEE, there 
are numerous examples of manifestations of this anxiety and subsequent action 
108 See Rose, Richard and W. Maley (1994) Nationalities in the Baltic States: A Survey Study. 
Glasgow: Centre for the Study of Public Policy, Studies in Public Policy No. 293, p. 44. 
109 See Steen, Anton (2000) "Ethnic Relations, Elites and Democracy in the Baltic States", Journal of 
Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 16:4, p. 216; Steen, Anton (1997) Between Past and 
Future: Elites, Democracy and the State in Post-communist Countries. A Comparison of Estonia, 
Latvia and Lithuania. Aldershot: Ashgate, p. 78. 
110 See Rose (2000), p. 36; Steen (2000), p. 78. 
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against the Romany populations. In the Czech town ofUsti nad Labem, for example, 
a wall was erected in 1999 to segregate a Romany neighbourhood from a Czech 
neighbourhood, the action being commissioned by the town's leaders.111 Similarly, the 
Romany minority is often the subject oflarge-scale discrimination, sometimes even of 
violence, in Slovakia, Romania and Hungary, which is currently one of the most 
significant sources of social conflict in these transition countries. 
The vast majority of the political elite does not share these rather extreme views about 
the Romany population held by substantial parts of the public in CEE. There are, 
however, few exceptions. In Hungary, for instance, the ultra-nationalist Hungarian 
Justice and Life Party, led by the populist Istvan Csurka and in Romania, the Party of 
Greater Romania, headed by Corneliu Vadim Tudor, try to boost public resentment 
against minorities. The European Union has declared on several occasions that the 
· just treatment of minorities, including the Romany population, is one of the political 
preconditions of membership. Thus, governments in CEE are keen to assure their 
Western colleagues ofthe lengths to which they are going to try to improve the life of 
minorities, something, which appears to be difficult at a time, when the number of 
Roma families fleeing their home countries in CEE and asking for asylum in EU 
countries is increasing. Since 1998, Britain, Ireland, Belgium, Denmark and Finland 
have re-imposed visa requirements on Slovakian citizens, in response to an influx of 
Romany asylum seekers from the Slovak Republic. In addition, the Czech Republic 
and Hungary were warned that they could be the subject of similar restrictions, should 
its government fail to address the issue of the Romany minority. 
The political elite of CEE does recognise the potential of minority- and ethnic groups-
related conflicts and their threat they pose to national security. To varying degrees, 
most national security concepts/strategies reflect these concerns (e.g. Estonian, 
Latvian, Romanian, Hungarian, Bulgarian and Czech documents). It has to be 
acknowledged, however, that beyond simply voicing their concern over this issue, 
some recognise the importance of finding solutions for reducing ethnic tensions. For 
example, the 'National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia' states that 
111 See Hill, Don (1999) "Czech Republic: Deputy Minister Faces Sharp Questions on Roma", RFEIRL 
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Estonia shares the understanding well rooted in today's Europe that the state 
must guarantee minority rights and assist the integration into society of 
. h . d . l 112 varzous et me an socza groups. 
According to opinion polls conducted among the political elite in the three Baltic 
states in the 1990s, the Estonian elite was most oriented towards a possible ethnic 
confrontation, the Lithuanian elite thought that such a conflict was rather unlikely, 
while the Latvian elite took a middle position. Since 1994, the proportion of those 
elites who saw a possible ethnic confrontation has shown a declining tendency. Steen 
explains the confrontational character of the minority-majority relations in the early 
1990s in Estonia through the "country's lack of multi-ethnic integration and its harsh 
experiences during the occupation period, with severe deportations and a big influx of 
Russian settlers after the Second World War". 113 It has to be acknowledged, too, that 
most of the respondents among the political elite believed, conflict would be more 
oriented towards aggressive rhetoric than open and massive violence. 
The major challenge that governments in CEE face with regard to the integration of 
national and ethnic minorities into society, is, that in many cases there is little support 
for these initiatives from the majority. The example of the Romany minorities in 
many countries of the region illustrates, how little government programmes alone can 
achieve, if there is a lack of a strong civil society, upholding values, such as tolerance 
and the respect of individual and human rights. 
4.3.3 Escalating Migration 
Migration is a new issue, which was virtually non-existent during the communist 
period in CEE. Whilst the authoritarian nature of the CEEn regimes generated 
migration, with thousands of people fleeing their countries of origin to go to the West, 
migrants or refugees did not target the CEEn countries. After opening up their borders 
post-1989/90, CEEn countries have increasingly became popular destinations for 
economic immigrants from the Far East and from Russia and the CIS. This situation 
Newsline, 19/10/1999. 
112 National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia (2000), section 1. 4. 
113 Steen (2000), p. 76. 
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intensified during the war in the Balkans that triggered a massive influx of refugees 
into many CEEn countries. Thus, migration has created some very real problems in 
some of the region's countries that were neither experienced nor financially prepared 
for handling this challenge. 
It is, therefore, not surprising that the public in some CEEn states perceives 
immigrants and refugees as threats to peace and stability in their respective countries 
(see figure 4-7). This kind of risk perception was fairly high in Poland in 1992 (41 per 
cent), then it declined in 1996 (14 per cent), and since then it has shown a tendency to 
increase again (24 per cent).114 Due to its geographical situation, Poland is an 
attractive destination or transit route for illegal immigrants, "fleeing turmoil, conflict 
and disasters". 115 Probably for similar reasons, these threat perceptions are on the rise 
in Slovakia and the Czech Republic since 1992, reaching 40 as well as 38 per cent in 
1998 respectively. 116 Likewise, people in Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary appeared to 
be more anxious about the consequences of escalating migration in 1998 than in 
earlier years (14, 22 and 35 per cent respectively). 117 The main reason hereof is 
clearly the war in the Balkans. 
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Figure 4-7 Perception of the threat posed by immigrants and refugees 1992-1998 
Source: Haerpfer et al. 1999, p.1006. 
114 See Haerpfer et al. (1999), p. 1006. 
115 See Starzynski (1996), p. 59. 
116 See Haerpfer et al. (1999), p. 1006. 
117 Ibid. 
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To varying degrees, the populations of the three Baltic states perceive some kind of 
threat to their peace and security generated by refugees and immigrants. This type of 
threat perception is most clearly manifest in Estonia, where in 2000, in the surveys 
carried out by Rose, 13 per cent of respondents among the indigenous population 
thought refugees and immigrants were definitely a threat to peace and security, whilst 
33 per cent perceived a possible threat of this kind.118 These figures show a significant 
increase since 1995, when the same threat was perceived by 4 per cent and 15 per cent 
of the population respectively.119 Similarly, the indigenous population in Lithuania 
expressed a somewhat more apprehensive view with regard to refugees and 
immigrants in 2000 than in 1995, but the increase was consistently less than in 
Estonia (in 1995, 1 per cent said 'definitely' and 20 per cent 'possibly', compared to 6 
per cent and 20 per cent in 2000, respectively). In contrast, the indigenous population 
in Latvia seemed to be less worried about the consequences of the influx of refugees 
and immigrants in 2000 than five years earlier. Whilst in 1995, 7 per cent of the 
population perceived a definite and 28 per cent a possible threat from refugees and 
immigrants, these figures decline somewhat by 2000 to 4 per cent and to 22 per cent, 
respectively. According to the same surveys from 1995 and 2000, respondents among 
the dominant Russian minorities in all three countries perceive refugees and 
immigrants as less significant threats to peace and security.120 An obvious explanation 
for this is offered by the fact that the majority of the so-called 'economic immigrants' 
seeking refuge in the economically comparatively more developed Baltic states 
originate from Russia and the CIS. 
The political elite perceives similar risks that can be generated by migration and the 
mass influx of refugees. Most CEEn security concepts/strategies are concerned with 
the consequences of illegal migration, the upsurge of economic immigrants and 
refugees, caused by conflicts and ecological disasters in the region. The Polish 
document concludes that the "present scale of economic migration poses a serious 
challenge to state structures and services" .121 The Czech security strategy registers 
similar concerns as it states that "massive migration waves, the advance of which onto 
118 See Rose (2000), p. 36. 
119 See Rose (1995), p. 34. 
120 lbid; Rose (2000), p. 36. 
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the country's territory may develop into violent actions on the part of the 
immigrants" .122 Also, Estonia and Latvia's security concepts mirror some kind of risk 
perceptions triggered by illegal migration and refugees. The Latvian document 
suggests a treatment of illegal migrants and refugees under the same provisions, a 
rather biased view that is often held by parts ofthe population in CEE: 
In order to prevent the mass influx of refugees and illegal migrants across the 
nation's borders, effective national borders are insured, territorial water and 
airspace control is provided ... 113 
4.3.4 Ecological Issues 
Perceptions of environmental risks do not seem to preoccupy the security concerns of 
the majority of the CEEn population. As Kobtzeff has concluded, the "environment 
has become less than a secondary concern for Central and Eastern European 
voters" .124 This impression is supported by the findings of the 'Gallup International 
Millennium Survey', which suggests that the majority of the CEEn citizenry believes, 
economic growth was more important than environmental protection.125 The same 
survey reveals some interesting differences between the environmental risk perception 
of Eastern and Western European publics. When asked, the majority of the CEEn 
population appeared to be more worried about basic or traditional pollution problems 
(drinking water and industrial pollution), while the population of Western Europe 
seemed to be concerned about comparatively abstract issues (ozone layer, rainforests, 
species, wildlife and global warming). Both Eastern and Western Europeans seem still 
to be highly apprehensive of potential nuclear accidents. 
With regard to the public perception of environmental security in the Czech Republic, 
ecological risks rank fifth out of eight different security issues, and, as Blasek found, 
121 Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland (2000), section 2. 7. 
122 Security Strategy of the Czech Republic (1999), section I. 4. 
123 Security Concept of the Republic ofLatvia, approved by the Cabinet ofMinisters on the 6th ofMay 
1997, Source: http://www.rnfa.gov.lv/eng/policy/security/securconc.htrn [10/11/2000], section IV. 8. 
124 Kobtzeff, Oleg (2000) "Environmental Security and Civil Society", in Gardner, Hall (ed.), Central 
and Southeastern Europe in Transition- Perspectives on Success and Failure Since 1989. Westport 
and London: Praeger. p. 135. 
125 See Gallup International Millennium Survey (2000) 
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it is "primarily the younger generation who take ecological risks seriously". 126 
Nevertheless, it is very likely that some recent environmental catastrophes, such as 
serious floods in a number of CEEn countries and the subsequent pollution of 
drinking water sources, large-scale pollution of rivers will increase the populations' 
perception of environmental risks in the near future. 
The CEEn political elite identifies in their countries' security concepts/strategies the 
preservation of the environment as a principal objective of national security. The 
Polish document devotes an entire section to 'The Natural environment' and states, 
efforts to protect and improve the quality of the natural environment must be 
regarded as closely linked to the question of national existence. Natural 
disasters as well as catastrophes caused by human activity can constitute a 
serious threat to state security. Particular concern surrounds the question of 
safe nuclear power in Europe, particularly in our close vicinity. The 
experience flowing from the Chernobyl disaster inclines us to devote the 
greatest attention to the matter as a potential threat to the life and health of 
. . 127 
soczetzes. 
As we can see, the 'Chemobyl syndrome' seems to shape the elite's perception of a 
potential nuclear risk to a great extent. Almost all countries' documents identify this 
specific source of risk. The Czech Republic's Security Strategy lists ecological risks 
as the number one security issue and points out that the matter of their 
unpredictability makes them difficult to avert: 
Natural disasters, industrial and environmental accidents, emergence and 
spreading of epidemics: This risk remains highly topical at all times, with a 
catastrophe of a hardly predictable scope imminent in hours or days, and with 
a potential of turning into a threat of an as yet unknown character. 128 
4.4 Conclusion 
In general it can be argued that the risk perceptions of the CEEn populations and their 
political elites reflect a wide range of factors, which include traditional (already 
experienced) as well as new types of insecurities. This widened set of perceived risks 
126 Blasek (1998), p. 95. 
127 Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland (2000}, section 2. 8. 
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and vulnerabilities underlines the analytical utility of the comprehensive security 
framework employed in the previous chapter. The sectoral approach to the analysis of 
security predicaments of the Copenhagen School is broadly in line with the way in 
which the political elite perceives security in some CEEn countries. This view, for 
instance, is most clearly expressed in the 'Security Strategy ofthe Republic of Poland', 
as it declares that 
Poland approaches security in a comprehensive manner, taking into account 
the significance and influence of diverse political, military, economic, social, 
environmental, energy-related and other factors. 129 
In addition, the Copenhagen framework is also of considerable use in analysing the 
attitudes of individual CEEn countries' populations towards "such issues as national 
security, security risks and potential threats", as Blasek has argued in the context of 
the Czech Republic.130 
This chapter has found that the CEEn populations and their political elites perceive a 
range of objective and subjective risks/vulnerabilities. The latter are often influenced 
(or biased) by cognitive processes, i.e. by beliefs held by the public and the members 
of the political elite. Among these beliefs, the most influential ones appear to be 
historical analogies that shape security perceptions in post-Cold War CEE. Vivid 
recollections of past events and, often, historical grievances can, to a great extent, 
contribute to the endurance of negative hostile images. These are partly responsible 
for the apprehensive attitudes of parts of the CEEn public towards Germany and, 
more significantly, towards Russia. As Haerpfer et al. have put it, 
history still plays a very important part in shaping attitudes of some Central 
and Eastern Europeans. The prejudices and alliances created during World 
War If and even the period preceding it still affect the attitudes of Central and 
Eastern Europeans today and are likely to continue to do so. 131 
Yet, the perceptions of external military threats are not merely products of biased 
images, prior knowledge and historical interference. So, for instance, in the case of 
128 Security Strategy of the Czech Republic (1999), section I. 4. 
129 Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland (2000), section 1. 2. 1. 
130 See Blasek (1998), p. 90. 
131 Haerpfer et al. (1999), p. 1009. 
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Russia, apprehensive attitudes in CEE are shaped by both negative historical 
analogies (e.g. occupation, hegemony etc.) and a set of contemporary developments 
(e.g. instability, handling of the Chechen crisis etc.) originating from Russia. In a 
similar vein, the perceptions of neighbouring countries as risks to national security, 
held by parts of the CEEn populations, are fed by historical processes (e.g. 
occupation, war, local conflict etc.) and current developments (e.g. war in the Balkans 
etc.). A succession of surveys of public attitudes demonstrates that, to varying 
degrees, the CEEn public at large is still concerned about the possibility of an external 
military threat, whilst the political elite generally does not perceive any concrete 
external threats. 
Thus, it has been noted in this chapter that the risk perceptions of CEEn populations 
and their political elites seem to be more dominated by new (mainly internal) types of 
threats than by external military ones. Indeed, the perceptions of a wide range of risks 
generated by various, mainly new, issues in CEE have increased since the early 
1990s. Both CEEn populations and their elites are concerned about the possible 
security implications of the complex transition process that the region is currently 
undergoing. These involve instability in the political, economic and societal spheres, 
which can each affect the security of the state, regions or individuals. Socio-economic 
difficulties have also intensified criminal activity in the region, most importantly in 
the appearance of international organised crime. The CEEn populations fear that their 
respective governments either cannot or else lack the will to fight organised crime 
effectively. 
Another important new source of insecurity as perceived by parts of the CEEn publics 
and their elites is represented by minorities and ethnic groups, although it has to be 
acknowledged that, to lesser extent, this kind of threat perception existed already 
during communist times. Evidently, anxieties of minority- and ethnic-related conflict 
are primarily held by the populations of CEEn countries with a large proportion of 
minority or ethnic groups ('dominant minorities'). Like external military threat 
perceptions, cognitive processes, such as historical analogies or sentiments, often 
influence the populations' attitudes towards minorities and ethnic groups. 
Additionally, in many of the region's recently 'reincarnated' nation-states, identity 
related issues play a distinct part in the process of defining statehood and nationhood, 
113 
as we will see in chapter six in the Hungarian context. Thus, the indigenous 
populations and their elite's self-understanding and definition of national identity can 
have an impact on their understanding of others, in this case the national and ethnic 
minorities living in their territory. National and ethnic minority related problems have 
often been triggered by nationalistic politicians and by the insufficient application of 
democracy in the fragile transitional societies in CEE. Also, the public's attitudes 
towards minority and ethnic groups have often been the subject of elite manipulation, 
as happened for instance in the Balkans during the 1990s. Another issue that raises 
widespread concern among parts of the CEEn populations is the accommodation of 
the Romany minorities. In general, surveys reveal that this ethnic group faces hostile 
attitudes in many CEEn countries and numerous recent incidents suggest that these 
views may even deteriorate in the short term. 
Escalating migration is another relatively new issue that has raised security concerns 
among the CEEn public at large and their political elite. These fears intensified in 
countries bordering ex-Yugoslavia, which faced a massive influx of refugees during 
the war. The major apprehension was that the ethnic balance and tranquillity of those 
societies could be endangered and the relative political and economic stability 
threatened. In addition, it was feared that the conflict might spread to neighbouring 
countries through mass migration. Apart from migration ignited by the war in the 
Balkans, the economic hardship in Russia and the CIS and in some countries in the 
Far East generates illegal migration into some CEEn countries. In recent years, public 
and elite concerns generated by escalating illegal migration have increased in all the 
more developed CEEn states (Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia and Hungary). 
It will take probably decades, until ecological challenges will occupy a prominent 
position in the minds of inhabitants of CEE. CEEn populations seem to be far more 
worried about immediate challenges caused by the socio-economic difficulties, 
identity related issues and migration than about the longer-term and more subtle 
effects of environmental degradation. In addition, as surveys have revealed, the 
majority of the CEEn population ranks economic growth and development as being of 
higher importance than environmental protection. The exception to this occurs when 
individuals' existence is threatened by catastrophic natural disasters, such as the 
severe flooding and pollution of rivers that have lately afflicted some countries in the 
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region. Future EU membership would have a positive effect on raising public and elite 
awareness for environmental issues, as it represents an important part of the EU's 
policy. 
This chapter has analysed security perceptions held by the CEEn publics and their 
political elites. It has also attempted to explain, how cognitive processes can 
contribute to the emergence of some security predicaments. The next chapter will 
examine, how the CEEn political elite responds to security predicaments and 
perceptions. 
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5 Foreign and Security Policy-responses in post-Cold War Central 
and Eastern Europe 
The purpose of this chapter IS to highlight the main policies, which CEEn 
governments formulate in order to address the variety of security predicaments and 
perceptioons, described in chapters three and four. It deals mainly with the first stages 
of the policy-making process, that is, the initiation and formulation of policy 
objectives, whilst the implementation and evaluation phases are treated in less detail. 
What matters here, in the first instance, is, which policies CEEn governments chose to 
embark on in order to tackle a widened set of risks and vulnerabilities, rather than the 
details of the implementation processes and the matter of their success or failure. 
Just as security predicaments can crop up in a range of sectors (which we referred to 
as 'interconnectedness' in chapter three), their treatment requires action coordinated 
across various domains (e.g. foreign policy, defence policy, economic policy, social 
policy, environmental policy etc.). Regarding the risks requiring foreign policy 
action, the chapter highlights three main initiatives pursued by the majority of CEEn 
governments. These include the pursuit of integration into and cooperation with 
supranational organisations and the fostering of regional cooperation and of good-
neighbourly relations. 
Within the field of domestic policy, the chapter analysis four main areas: defence, 
economic, internal security and environmental policies and their utility in combating 
security predicaments. It will be shown that in many cases it is not the lack of 
appropriate institutions and their initiatives, but rather the scarcity of resources and 
lack of adequately trained staff that prejudice the effectiveness of security policy-
responses. 
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5 .1 Introduction 
In the previous two chapters, we highlighted security predicaments that the CEEn 
states face in the post-Cold War era. We also examined the differing security 
perceptions, held by the public at large and by the political elite. This chapter 
considers the CEEn governments' responses to real and imagined (objective and 
subjective) security predicaments. It analyses the ways, in which governments 
respond to security predicaments and perceptions and addresses the following 
questions: What are the major security policy objectives of the CEEn countries and to 
what extent can these policies offer useful remedies to combat existing and to prevent 
the emergence of potential security predicaments? Are there any common parameters, 
which characterise various CEEn countries' security policies? In order to limit the 
scope of the analysis, at the centre of the analysis will stand, primarily, the first phases 
of the policy-making process, that is, the initiation and formulation of policies 
(objectives), whilst the implementation and evaluation phases (how policies are 
implemented and with what degree of success) will be paid less attention here. Thus, 
in the first place, this chapter investigates, whether the perceived and identified 
security predicaments are followed by any response on the part of the political elite, 
and what is the nature of the response. Detailed elaboration on the effectiveness and 
outcome of a single policy initiative would go beyond the scope of this thesis. 
Furthermore, in many cases, policy-responses are still in progress (or not yet 
implemented), thus it would be too early to evaluate their success and draw any 
conclusions here. 
As far as common security policy objectives are concerned, there are some clear 
similarities between different CEEn countries' policy-responses to insecurities. This is 
certainly not a result of some coordinated approach among CEEn governments, it is 
rather a consequence of the similar nature of most of the risks and challenges that 
these countries face. Therefore, it is hardly surprising that most CEEn governments 
attempt to remedy their security predicaments in similar ways. Many of the national 
security policies reflect the transitional character of the respective states. Thus they 
have evolved in parallel with the political, economic and social transformation. In this 
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respect, a number of major CEEn national security policy objectives appear to be 
more fluid or transitional than the ones of consolidated democracies. This rather 
transitional character of security policy-making is even more apparent in those states 
that have no or very limited defence capabilities after the dissolution of the Warsaw 
Treaty Organisation. So, after having become independent sovereign states, Slovenia 
and Slovakia, for example, have been struggling to build up their armed forces from 
scratch, whilst other CEEn states have been working hard to establish civil-military 
control over their formerly Soviet-trained and commanded People's Armies. 
The CEEn governments understand that the wide range of distinct post-Cold War 
risks and challenges can only be dealt with through a comprehensive approach, 
including a number of foreign and domestic oriented policies. Consequently, with 
regard to the government's security policy, the Czech Security Strategy acknowledges 
that 
the Czech Republic seeks to provide for its security by exercising its foreign, 
defence, internal security and economic policies, which are mutually cohesive, 
supportive, and on an equal footing. 132 
Similarly, the Latvian document calls for "co-ordinated and simultaneous action in all 
spheres of threat prevention".133 The Romanian Strategy ofNational Security assigns 
an even more inclusive system of security policy interests, including "foreign policy, 
economic and financial, national safety, law enforcement and national defence 
fields" .134 In a similar manner, the Polish Security Strategy recognises that the 
country's security should be maintained "through national efforts as well as through 
further integration and co-operation within the Atlantic Alliance and with the 
European Union" .135 
Leaning on these rather general accounts and the more specific framework for foreign 
and security policy analysis set out in chapter two, in the following we will examine, 
which particular policy objectives CEEn governments pursue in two distinct policy-
making environments, foreign and domestic. Thus, leading on from the point raised 
132 Security Strategy of the Czech Republic (1999), section II. 
133 Security Concept of the Republic ofLatvia (1997), section IV. 
134 Romania's Strategy of National Security (1999) 
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by the aforementioned Polish Security Strategy, objectives stressing integration into 
and cooperation with NATO and the EU appear to be major security policy goals of 
all CEEn governments. In addition, all CEEn governments identify the following 
foreign policy objectives aimed at the strengthening of their respective countries' 
security: enhanced regional cooperation and further development of good-neighbourly 
relations. 
In the field of domestic activities, CEEn governments identify a wide range of 
security policy objectives. With regard to the maximisation of military security, 
defence policies enjoy priority, including policies to reform the armed forces and to 
establish better-organised, smaller and more efficient national armies. In addition to 
the quality and size of the armed forces, the gradual switch to civilian control is 
another main security policy objective of the CEEn governments, which is aimed at 
curtailing the possibility of a military praetorian threat. Beside the domestic defence 
policy objectives, major attention is given to economic policies and a range of internal 
security policies (combating crime, illegal migration, environmental security etc.) as 
major stabilising factors. 
5.2 Foreign Policy-responses 
5.2.1 Integration and Cooperation 
Without exception, all CEEn governments regard their countries' integration into the 
North Atlantic Alliance as a security policy objective of the utmost importance. 
Furthermore they all acknowledge that their 'hard security' situation will only be 
regarded as more secure, when the countries become full members of NATO and are 
then, as a result, protected by Article 5 of the Washington Treaty. As the 'Foreign 
Policy Priorities ofthe Republic ofSlovakia' states, the pursuit ofNATO membership 
"is the only real, politically and economically justified response to the requirements" 
of national defence.136 NATO's eastward enlargement of March 1999 has shown that 
135 Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland {2000), section 3. 
136 Foreign Policy Priorities of the Slovak Republic (2000), section 11. 
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the Alliance is willing to grant membership on political grounds to ex-communist 
countries and this has boosted the expectations of the remaining nine CEEn candidate 
countries. Although the main objective is full membership of NATO at the earliest 
possible date, in the interim period candidate countries seek to increase their security 
via enhanced political-military cooperation with the Alliance and its member states. 
After the breakdown of communism in CBE, this cooperation has materialised 
through a number of channels. The Rome Summit of NATO in 1991 established the 
North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC), which was succeeded by the Euro-
Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC) in July 1997. Furthermore, the Partnership for 
Peace (PfP) programme was launched in January 1994, in order to establish direct 
military contact between NATO members and CEEn candidate countries. The 'Study 
on Enlargement' outlined NATO's expectations in September 1995, which were 
decisive for the preparation and subsequent admission of the 'first wave' new 
members. In addition, NATO's IFOR/SFOR programme in Bosnia and KFOR in 
Kosovo enjoyed contributions from CEEn countries and operation Allied Force 
received the support of most CEEn states. As a result of the Washington Summit in 
April 1999, the 'Study on Enlargement' document was supplemented by the 
'Membership Action Plan' (MAP). Learning from the difficulties that arose during the 
first round of enlargement negotiations, the MAP gives more detailed guidance for the 
nine CEEn aspirant countries as to what they need to achieve to be eligible for 
membership and offers assistance in "developing forces and capabilities that could 
operate with NATO under its new Operational Capabilities Concept (OCC)". 137 
NATO will review the preparation process of the candidate countries at its 2002 
summit and it is likely that the Alliance will then invite new members. 
It is important to highlight briefly, what actions the CEEn applicants need to 
undertake within the MAP, as, even if indirectly, these actions are aimed at stabilising 
the countries. Aspirants need to submit an Annual National Plan (ANP) to NATO that 
covers "political, economic, defence, resource, security, and legal aspects of 
137 Simon, Jeffrey (2000a) "NATO's Membership Action Plan (MAP) and Defense Planning: A 
Preliminary Assessment", Paper as a Result of a Conference Hosted by INSS, the George C. Marshall 
Center (Garmisch) and the Bulgarian Defense Ministry Held in Sofia, Bulgaria, on 12-13 June 2000, p. 
2, (personal communication). 
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membership" .138 Candidate countries also need to establish enhanced defence 
planning that includes the implementation and revision of agreed Partnership Goals 
(PGs). Therefore, it can be argued that the NATO integration process triggered a set 
of security policy objectives in the CEEn countries that have, generally speaking, two 
distinct aims. Firstly, they are aimed at strengthening security in the region through 
indirect channels, e.g. through the democratisation of the defence establishments or 
through the launch of enhanced cooperation. Secondly, these new policies intend to 
prepare the grounds for full membership in the Alliance, via attaining interoperability 
of strategic planning, command and military structures. 
As the Latvian Security Concept sums up one of the main security policy aspirations 
of most non-NATO member CEEn countries: 
Maximum co-operation with NATO, its member states, as well as with other 
friendly nations is supported in order to develop closer ties and facilitate the 
fastest possible integration of Latvia into NATO. 139 
The Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland, although legally full members of NATO 
since lih March 1999, acknowledge that they need to pursue policies with the aim of 
further integration within the Alliance. The 'Security Strategy of the Republic of 
Poland', for instance, sets out a number of policy objectives at the legislative and 
executive levels, which "serve to strengthen the defence capability of the state". 140 
These include organisational issues related to the achievement of the required level of 
interoperability of the Polish Armed Forces with the forces of other NATO states and 
appropriate "training of personnel for work within the Alliance's structures". 
Furthermore, policies target matters in the "economic-financial sphere", including the 
adoption of the defence budget to NATO standards, guarantee of "stable, long-term 
financial resources for defence, ( ... ) skilful application of NATO's Security 
Investment Programme (NISP) to expand infrastructure in Polish territory" and the 
adoption ofthe "economic-defensive infrastructure to the Alliance's requirements". 
138 Simon, Jeffrey (2000b) "Transforming the Armed Forces of Central and East Europe", Strategic 
Forum. Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, June 2000, No. 172, p. 3. 
139 Security Concept of the Republic ofLatvia (1997), section IV. 11. 
140 Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland {2000), section 3. 2. 2. 
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The Security Strategy of the Czech Republic identifies similar defence policy 
objectives in the wake ofNATO membership: 
... the Czech Republic's priorities include full-fledged integration within 
NATO; further development of Czech armed jorces; and the State's ability to 
make adequate defence resources available. I I 
Another main foreign and security policy objective of all CEEn countries is 
represented by their attempts to gain full membership in the European Union. Since 
the late 1990s, the EU has embarked on the development of an autonomous foreign 
and security policy, most distinctively through the launch of its European Security 
and Defence Policy (ESDP) in 1999. Nonetheless, CEEn governments are, to a great 
extent, guided by 'soft security' considerations in their attempts to join the EU, rather 
than pursuing 'hard security' motivations. As Webber has argued, "for political 
reasons( ... ) they [the CEEn states] ought to be seen to back ESDP",142 since they 
seek to become members of the EU, yet, their major security policy priority is to 
enjoy collective defence through NATO membership. This notion is clearly expressed 
in the 'Foreign Policy Priorities ofthe Republic ofSlovakia', which states: 
We perceive the building of more efficient European security capacities as a 
means of strengthening the North Atlantic Alliance, which is the crucial 
element of the European security system. 143 
Membership of the EU is regarded rather, in the first instance, as a major policy for 
stabilising the political and economic systems of the CEEn countries. The Czech 
Security Strategy confirms this view by stating that the "fundamental pillars of the 
European security system include ( ... ) the European Union as a grouping for 
economic and political integration" .144 
141 Security Strategy of the Czech Republic (1999), section 11. 2. 
142 Webber, Mark (2000) "NATO Enlargement and the European Security and Defence Identity/Policy 
(ESDIIP): Past, Present and Future", Paper Delivered to a Conference on 'The Transformation of 
NATO and the Question of European Unity', Centre for West European Studies, University of 
Washington, Seattle, May 5-6th 2000, p. 8. 
143 See Foreign Policy Priorities of the Slovak Republic (2000), section 11; for further reference see also 
'Joint Statement of the Budapest meeting of the Foreign Ministers of the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland on the occasion of the first anniversary oftheir accession into NATO', Budapest, March 18, 
2000, Source: http://www.mfa.gov.hu/Szovivoi/2000/Martonyi/0318jstat.htm [ 10/01/2001] 
144 Security Strategy of the Czech Republic (1999), section 11. 1. 
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Also, the governments of the four Visegrad states have associated EU membership 
with their countries 'return to Europe'. It is, therefore, increasingly difficult for CEEn 
politicians at home to justify politically any further delay in accession to their 
impatient electorate. The EU is considered by many as an exclusive club of wealthy 
nations, a kind of 'fortress Europe', in which egotism has a greater weight than 
solidarity.145 Despite some clear achievements between the countries of CEE and the 
EU since the early 1990s, CEEn leaders have often felt ill-treated by their Western 
colleagues. Former Hungarian Prime Minister Gyula Horn remembers many of those 
meetings with a great deal of bitterness and characterises them in his memoirs as 
'time-wasters'.146 For instance, he described that at the 1995 Cannes EU summit, after 
having waited for hours in a small room with his CEEn colleagues for the EU leaders, 
they had a one-hour meeting, where their opinions were as good as irrelevant, because 
most of the EU leaders were either resting or did not even attend. At the end of the 
meeting, French President Jacques Chirac, its chairman, turned to Chancellor Kohl 
and said in front of all CEEn leaders: "I kept my promise. It did not take more than 
sixty minutes" .147 
Because of the complex nature of EU activities, membership for the CEEn applicants 
requires that they adopt and implement a wide range of policies. The main objective is 
the adoption of the EU's 'acquis communautaire'. For this, the European Commission 
first invented the so-called 'Europe Agreements' and then entered into Accession 
Partnerships with each individual candidate country, outlining the major goals that the 
country has to achieve on its path to membership. In response, each individual 
country set up a so-called 'National Programme for the Adoption of the Acquis', 
delineating in detail how the acquisition of EU legislation will be carried out. 148 This 
includes details of available financial and human resources and indications of main 
problem areas that could lead to transitional arrangements. Currently, there are ten 
CEEn countries involved in accession negotiations with the EU, including the first 
applicant, Hungary, (March 1994) and the latest one, Slovenia (June 1996). Overall, it 
145 Interview with Bronislaw Geremek, Die Zeit, 30/07/98, p. 7 
146 Horn, Gyula {1999) Azok a Kilencvenes Evek ... Budapest: Kossuth, p. 323f. (Those Years in the 
Nineties) 
147 1bid. (quotation translated from the Hungarian by the author) 
148 Regular Reports from the Commission on Progress Towards Accession by Each of the Candidate 
countries, November 8, 2000, Source: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report_ll_OO/index.htrn 
[01/12/2000], section 11. 1. 
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can be argued that the EU integration process represents one of the most important 
policy-responses of the CEEn governments to post-Cold War 'soft security' 
challenges, thus its realisation enjoys high priority in the countries concerned. As 
former Polish Foreign Minister Bronislaw Geremek put it back in 1998, 
the EU means higher level of security for an independent, democratic and 
sovereign country. Together with Hungary and the Czech Republic we hope to 
become soon members of the NATO in some months and believe that NATO 
will give us the feeling of security we need. The European Union however 
seems to offer a special kind of security. At the end of the century we should 
envision the security issue not only as a question of defense, of military 
structures, but also as something which includes democracy, the rule of law, 
and prosperity. (. . .) Our feeling is that the EU can provide this sense of 
security because it combines prosperity, security and democracy. 149 
5.2.2 Enhanced Regional Cooperation 
Official documents of CEEn countries confirm that regional cooperation represents 
one of the main lines of foreign and security policy, in order to ensure the respective 
countries national security and the overall region's stability. However, it is interesting 
to note that the policy of enhanced regional cooperation does not seem to relate to the 
entire CEEn region. It seems to be understood much more in a rather narrow sense, 
i.e. governments stress the importance of cooperation and good relations with the 
countries in their immediate neighbourhoods. So, for instance, Latvia, Estonia and 
Lithuania appear to concentrate primarily on policy options regarding the security of 
the Baltic subregion. The 'Security Concept of the Republic ofLatvia' states, that the 
security of Latvia is aimed toward fully co-ordinated and joint activities of the 
Baltic states in averting an external threat. Particular attention is paid to the 
development of practical joint defence and security projects and programs, 
such as the Baltic peace-keeping battalion, the joint Baltic nary training unit, 
the regional airspace initiative and other regional projects. 150 
Similarly, the 'National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia' expresses the 
strong desire for cooperation in the Baltic Sea region. Beside its impact on regional 
149 Geremek, Bronislaw (1998) "Why Should the EU be Expanded to the East?", IWM Newsletter, 61, 
May-July 1998, p. 23. 
150 Security Concept of the Republic ofLatvia (1997), section IV. 2. 
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security, all three Baltic republics regard strong regional cooperation as means of 
promoting their integration into European and transatlantic structures. 151 The most 
comprehensive regional initiative is the Council of Baltic Sea States (CBSS), 
including the five Nordic states, the three Baltic states, Germany, Poland, Russia and 
the EU Commission. Cottey has argued that, in spite of the CBSS's limitations 
resulting from "the diversity of its members and lack of resources, it has made a 
positive contribution to cooperative security in the Baltic subregion" .152 It provides a 
consultation framework for Nordic and Baltic leaders as well as the EU Commission 
to coordinate their economic, environmental and social policies and support the 
process of democratisation in the transitional CBSS member states. In addition, when 
Russian-Baltic relations were troubled in the mid-1990s, the CBSS offered a neutral 
forum for ameliorating tensions, as, for instance, the CBSS commissioner on 
democratic institutions and human rights helped defuse tensions over the Russian 
minorities in Estonia and Latvia.153 In addition to the CBSS, the three Baltic states 
have also agreed to establish trilateral political cooperation, such as the Baltic 
Assembly (meeting of national parliaments), the Baltic Council of Ministers (meeting 
of ministers) and the Baltic Council (meetings of parliaments and ministers), all of 
which are designed to maximise regional security via political and economic 
cooperation. In the area of military cooperation, there are a number of joint initiatives 
in the Baltic region, including the Baltic Battalion (BALTBAT), the Baltic Air 
Surveillance Network (BAL TNET), the Baltic Naval Squadron (BAL TRON) and the 
Baltic Defence College (BALTDEFCOL). 154 
A strong desire to cooperate on the regional level cannot be assumed, to the same 
extent, of the other CEEn countries. Although officially, all countries proclaim, to 
varying degrees, the importance of regional cooperation, they seem to expect far less 
from it than the Baltic States. It is striking how little attention the four Visegrad 
countries' security strategies/doctrines pay to the matter of regional cooperation and 
regional organisations. The otherwise well-drafted and detailed Polish document 
151 See, for example, National Security Concept of Estonia (2000), section 1. 1. 
152 Cottey, Andrew (2000) "Europe's New Subregionalism", The Journal of Strategic Studies, 23:2, p. 
25. 
153 lbid, p. 25f. 
154 Pop, Adrian (2000) "Subregional Security Arrangements in Central and Southeastern Europe", EES 
News (Newsletter of East European Studies at The Woodrow Wilson International Centre for 
Scholars), November-December 2000, p. 10. 
125 
treats this issue in a very short paragraph and does not elaborate on further policies 
directed towards such regional initiatives.155 The Czech document suggests that 
regional cooperation plays a minor role in the country's security policy and Slovakia's 
Foreign Policy Priorities for the period of 2000-2003 forecast no special policy 
objectives in this area. Similarly, the 'Principles of the Security and Defence Policy of 
the Republic of Hungary' contains little evidence of concrete policy objectives in the 
field of regional cooperation. Consequently, all four countries pursue separate 
national strategies on their way to joining the EU and, in general, there is no or little 
coordination of their security policies on a regional level. This can be explained 
simply by the fact that the politically and economically more advanced Visegnid 
countries seem to be less keen on joining regional formations with weaker states, 
because of a fear that this could undermine their prospects in the race for EU 
membership. 
It is fair to acknowledge, however, that there are some military cooperation initiatives 
in CEE, yet, these do not and cannot offer hard security guarantees to any of the 
countries involved. These regional formations involve rather ad-hoc multinational 
military units, such as the Multinational Peace Force Southeast Europe/South-
Eastern Europe Brigade (MPFSEE/SEEBRIG), the Black Sea Force 
(BLACKSEAFOR), and the Central European Nations Cooperation (CENCOOP). 
Additionally, there are some trilateral formations, such as the Italian-Slovenian-
Hungarian Land Force, the Romanian-Hungarian-Ukrainian Engineering Unit, and 
the Romanian-Moldavian-Ukrainian Unit, as well as bilateral ones such as the Polish-
Ukrainian Battalion, the Romanian-Hungarian Battalion, and the Romanian-
Ukrainian Battalion. The reason, why these regional military initiatives are rather 
weak, lies mainly in the attitude of some of their members. A Romanian scholar has 
summed up the attitude of different CEEn governments in the following way: 
Broadly speaking, countries, which are full NATO and/or EU members, or 
those who have begun EU accession negotiations, tend to ascribe less 
importance to subregional arrangements. "Neutrals" and countries that have 
no immediate prospects or intention to join the Euro-Atlantic organizations 
tend to view subregional arrangements more seriously. 156 
155 Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland (2000), section 3. 4. 
156 See Pop (2000), p. 10. 
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There are also some, albeit weak, initiatives for political and economic cooperation in 
the region. The Central European Initiative (CEI), for instance, has developed a fairly 
low-scale political cooperation, but its documents are not legally binding and it is up 
to the member states to decide whether they sign up to a document or rather abstain 
from it. So, for instance, the 'CEI Instrument for the protection of minority rights' 
acknowledges 
that respect for the rights of persons belonging to national minorities, as part 
of universally recognised human rights, is an essential factor for peace, 
justice, stability and democracy in the States, 157 
but, by focusing too much on the level of the nation-state, it fails to elevate the 
minority issue onto the level of a regional security concern. Nevertheless, the CEI, 
like the CBSS in the Baltic region, has a comprehensive membership, gathering most 
countries ofthe region (16 states), therefore, it offers a useful consultation forum for 
promoting subregional peace and security. 158 Additionally, the CEI could play an 
important role in preventing divisions within the region caused by a partial 
enlargement of the EU and further enlargement of NATO. Indeed, at their 1997 
Sarajevo Summit, the CEI Foreign Ministers stressed that 
one of the main tasks of the CEL as a forum for cooperation including both, 
candidate and non-candidate countries, should be to reduce the impact of 
existing and possible emerging new differences and disparities between CEI 
Member States and to avoid the creation of new barriers and divisions in 
Europe. 159 
The Central European Free Trade Agreement (CEFTA) came into effect in March 
1993, initially between the four Visegnid states. Since then it has granted membership 
to Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria and is currently considering other applications 
from countries including those of the Baltics, Croatia and Ukraine. According to its 
founding document, CEFTA's main objective is to establish a free trade area no later 
157 Central European Initiative, CEI Instrument for the Protection of Minority Rights, 19/11/1994, 
Source: http://www.ceinet.org/minority.htm [2/12/2000]. 
158 See Cottey (2000), p. 32. 
159 Final Document of the Meeting of the Ministers for Foreign Affairs of the Member States of the 
Central European Initiative, Sarajevo 1997, Source: http://www.ceinet.org/meetings/findoc.htm 
[02/02/2001]. 
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than January 1, 2001, via the liberalisation of trade of industrial and agricultural 
products among its members.160 The member countries' activity in CEFTA has been, 
however, subordinated from the very beginning to their efforts to join the EU. They 
considered the Agreement, alongside the Visegnid Declaration of 1991, merely as "an 
additional element designed to facilitate Central Europe's integration with the Union 
[EU]" .161 It is therefore not surprising that, so far, efforts to expand the scope of 
cooperation have failed, as have attempts to make CEFTA more institutional. 
Currently, it is run by a Joint Committee on a mainly ad-hoc basis that lacks clear 
powers and competencies. 162 In addition, when CEEn states join the EU, they will 
have to leave CEFTA, since the EU's common external trade policy prohibits 
membership of separate trade blocs. It is, therefore, likely that with some more 
developed countries joining the EU well before others, CEFTA's role in the region 
will dimish substantially (if not completely), by preventing less developed CEEn 
countries freely accessing the regional trade market.163 
Similarly, the medium-term future of the formerly influential Visegnid cooperation 
between the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland and Slovakia is not clear. Whilst at the 
beginning of the 1990s, Visegrad cooperation proved to have sufficient political 
weight that its concerted pressure on the Soviet Union persuaded the latter to agree to 
the dissolution of the Warsaw Treaty Organisation and to withdraw its troops from the 
region, by the mid-1990s, it has become largely inactive. Although the leaders of the 
four member states decided at their Summit in Bratislava in 1999 to revitalise their 
cooperation to 'its full capacity' in agreeing to cooperate in meeting EU accession 
criteria, promoting cross-border ties and calling for Slovakia's membership ofNATO, 
in terms of real policy-outputs there has been little done to improve the region's 
security. As Cottey has argued, with the Visegrad-four joining the EU and Slovakia 
being admitted to NATO, "the rationale for cooperation between these four states, 
16
° Central European Free Trade Agreement, concluded by the Czech Republic, the Republic of 
Hungary, the Republic of Poland and the Slovak Republic on December 21, 1992, article 1, Source: 
http://www.cefta.org/agreementlengtreaty.htrn [15/01/2001]. 
161 See Rutkowski, Jerzy (1999) "The Advantages ofCEFTA and Threats Awaiting it in the Future", in 
Bozyk, Pawel (ed.), CEFTA and the European Union. Warsaw: World Economy Research Institute, p. 
19. 
162 Ibid. 
163 See Cottey (2000), p. 30. 
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distinct from that with their other NATO/EU partners and neighbours, may 
diminish" .164 
5.2.3 Development of Good-neighbourly Relations 
Pursuing good-neighbourly relations seems to be a more successful policy objective 
of most CEEn countries than regional cooperation. This is the area where, not only on 
paper but also in practice, much has been achieved. On the official side, security 
strategies/doctrines of all CEEn states emphasise the importance of good relations 
with their neighbouring countries. This is one of the main foreign and security policy 
objectives of all CEEn states. Estonia seeks the "continuation and further 
development of good-neighbourly relations" 165 and, similarly, Romania seeks to 
ensure its national security "by promoting good neighbourly relations" .166 The 
document on 'Foreign Policy Priorities of the Slovak Republic' declares the recent 
policies of the government towards its neighbours, coupled with the progress achieved 
in the country's EU integration process to be "the basic successes of Slovakia's foreign 
policy" .167 
Certainly, the importance of agreements between neighbouring countries should not 
be underestimated in a region that had experienced great disputes over territorial and 
minority related issues in its recent history, as discussed in chapters three and four. By 
the late 1990s, most of the former Warsaw Pact countries concluded bilateral basic 
treaties that were aimed at regulating cooperation and good neighbourly relations 
between countries, that has involved respect of existing borders and minority rights. 
Admittedly, the driving force behind these treaties was not only the CEEn 
governments' recognition of the historic opportunity for reconciliation. They were 
often influenced by international organisations, notably the Council of Europe, the 
OSCE, the EU and NATO, as, for example, the conclusion of these treaties were 
declared a precondition for EU and NATO accession. As Wohlfeld has argued 
164 1bid, p. 29. 
165 National Security Concept of Estonia (2000), section 1. 2. 
166 Romania's Strategy of National Security (1999) 
167 Foreign Policy Priorities of the Slovak Republic (2000) 
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the emphasis that both EU and NATO place on good-neighbourly relations 
among candidate countries is a step in the right direction, as it accentuates the 
relevance to the process of integration of bilateral issues. 168 
The EU had its part in promoting good-neighbourly relations in the region, via its 
Stability Pact, which was initiated by French Prime Minister Edouard Balladur in 
April1993 and integrated into the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
at the December 1993 European Council in Brussels. Although the Stability Pact 
failed to live up to its euphoric goals and turned out to be an EU foreign policy fiasco, 
it did manage to gather representatives of CEEn countries and to initiate a debate on 
the security of the region.169 An additional shortcoming of the Stability Pact was that 
it considered only those nine countries of CEE (Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Poland, Romania, Slovakia, the Czech Republic and Hungary), which had applied for 
EU membership at that time. Neither Ex-Yugoslavia nor the CIS states were included 
in the process. Thus, as some observers have argued, it appeared that the target group 
of the Stability Pact included those countries, on which the EU could exercise its 
greatest external influence; the already relatively secure states of CEE.170 It is, 
therefore, not surprising that very little was achieved within the framework of the 
Stability Pact. Apart from the ceremonial signing of a bilateral treaty between 
Hungary and the Slovak Republic at the closing conference of the Stability Pact in 
Paris on 20th March 1995, no significant result could be presented. 171 Partly in order 
to avoid additional embarrassment, the EU passed on the future administration of the 
Stability Pact to the OSCE. More about the circumstances accompanying the 
negotiations and the signing of the Basic Treaty between Hungary and Slovakia will 
be presented in chapter six in our detailed case study on Hungary. 
168 Wohlfeld, Monika (ed.) (1997) The Effects of Enlargement on Bilateral Relations in Central and 
Eastern Europe. Paris: Institute for Security Studies of Western European Union, Chaillot paper No. 
26, Source: http://www .weu.int/institute/chaillot/chai26e.htm [1 0/0112001 ]. 
169 See Dunay, Pal and Wolgang Zellner (1996) "Der Stabilitatspakt ftir Europa- Diplomatische 
Episode oder Dauerhafter Erfolg?", in Institut ftir Friedensforschung und Sicherheitspolitik an der 
Universitat Hamburg I IFSH (Hrsg.), OSZE Handbuch 1996. Baden-Baden: Nomos 
Verlagsgesellschaft, Bd. 2, pp. 319-333. (The Stability Pact for Europe: a Diplomatic Episode or an 
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Overall, bilateral relations in general and neighbourly relations in particular have 
developed positively in the period after 1990 and have had a stabilising impact on the 
region's security. 172 Most disputes have been settled by diplomatic means, for which 
the framework was supplied by the newly concluded basic treaties between individual 
countries. The Romanian Ambassador to NATO and the EU assessed the importance 
ofthese treaties in the following way: 
Throughout history we have striven for the creation of a community, in our 
part of Europe, where good neighbourly relations can be developed. Based on 
this sentiment, important political treaties have been signed with Hungary and 
Ukraine, thus avoiding territorial claims and ensuring the protection of 
national minorities. 173 
The 'Regular Report of the European Commission on Latvia's Progress towards 
Accession' has also found that "Latvia strives to contribute to regional stability 
through a policy of good-neighbourly relations and regional co-operation" .174 It 
concluded border agreements with its neighbouring countries and eventually cleared 
up its outstanding problems regarding borders. The relationship between the Baltic 
States and Russia seems to be the exception, which, especially as a result of the Baltic 
troika's efforts to join NATO and the EU, continues to be somewhat problematic. 
5.3 Domestic Policy-responses 
5. 3.1 Defence Policies 
An important challenge that the first democratically elected CEEn governments faced 
after 1990 was the non-existence of democratic control over their armed forces. By 
the mid-1990s, all CEEn states identified the principle of civilian control of the 
military as a major policy objective and developed strategies for its achievement, in 
172 See Hyde-Price (1996), p. 101. 
173 Ene, Constantin (1997) "Romania Sets its Sights on NATO Membership", in NATO Review, 45:6, 
Nov.-Dec., p. 9. 
174 Regular Report from the Commission on Latvia's Progress towards Accession, October 13, 1999, 
Source: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargementllatvia/rep_10_99/b38.htm [1/1112000], section 3. 8. 
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order to avert the possibility of a military intervention in domestic politics. 175 A recent 
study confirms that since this period, the CEEn countries "have made some 
substantial progress in establishing democratic control of the armed forces". 176 
Amended or re-written constitutions ensure that the democratically elected president 
and/or government controls the armed force, and further, this process is overseen by 
the national parliaments. New laws on the armed forces and new security and defence 
strategies/doctrines have been developed, underpinning the absoluteness of civilian 
control and political neutrality of the armed forces. 'The Security Strategy of the 
Republic of Poland' states uncompromisingly that the armed forced "maintain their 
political neutrality and are subject to civil and democratic control" .177 In a similar 
manner, the 'National Security Concept ofthe Republic of Estonia' states that "Estonia 
has established civil-military relations in accordance with the traditions of other 
democratic states". 178 Likewise, 'The National Security Concept of the Republic of 
Bulgaria' reinstates that the "civilian control upon the state policy for security and the 
bodies performing it is guaranteed by the Constitution and the laws of the country" .179 
Nonetheless, as Joo has pointed out, there have been some major obstacles to the 
evolution of civilian control in CEE, on both the civilian as well as military sides.180 
On the civilian side, there has been a lack of expertise in security and defence matters. 
In addition, widespread anti-military feelings in most CEEn societies have hampered 
the smooth development of civil-military relations. On the military side, there has 
been a lack of experience in working with civilians from the ministries of defence and 
the national parliaments. Furthermore, the sudden subordination of the military to 
civilians, most notably the integration of general staffs within civilian ministries of 
defence, and the criticism from the arising democratic media has generated some 
problems. 
175 See Jo6 (1996), p. 21. 
176 Cottey, Andrew, Tim Edmunds and Anthony Forster (2001) "Soldiers, Politics and Defence: Some 
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Yet, as Cottey et al. have argued, "in post-communist Central and Eastern Europe, 
securing democratic control of the defence policy has proven to be more problematic 
than securing democratic control of the armed forces ( ... )".181 Thus, the above-
mentioned problems on the civilian and military sides emanate from the difficulties of 
the civilianisation of the overall defence establishment, rather than from questioning 
the basic principle of civilian control of the armed forces. 
Also, it can be argued that in the context of defence policy-responses, problems 
connected to the state of the CEEn armed forces and their reform appear to be as 
pertinent as the issue of civilian control of the armies or defence policies. After 1990, 
all CEEn governments have embarked on a complex reform of their armed forces. 
The general goal is to establish better-organised, smaller, more efficient and more cost 
effective national armies that are interoperable with the armies of NATO member 
countries. This is a medium- as well as long-term objective, since the overall reform 
of the armed forces requires substantial financial resources, which often exceed the 
potential and actual socio-economic capacities of the CEEn states. As Simon has 
found, in general, there are some serious shortcomings in CEEn military planning, as 
CEEn governments "have been unable to provide long-term plans and to guarantee 
resources to build military capabilities".182 This criticism might be valid in general 
terms, yet, it overlooks the national endeavours of CEEn governments for reforming 
the armed forces. Most states have developed some medium- or long-term 
modernisation programs, for which they have received substantial assistance from 
NATO within PfP and the Planning and Review Process (PARP) as well as via the 
Membership Action Plan. As a result, some NATO aspirant CEEn countries set out 
medium- and long-term reform packages for transforming their armies, for instance 
Romania adopted the future 'Romanian Army Restructuring Programme FARO 2005-
2010', starting from the premise that the country can join NATO by 2005 and the EU 
by 2010. The Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic also produced a reform 
plan, called the 'Concept of the Defence Department Establishment of the Slovak 
Republic Reform by 2002 (with an outlook up to 2010)'. 183 On the basis of its military 
and security doctrines, Bulgaria has also drafted a 'Program for the Reform of the 
181 Cottey et al. (2001), p. 6. 
182 Simon (2000b ), p. 1. 
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Bulgarian Armed Forces'. New NATO member Poland adopted a reform programme 
of its defence establishment as well, the 'Programme for Integrating and Modernising 
the Polish Armed Forces for the Years 1998-2012'. Similarly, the Czech government 
approved a future plan called the 'Concept for the Development of Forces 2003-2008', 
outlining the modernisation of the armed forced. The document on the 'Long-term 
(2000-2010) transformation of the Hungarian Armed Forces' adopted by the 
Hungarian Parliament, cleared the way for the launch of a comprehensive reform 
programme. 
In addition, the CEEn national security doctrines/strategies emphasise the 
governments' firm commitment to reform their armed forces. The 'Security Strategy 
of the Republic of Poland' states rather generally that the "process of upgrading the 
Polish Armed Forces ( ... ) calls for radical decisions and action with regard to their 
functioning, management and technological modernisation". 184 'Romania's Strategy of 
National Security' identifies the following ways of action in the defence area for 
ensuring national security: "modernising, streamlining and restructuring the armed 
forces in agreement with the requirements of the new security environment and 
available resources" .185 Similarly, the 'Security Concept of the Republic of Latvia' 
affirms that the "National Armed Forces must be small, mobile, well-armed, well 
trained and interoperable with NATO military structures ( ... )" .186 
In the matter of downsizing their national armed forces, CEEn governments have 
already achieved some considerable progress (see figure 5-1). For instance, the 
strength of the Czech defence establishment has been reduced between 1993 and 1999 
by ea. 40 per cent, in Poland the reduction between 1988 and 1999 was ea. 30 per 
cent, in Romania between 1990 and 1999 almost 50 per cent.187 Bulgaria lags behind 
the other countries of the region in reduction of its defence establishment. In the years 
1991 to 1999, only a small-scale reduction took place, yet, more significant re-scaling 
of the defence establishment is planned by 2004 (by ea. 60 per cent). In contrast, the 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia and the three Baltic states needed to build up their armed 
183 Kanis, Pavol (2000) "All our Effort Leads towards NATO Accession", Slovak Army Review, No. 1, 
Summer 2000, Source: http://www.mod.gov.sk/e-ziny/sar/2000 _ summer/0 l.html [ 10/0112001] 
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forces almost from scratch after independence. Despite that, by 1995, Slovakia had a 
somewhat oversized armed force of 47,000, which was reduced to 35,000 in 1999 and 
is projected to decline to 25-30,000. The Baltic states are currently increasing the 
overall size of their armed forces and Slovenia is expected to maintain an army of ea. 
8,200-9,400, variations depending on the number of conscripts. 188 
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Figure 5-1 Comparative trends in the strength of CEEn defence establishments 
Source: Simon 2000b, p. 3. 
The scarcity of public resources is a major problem facing all CEEn countries and this 
is reflected in the financial constraints that plague their national armies. As figure 5-2 
shows, there is a huge gap between the per capita defence expenditure of the three 
new NATO member states and the total per capita defence expenditure of all NATO 
member states. Although, it has to be mentioned, that NATO membership exerts an 
upward pressure on defence spending. According to projections of national defence 
budgets, it is uncertain, whether the ambitious reform plans can be carried out in full 
length. Insufficient funding can jeopardise the defence capabilities of the individual 
countries as well as hamper the fragile reform process. Furthermore, as Simon has 
forecast, as a result of harsh decisions (e.g. closure of army bases and dismissal of 
military personnel), taken during the transformation period, "CEEn governments and 
societies are likely to experience civil-military tension" .189 
187 See Simon (2000b ), p. 2. 
188 Ibid, p. 4. 
189 Ibid. 
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Czech Republic Hungary Poland NATO total 
Figure 5-2 Defence expenditure of three new NATO members in comparison to all NATO 
countries (per capita in US$, 1999) 
Source: NATO Review, 2000, Spring/Summer, p. Dl5. 
5.3.2 Economic Policies 
All CEEn security strategies/doctrines deal extensively with security policy-responses 
in the economic field. This demonstrates both how important the issue of economic 
security is in post-Cold War CEE and how concerned politicians about its treatment 
are in the region. As noted earlier, the matter of state intervention in economic 
security issues is even more pertinent in a region, in which countries face a complex 
transition process than in consolidated democracies. Thus, CEEn economic policies 
show, to a great extent, a transitional character, that is, they deal with the 
establishment and strengthening of a stable legal and institutional framework, in 
which state and private economic and financial activities can be carried out. In 
addition, the safeguarding of these newly created laws and institutions require more 
attention in transitional economies than in long established market economies. 
Although by the turn of the century, many CEEn countries have achieved remarkable 
progress in the performance of their economies and financial markets, there is still a 
long way for them to go to reach the average level of development of the EU. As the 
'National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia' summed it up, the main goals 
of economic policy-making are: 
136 
To ensure sustainability and social stability, Estonia must continue structural 
reforms and implement macroeconomic policy measures along the principles 
of liberal trade and the free movement of capital. A short-term goal is to 
increase the competitiveness of Estonian production in markets of developed 
states and to harmonise legislation with the EU acquis. 190 
The concentration on fundamental policies of economic stabilisation and growth as 
important strategic tasks of national security policy is even more apparent in 
economically less developed CEEn countries. So, for instance, the 'National Security 
Concept of the Republic of Bulgaria' establishes a direct link between the issue of 
economic development and the satisfaction of citizens' interests and indicates the 
risks, which the absence of economic stability poses: 
The economic factor is decisive for the guarantee of national security. Only 
the stabilisation, re-establishment and growth of Bulgarian economy are in a 
position to satisfy the interests of the Bulgarian citizens, society and state, to 
solve the problems concerning the deficiency of resources, to improve the 
living standard and increase the degree of social protection. 191 
In parallel to the economic policies stemming from the transition process, CEEn 
governments also have to respond to a set of issues effecting their economic security 
that emanate from the competitive and open nature of the globalised world economy. 
In addition, the current situation in CEEn countries, in which, the provision of 
strategic energy supplies still depends heavily on Russian imports, requires 
"diversifying energy import sources". 192 This entails policy action aiming at the 
connection of CEE national electricity, gas and oil supply systems with Western 
European energy networks and "ensure independence from imported energy resources 
to the greatest possible extent" .193 
The 'Security Strategy of the Czech Republic' devotes an entire section to economic 
policy relevant to the country's national security. It sets out a system of economic 
measures that are designed for the handling of crisis situations. These include 
... emergency economic measures; provision of the country's strategic 
supplies,· economic mobilisation; development of the necessary infrastructure; 
190 National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia (2000), section 3. 3. 
191 National Security Concept of the Republic of Bulgaria (1998) 
192 Security Concept of the Republic ofLatvia (1997), section IV. 3. 
193 National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia (2000), section 3. 3. 
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and regulatory measures. The purpose of such measures is to ensure that the 
economy has the required material resources available and to provide 
services to the population and armed forces, armed security units, rescue 
corps and emergency services in situations that pose danger to the country's 
security. 194 
5.3.3 Internal Security Policies 
According to the national security doctrines/strategies in CEE, there is a wide range of 
areas in which governments undertake policy action in order to preserve, develop or 
strengthen internal security. Amongst these, there are three areas in particular, which 
seem to be of major importance in all CEEn countries: combating crime, reducing 
illegal migration and, to a somewhat lesser extent, handling issues related to 
environmental security. In all three areas, there is an urgent need for developing a 
national legal framework as well as strengthening law enforcement. In addition to 
domestic policies, it is necessary to cooperate with other countries in combating 
organised crime, illegal migration and cross-border environmental degradation. 
In the area of combating cnme, governments' policies generally subscribe to a 
coordinated approach of various domestic and international actors. The 'Security 
Strategy of the Republic ofPoland', for instance, states that 
while initiating and organising efforts to prevent crime and crime-breeding 
phenomena, including those of a cross-border character, Poland's police co-
operate with state and self-government organs and social institutions in the 
Republic of Poland, as well as with police forces of other states and their 
international organisations.195 
More fundamentally, internal security policy-response attempts to promote a more 
active participation of citizens' organisations in the fight against crime. It is generally 
the case in CEE that there is a wide gap between the police forces and the public at 
large that need to be closed. Also, it is one of the legacies of the previous authoritarian 
regimes that the public's confidence is fairly low in the police forces. The Czech 
government tries to tackle this problem mainly "through emphasis on the police 
194 Security Strategy of the Czech Republic (1999), section II. 4. 
195 Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland (2000), section 3. 1. 5. 
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members' correct behaviour to citizens and their professional, consistent and speedy 
action and bearing". 196 
Policy-response also includes the modernisation of the judicial systems "on the basis 
of a unified strategy for combating criminality and corruption" .197 In the case of 
organised crime, it requires the creation of new national institutions that have the task 
of liasing with national and international organisations. For instance, the 'National 
Anti-Crime Strategy' of Bulgaria adopted in July 1998 develops a number of policies 
for combating crime, one of which is the establishment of the 'National Service for 
Combating Organised Crime'. 198 A report of the Ministry of Interior on organised 
crime in the Czech Republic in 2000 found that an inter-ministerial body to combat 
organised crime had not yet been established, a serious shortcoming of national 
security policy. 199 As the Polish example shows, however, the creation of institutions 
alone cannot solve the problem of crime. Poland has established a 'Bureau of 
Organised Crime' within the Ministry of Justice, dealing with a wide range of issues, 
including drugs, forgery, financial frauds, money-laundering, car theft, arms 
trafficking, terrorism etc. Yet, the 'Regular Report from the Commission on Poland's 
Progress towards Accession' in 1999 revealed some serious systemic shortcomings. It 
concluded that 
there is a lack of sufficiently motivated, experienced and adequately paid staff, 
lack of management continuity, lack of co-ordination, lack of modern 
'intelligence' methods and technology and an overall absence of strategy for 
b t . . d . 200 corn a mg orgamse crzme. 
Leading on from the issue of organised crime, the fight against illegal migration 
requires a coordinated national and international policy-response as well. Illegal 
migration is a serious security problem in post-Cold War CEE and the security 
196 Security Strategy of the Czech Republic (1999), section 11. 3. 
197 National Security Concept of the Republic of Bulgaria (1998) 
198 See Pre-accession Strategy of the Republic of Bulgaria, July 2000, Source: 
http:/ /www.mfa.government.bg/eiweb/Europe%20Agreement/en/ Association%20Committee/2000/aco 
m 2000_position_paper.htrn [15/01/2001]. 
19
'1see Information on Organised Crime Status in the Czech Republic in 2000, Ministry oflnterior of 
the Czech Republic, Source: http://www.mvcr.cz/dokumenty/org_zlo/konc2000/english/3 _ furth.htrnl 
[15/01/2001]. 
200 See Regular Report from the Commission on Poland's Progress towards Accession, October 13, 
1999, Source: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/poland/rep _1 0 _99/b4.htrn [1/4/2000], section B. 
4. 2. 
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doctrines/strategies of all countries reflect some serious policy-outputs in this area. 
The 'Security Concept of the Republic of Latvia' states that "methods and legislation 
for the detaining and deporting of illegal immigrants are being developed ( ... )".201 
Action is required on the one hand for the national security of individual CEEn 
countries, on the other sufficient policing of illegal migration is also urged by the EU, 
as CEEn countries seek membership in the EU and once they become members, they 
need to subscribe to the 'Schengen Agreement'. This necessitates, in the first instance, 
effective control of national borders, territorial waterways and airspace. Additionally, 
CEEn governments will need to devise a concept for the modernisation of their "visa 
granting process and personal checks at national borders" and will need to harmonise 
their "visa policy with the EU countries".202 
But, the 'Regular Report from the Commission on the Czech Republic's Progress 
towards Accession' exposed a wide disparity between policy formulation and actual 
results: "border guards remain understaffed, badly equipped and bound by inefficient 
communication procedures with national police headquarters". 203 The Commission's 
overall assessment of the situation in the fields of 'justice and home affairs' in CEEn 
applicant countries was, nevertheless, more balanced: 
Steady progress has been made in most candidate countries in the field of 
justice and home affairs. New legislation has been introduced in several 
countries on visa policy, asylum and rules of admission of third countries' 
citizens. Nevertheless, more attention should be paid, on the one hand, to 
border management where much remains to be done to ensure that the future 
EU's external borders will be managed according to the Union's standards. 204 
As regards environmental issues, CEEn policy-makers recognise their importance to 
overall national security and some noticeable progress has been made in this area. 
Again, this is motivated partially by the EU integration process, since EU regulations 
cover a broad range of environmental issues, and partially by some recent tragic 
environmental disasters, which have afflicted the region (e.g. floods, pollution of 
201 Security Concept of the Republic ofLatvia (1997), section IV. 8. 
202 Security Strategy of the Czech Republic (1999), section 11. 3. B. 
203 See Regular Report from the Commission on the Czech Republic's Progress towards Accession, 
November 8, 2000, Source: 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/dwn/report _11_ 00/pdf/en/cz_ en.pdf [30/01/2001 ], p. 108. 
204 See Regular Reports from the Commission on Progress towards Accession by Each of the Candidate 
Countries (2000), section Ill. 3. c. 
140 
drinking water and cyanide pollution of rivers). Nonetheless, environmental 
protection does not seem to be at the top of CEEn security policy-makers' agenda. 
Although almost all security doctrines/strategies have some concessions on policy 
objectives in the environmental field, they fall short compared to other policy areas. 
Policies involve the establishment of control systems "to reduce the possibility of a 
disaster and its consequences"205 and the adoption of effective "crisis management 
and measures for civilian emergency planning",206 to make sure that the government 
agencies can respond to crisis situation. 'Romania's Strategy of National Security' 
recognises the threat emanating from the environment, yet, it does not elaborate on 
any policy objectives to remedy them. Similarly, the 'National Security Concept of the 
Republic of Bulgaria' does not go beyond the mere identification of some challenges 
stemming from environmental problems and does not offer any policy-response in 
this field. Also, the 'Security Strategy of the Republic of Poland' suffices itself with 
the simple acknowledgement of environmental risks to national security and 
disregards the discussion of policy-responses. 
Among the CEEn countries, Estonia devotes the most space to environmental policy 
in its National Security Concept. It sets out a wide range of objectives, such as the 
• Stimulation of environment awareness and environmentfriendly consumption 
patterns; 
• Promotion of environment friendly technologies; 
• Reduction of the power sector's negative effect to the environment; 
• Improvement of the quality of air, more efficient handling of waste and 
protection of the sea, surface, and subsoil waters; 
• Liquidation of the pollution originating from the past (in connection with 
earlier industrial and military activities); 
• Preservation of landscape and biological diversity; 
• Improvement of living and working environment according to the need of the 
people and requirements of environment protection. 207 
In the economically rather weak CEEn countries, environmental protection is not high 
on the political agenda. Although to the international community, CEEn countries 
acknowledge the importance of the issue, the lack of resources prevents them from 
taking concrete action. A more concerted response has only become apparent in the 
205 Security Concept of the Republic ofLatvia (1997), section IV. 10. 
206 Security Strategy of the Czech Republic (1999), section 11. 3. E. 
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immediate aftennath of ecological disaster, such as that which occurred in February 
2000, following an accident in a Romanian gold mine, when a large quantity of 
cyanide flowed into the river Tisza and, subsequently into the Danube, causing 
irreversible ecological damage in Hungary and Yugoslavia. Mainly as a result of the 
Tisza-disaster, the Hungarian government appealed to other CEEn states for more 
cooperation in the matter of environmental security within the existing regional and 
sub-regional organisations and launched the so-called 'Regional Environmental 
Initiative' in June 2000. The document states that 
stopping the environmental degradation which causes common concern and 
restoring the damaged environment could promote the prevention of potential 
economic and political conflicts arising among the nations of the region ( ... ) 
The Government of the Republic of Hungary calls on the international, 
regional and sub-regional organisations having an interest in the security of 
the Central, Eastern, and Southeast European region and in deepening co-
operation amongst the countries of the region, as well as other institutions of 
international co-operation, to consider the possibilities of embracing and 
supporting the Hungarian initiative and show themselves to be recefotive to an 
implementation of environmental co-operation with a fresh content. 08 
The document also acknowledges that regional cooperation in the field of the 
environment could be a catalyst for the environmental dimension of European 
integration, that is, the implementation of regional measures could enhance the 
individual countries' chances for membership in the EU. But even the most developed 
CEEn countries, those likely to become members of the EU first, have asked for 
substantial temporary derogations in the environmental sector. The Czech Republic is 
requesting derogations in 10 environmental areas,209 Hungary in 4?10 With regard to 
Poland's compliance with EU environmental regulations, 
the major derogations cover: municipal sewage treatment, agricultural 
sewage treatment, drinking water standards, waste controls, oil and diesel oil 
quality, waste materials and packaging. 211 
207 National Security Concept of the Republic of Estonia (2000), section 3. 7. 
208 Regional Environmental Initiative of 19/06/2000, Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Source: 
http://www.mfa.gov.hu/StrategyiRKK-KOMangol.htm [1/12/2000]. 
209 RFEIRL Newsline, 10/5/2000. 
21
° Central Europe Review, 13/12/1999, Source: http://www.ce-review.org/99/25/csardas25.html 
[1/10/2000]. 
211The Warsaw Voice. Polish and Central European Review, 19/03/2000, No. 12. 
Source: http://www. warsawvoice.com.pl/v595/Euro 11.html [0 111112000]. 
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An EU report from 2000 acknowledges the progress made in a number of candidate 
countries, but, at the same time, it pointed out the deficiencies of "both acquis 
alignment and implementation capacity ( ... ) in particular in the areas of water, 
industrial pollution control, chemicals and nature protection". It also urged candidates 
to accelerate the "ongoing work to prepare specific implementation programmes with 
corresponding financial plans".212 
5.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has shown that the majority of CEEn governments have devised broadly 
similar responses to security predicaments and perceptions, they face. This is not 
because they conduct a region-wide mutually cohesive security and foreign policy, 
but more because they all face very similar risks and vulnerabilities. Indeed, there is a 
lack of a regional organisation, unifying all CBE in a single framework. Instead, there 
exist a number of subregional organisations, which are, to varying degrees, involved 
in the treatment of mainly 'soft security' issues. This is especially valid for the Baltic 
region, where subregional cooperation (with the participation of the Nordic states, 
Russia and the EU) offers a valuable and successful forum for reducing tensions and 
preparing the three Baltic countries for membership ofthe EU and NATO. 
The other CEEn states seem less keen on establishing strong subregional cooperation, 
under which the existing frameworks clearly suffer (they lack substance). One 
explanation for the unwillingness to further subregional cooperation is offered by the 
negative impact of history, that is, because of diverse historical grievances, there is 
not yet sufficient level of trust for genuine partnership conducted in a purely 
subregional framework, in which Western countries are not represented. Another, 
probably more conclusive, argument is that some CEEn governments hold the view 
that their vital national interests and foreign and security policy priorities can be better 
achieved, if they are pursued in a unilateral, as opposed to collective-regional manner. 
This is certainly true of the approach of some governments towards EU and NATO 
enlargement, where the more advanced CEEn countries especially advocate an 
212 See Regular Reports from the Commission on Progress towards Accession by Each of the Candidate 
Countries (2000), section Ill. 3. C. 
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individualistic approach. There is a danger that the EU enlargement process could 
turn into a race of rationally acting individual countries negotiating their terms of 
membership with the EU on a one-to-one basis, with the weaker candidates lagging 
behind or even dropping out. 
As argued in chapter three, security predicaments can occur in a number of sectors 
(military, political, economic, societal and environmental). Similarly, security policy 
in post-Cold War CEE is conducted through the combination of mutually supportive 
action in various domains, including foreign, defence, internal security, economic and 
environmental policies. 
With regard to foreign policy-responses to security predicaments and perceptions, all 
CEEn governments consider vital for their national interest the integration of their 
respective countries into NATO and the EU (in CEE often called the Euro-Atlantic 
integration process). It is generally hold in CEE that NATO is the sole organisation 
that can fully guarantee the hard security of its members. Since the collapse of the 
Eastern bloc, NATO has already conducted one round of enlargement into former 
Warsaw Pact territory in 1999, with the admittance of the Czech Republic, Hungary 
and Poland. It also offers substantial assistance to the other CEEn aspirant countries 
on their way to meet the membership criteria. In order to qualify for membership, 
CEEn governments have embarked on a complex reform of their armed forces, 
including the downsizing (with the exception of the Baltic states), the restructuring 
and the modernising of their defence establishments, as well as making them NATO 
interoperable. This is a long and costly process, for which all CEEn governments, 
with the help of existing NATO member states, set up detailed national action plans. 
The question has been raised in chapter two, whether the rather psychological issue of 
retaining an external reference has played a role for CEEn countries in their vigorous 
pursuit ofNATO membership. Is NATO membership, to some extent, the means to 
replace old Soviet influences by Western ones and maintain (or restore) the 
'comfortable certainty' of an external reference? With NATO membership, the West 
sets the rules (as the Soviet Union did during the Cold War) and offers protection for 
'loyalty'. To some extent, NATO's reaction to the attitudes of its new members during 
the Kosovo intervention in 1999 has revealed some evidence that supports this 
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presumption: Hungary and Poland were praised for their unconditional support of the 
NATO action, while the Czech Republic received criticism for its initial reluctance. In 
addition, the fact that after 1989/90, all CEEn governments opted for the quest of 
NATO membership, instead of establishing neutrality or a non-aligned status, 
suggests that there is some validity of the external reference thesis in the regional 
context. Yet, from a consideration of the details, it has to be acknowledged, that the 
future status of CEEn governments as members of NATO can, by no means, be 
regarded as equivalent to their former status as members of the Warsaw Treaty 
Organisation. Whatever their main motivations are, it is their own wish to become 
members of NATO, something that could have not be assumed for their membership 
of the WTO. Also, for Hungary and Czechoslovakia, their membership of the WTO 
created more suffering for their citizens than security, given the ruthless interventions 
ofthe Soviet Union and its WTO allies in 1956 and 1968, respectively. 
As regards the treatment of 'soft security' issues, the pursuit of EU membership 
constitutes the major foreign policy initiative of all CEEn governments. As in the case 
ofNATO membership, here also there are some cognitive issues that seem to play a 
distinct position in the argument advocating membership. Some CEEn countries 
(especially the Visegrad four) regard EU membership as a matter of restoring 
historical justice, that is, the return of their countries to the European mainstream, 
from which they were artificially removed by the Soviet Union after WW2. Beside 
this rather sentimental element, the CEEn countries' pursuit of EU membership 
represents a rather rational policy of vital national interests. Ten CEEn governments 
are currently (August 2001) engaged into negotiations with the EU about the terms 
and conditions, upon which they can enter the Union. These membership negotiations 
form a highly rational process, driven by the national interests of the candidate 
countries and the collective interests of the EU member states. 
Both the EU and NATO expect candidate countries to settle their neighbourly 
relations before they can enter the organisations. This conditionality of membership 
has proven to be an efficient means of exerting pressure that has helped stabilise 
relations in the region. All CEEn countries, often with the assistance of international 
organisations, have embarked on policy initiatives to normalise their relations with 
their neighbours and to stabilise the region. 
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As to domestic policy-responses to security predicaments and perceptions, some of 
the policies are, just as are some of the predicaments, of a transitional nature. These 
include a set of policies in the area of defence, establishing modem, civilian-
controlled and NATO interoperable armed forces. Similarly, a number of economic, 
social and internal security decisions have been taken to remedy security 
predicaments generated by the complex transition process. Often, new institutions and 
agencies needed to be established, in order to tackle the newly arisen predicaments, 
for instance those of organised crime, corruption and illegal migration. Today, it is not 
predominantly the lack of institutions that hampers successful treatment of 
predicaments, but the lack of expertise, resources and often public support, to make 
those institutions work effectively. It is valid for all countries in CEE that only the 
establishment of stronger civil societies and more proactive participation of the 
citizenry can help implement policies successfully and reduce predicaments 
effectively. 
In the last three chapters we discussed security predicaments, perceptions and policy-
responses in the post-Cold War CEEn region as a whole. In the one which follows, 
we narrow the geographical focus to the case of a single country, Hungary, in order to 
test our analytical framework against detailed, concrete examples as opposed to broad 
generalities. 
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6 The Case of Hungary 
This chapter looks at security predicaments, perceptions and policy-responses in the 
case of the Republic of Hungary. The main objective of this chapter is to analyse to 
what extent security matters in Hungary can be considered typical of the CEEn region 
and what are the specific features that appear to be unique to Hungary. In addition, it 
also represents a test case in a narrower geographical context for the analytical 
framework outlined in chapter two. 
For the sake of the theoretical and analytical coherence of the thesis, this chapter 
retains the five-sector security framework for the investigation of Hungarian security 
predicaments. Thus, in the first part, a set of risks and vulnerabilities, in the military, 
political, economic, societal and environmental sectors, that post-Cold War Hungary 
faces, will be examined. Again, as in the case of the CEEn region at large, attention 
needs to be paid to the interconnectedness between various sectors and the occurrence 
of some risks and vulnerabilities at more than one level. 
The second part of the chapter investigates how the Hungarian public and its political 
elite perceive security issues. Emphasis will be put on the discrepancy between real 
and imagined threat perceptions. In addition, it will be highlighted, to what extent 
cognitive processes can generate new, revitalise old and reinstate existing risks and 
vulnerabilities in the Hungarian context. The role of prior knowledge, that is historical 
processes such as grievances, occupation, the fate of Hungarian minorities in 
neighbouring countries etc., seem to play a distinct role in both the Hungarian public's 
and its political elite's security perceptions. 
The final part of this chapter deals with the policy-responses of post-Cold War 
Hungary, which have been aimed at providing remedies for security challenges. The 
achievement of full membership of NATO is arguably the most important success of 
post-communist Hungarian foreign and security policy that has direct and indirect 
stabilising effects for the country's security. This chapter will highlight the path taken 
to NATO membership, which, along with Hungary's relations with other international 
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organisations, appear to be imperative in the security context. Furthermore, Hungary's 
relations with the CEEn region as well as those with its neighbours will be analysed. 
Among domestic policy-responses, three major areas will be investigated: firstly, 
defence policies, including the reform of the Hungarian defence forces; secondly, 
economic policies that have had security implications in post-Cold War Hungary and 
thirdly, internal security policies, including undertakings to combat crime and tackle 
environmental challenges on the national level. 
6.1 Introduction 
In order to better understand contemporary Hungarian security matters, it is essential 
to draw attention to some important events in the country's history. The Hungarian 
nation, founded by King Step hen I. in 1000 in the Carpathian Basin, is one of 
Europe's oldest nation-states. The history of the Hungarian Kingdom and later the 
Hungarian Republic was, however, overshadowed by century-long occupations. In the 
13th century, troops of the Mongol Empire invaded Hungary ripping it from its 
independence for a short period of time. Then, in 1526, the defeat of Hungary by the 
Ottoman Empire was followed by more than 150 years of occupation. In the late 
1600s, Habsburg forces drove the Ottomans out of Hungary and consolidated their 
control over the country until1918, the end of World War 1. As a result of the WW1 
peace settlement (Treaty of Trianon), Hungary lost more than two-thirds of its 
territories to its neighbours, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Austria and the Kingdom of 
the Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes (later called Yugoslavia). Between the two World 
Wars, Hungary formally became a monarchy, but was, however, ruled by a regent as 
head of state. In March 1944, Nazi-Germany occupied the unreliable ally Hungary 
and set up a Nazi puppet-government. In late 1944, the Soviet Union invaded 
Hungary and by the late 1940s, it had set up a communist dictatorship, in line with the 
Soviet model. Hungary became a part of the so-called Eastern bloc and, with the 
exception of a very short period in 1956, during the popular revolution against 
communist rule, it was a single-party state until October 1989, when the democratic 
and free Republic of Hungary was proclaimed. Multi-party elections were inaugurated 
in April 1990. By July 1991, all Soviet troops had left the territory of Hungary, 
putting an end to a long succession of foreign invasions and occupations. 
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Historical experience of foreign invasion and occupation coupled with the fear of 
division of the state's territory has had significant security implications in the 
country's past and present alike and has contributed to the emergence of post-
communist security predicaments and biased security perceptions. In addition, some 
of the post-communist Hungarian political elite's responses to predicaments suggest 
that the role of historical analogies and identity related issues play a significant role in 
shaping foreign and security policy decisions. 
Yet the role of history is only one factor, however important, that can help explain 
contemporary Hungarian security predicaments, perceptions and policy-responses. 
Following on from our analytical framework introduced in chapter two and employed 
in the CEEn context in chapter three, this chapter too will utilise a comprehensive 
approach to the analysis of security. This will ensure the theoretical and analytical 
uniformity of this thesis and offer a coherent basis for a comparison of the CEEn 
region at large with the case study specific to Hungary. 
Thus, for the analysis of Hungarian security predicaments, the Copenhagen School 
Framework with its five sectors will be employed. Most of the CEEn security 
predicaments discussed in chapters two and three are also valid in the Hungarian 
context. Therefore, in order to avoid a simple reiteration of threats and vulnerabilities, 
this chapter will focus on those factors that appear to be either unique or particularly 
powerful in the Hungarian case. The issue of interconnectedness between different 
sectors and levels that has been illuminated in more detail in chapter two applies also 
for the classification of threats and vulnerabilities in the context of Hungary. For 
instance, an initially minority related problem, that would, according to the 
Copenhagen School Framework, fall into the societal sector, could engender serious 
internal political insecurities (political sector) and may even escalate into an armed 
conflict requiring a military response (military sector). Furthermore, a military 
conflict could provoke serious economic security predicaments (economic sector) 
and, in a given case, cause environmental damage (environmental sector). This 
example demonstrates that the issue of serial propagation of insecurities from sector 
to sector and from level to level makes a clear-cut systematisation of threats and 
vulnerabilities difficult. This challenge needs to be borne in mind in the analysis of 
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Hungarian security predicaments as well. The principal sources for the analysis of the 
security predicaments affecting Hungary were a number of publications of Hungarian 
defence and security experts, academics, and, in particular, information provided to 
the author by researchers at the Institute for Strategic and Defence Studies in 
Budapest. 
The second part of this chapter investigates security perceptions of the Hungarian 
public at large and its political elite. For the analysis of the latter, articles from the 
Hungarian media and journals are drawn on, in addition to interviews with Hungarian 
politicians conducted by the author in Budapest between 1998 and 2000. These 
include interviews carried out in 1998 with Geza Jeszenszky, Hungarian Foreign 
Minister in the first democratically elected conservative government between 1990 
and 1994, since 1998, Hungarian Ambassador to the USA; Imre Mecs, President of 
the Parliament's Defence Committee between 1994-1998; Zoltan Rockenbauer, then 
Chief Foreign Policy Advisor to Prime Minister Viktor Orban, since 2000 Minister of 
Cultural Heritage. The last interview was carried out in April 2000 with Peter Sikl6si, 
Senior Security Advisor to Prime Minister Viktor Orban, now Head of the Defence 
Policy Department of the Hungarian Ministry of Defence. The analysis of the 
Hungarian public's attitude towards security issues relies on vanous surveys 
conducted by international research institutes as well as by various Hungarian media 
and research organisations. 
The final part of this chapter investigates, the policy-responses that post-Cold War 
Hungarian governments have developed and deployed for the remedy of security 
predicaments. As in the CEEn context, the handling of insecurities in the Hungarian 
case requires action coordinated across various foreign and domestic policy domains. 
Thus, we will highlight efforts of post-1990 Hungarian foreign policy that have been 
aimed at improving the country's security, such as integration into major international 
organisations, enhancement of relations with neighbouring countries and the 
improvement of the situation of the Hungarian minorities living in neighbouring 
countries. In addition, we will elaborate a set of domestic policy-responses, which 
either directly or indirectly deal with the country's security. In this vein, we will 
examine Hungary's security and defence policies, including the formulation of basic 
documents, such as basic principles, doctrines and strategies, and the reform of its 
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defence establishment. The latter process is a complex one that is driven by the 
democratisation and civilianisation of controlling institutions over the armed forces 
that had hitherto been tailored to WTO requirements. Furthermore, the reform process 
has been accelerated by Hungary's accession to NATO and the consequent 
requirement for full interoperability of the Hungarian armed forces with the armies of 
other NATO member states. Beside defence policies, we will look at economic and 
internal security policy-responses, such as organised crime, illegal migration and 
environmental insecurities. 
6.2 Hungarian Security Predicaments 
Most Hungarian security experts agree that the likelihood of an external direct 
military threat has diminished significantly in the wake of the end of the Cold War.213 
Zellner and Dunay have concluded that the importance of the military factor has 
receded and non-military risks are now more pertinent.214 In a similar vein, Gyarmati 
has argued that "the 'high risk - high stability' situation has been replaced by a 'low 
risk- low stability' one".215 In line with this observation, Szemerkenyi has maintained 
that security challenges still exist, their nature having merely transmuted, becoming 
fragmented into various domains, military and non-military.216 These conclusions of 
Hungarian security and defence analysts support the utility of the analytical 
framework outlined in chapter two, and therefore, in what follows, we will examine 
Hungarian security predicaments across the five sectoral boundaries: military, 
political, economic, societal and environmental. 
213 See Dunay, Pal (1993) "Hungary: Defming Boundaries of Security", in Cowen Karp, Regina (ed.) 
Central and Eastern Europe: The Challenge of Transition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 122-
154; Joo (1996); Kardos, Gabor (1996) "The New Security Landscape in Europe and the European 
Crisis Policies- A Hungarian View", in Seidelrnann, Reirnund (ed.), Crises Policies in Eastern Europe. 
Imperatives, Problems and Perspectives. Baden-Baden: Nomos, pp. 141-148; Szemerkenyi, Reka 
(1997) "Az Atalakulo NATO", in Dunay, Pal and Ferenc Gazdag (eds.) Az Eszak-Atlanti Szerzodes 
Szervezete. Budapest: Strategia es V6delmi Kutatointezet, pp. 91-140. (The Changing NATO); Dunay, 
Pal (1997) "A Magyar Biztonsagpolitika 1990-1997", in Csaszar, Tibor, Ferenc Fischer, Ferenc 
Gazdag, Anna Koos and Otto Szabolcs (eds.) Biztonsagpolitika. Budapest: Strategia es Vedelmi 
Kutatointezet, pp. 165-193. (Hungarian Security Policy 1990- 1997); Gyarmati, Istvan (1997) 
"Security and Stability in Europe", Foreign Policy: A Quarterly of the Hungarian Institute of 
International Affairs, 3:Special Issue, pp. 131- 150. 
214 Zellner, Wolfgang and Dunay Pal (1998) Ungarns Auj3enpolitik 1990-1997. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 
p. 153. (Hungary's Foreign Policy 1990-1997) 
215 Gyarmati (1997), p. 131. 
216 Szemerkenyi (1997), p. 96. 
151 
6.2.1 The Military Sector 
Although the majority of Hungarian observers generally dismiss the possibility of a 
direct military threat, at the same time, they seem to share the view that the possible 
occurrence of a traditional or conventional military threat cannot be ruled out 
completely. It can therefore be argued that in post-Cold War Hungary there has been a 
lack of direct military threats, but that there have remained or arisen some clearly 
identifiable potential risks and vulnerabilities in the military sector. 
It can be argued that some of these potential security predicaments in the military 
sector have been more potent in post-communist Hungary than in other parts of the 
CEEn region, which can be explained mainly by the geopolitical situation of the 
country. First and foremost, Hungary has a common border with three of the 
successor states of former Yugoslavia: Croatia, Serbia and Slovenia, which makes, as 
Jo6 put it, "for a unique and quite uncomfortable geopolitical position on the 
European continent"?17 Second, in addition to former Yugoslavia, Hungary witnessed 
in the early 1990s at its northern borders the break-up of Czechoslovakia, and at its 
north-eastern borders, the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Although the re-emergence 
of the Ukrainian and Slovak nation-states, in contrast to the fragmentation that has 
occurred in former Yugoslavia, took place without the use of force, these newly 
created or re-defined nation-states have posed some threat to Hungary. Upon 
achieving independence, Ukraine became a nuclear power with defensive and 
offensive capabilities. Furthermore it also inherited a large conventional military 
capability. As Webber has put it, "this inflated military capability has created 
concerns not only in Russia but also amongst East European states ... ".218 This 
predicament diminished in importance with the conclusion of the 'Basic Treaty' 
between Hungary and the Ukraine in December 1991219 and evaporated eventually in 
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1996, when Ukraine, under immense pressure from both Russia and the USA, 
disposed of its nuclear capabilities and became a non-nuclear weapon state. 220 
With regard to Slovakia, there have been some serious tensions overshadowing 
relations with Hungary, which were mainly generated by the quarrel over the 
construction of the hydroelectric power system along the Danube, the treatment of 
ethnic Hungarians by the Meciar governments and Hungary's initial unwillingness to 
dismiss the possibility of peaceful alteration of the post-WW1 borders (these will be 
discussed below in detail). Concern over the escalation of tensions between Slovakia 
and Hungary was expressed by the EC as well, as Schopflin has put it: "there was a 
growing recognition within the EC that poor Slovak-Hungarian relations would be a 
source of continuing instability in Central Europe ... "221 Although, at times, 
diplomatic controversies have become heated, from Slovak side, the frailty of the 
independent military establishment could not make a military action against any state 
possible. Instead, the Slovak-Hungarian military security predicament intensified with 
Hungary's acquisition of 28 MIG-29 fighter aircraft in 1993, which, partly as a result 
of the military imbalance between the two countries, prompted the Meciar 
government to reach the controversial conclusion, that Hungary was instigating a 
revisionist foreign policy via enhanced military build-up. 222 It has to be 
acknowledged, however, that the changing minority policies of the post-Meciar 
government, the conclusion of the Basic Treaty between Slovakia and Hungary in 
1995 and the resolution of the issue of the Danube hydroelectric development at the 
International Court of Justice in 1997 have all contributed to the significant lessening 
of tensions between the two countries. 
As regards military security predicaments emanating from post-1989/90 Romania, 
given the strength of the country's military establishment, the proposition of an armed 
conflict between the two nations could have been more realistic than in the Slovakian 
case. In 1990, Romania maintained one of CEE's largest defence establishments with 
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a total strength of320,000 personnel (compared to 155,700 ofHungary in 1989) and, 
as a result of the bloody revolution in December 1989, there has been a remote 
likelihood of a military conflict spiralling beyond the boundaries of the Romanian 
state. Such a situation could perceivably have arisen as a consequence of the 
involvement of Hungarian armed forces in the delivery of humanitarian aid and in 
supporting the Romanian armed forces fighting against the Securitate in 1989. 
Military security predicaments from Romania intensified with the violent clashes 
between ethnic Hungarians and Romanians in the Tirgu-Mures area of Transylvania 
in March 1990 that, at least for a short period of time, raised the possibility of a 
Hungarian involvement in the conflict.223 In addition, the not too distant historic 
precedent of 1919, when Romanian troops invaded large parts of Hungary, including 
the capital city of Budapest, kept the spectre of a military security threat from 
Romania alive?24 This will be discussed in the section (6. 3) on security perceptions 
at length. However, as in the Slovak case, relations between Romania and Hungary 
have improved considerably with the signing of the Basic Treaty in September 1996 
and after the change in government in Romania later in the same year. 
Security experts in post-1990 Hungary often refer to another external security 
predicament in the military sector, which, unlike the concrete threat from Yugoslavia 
between 1991 and 1999, represents a much more latent and remote risk, that is, the 
possibility of military action from the former Soviet Union in general and from Russia 
in particular. Attention is drawn to the difficult transition process in Russia and the 
possibility of a coup followed by the imposition of an authoritarian or military order, 
which could revive expansionist Russian tendencies. 225 Furthermore, during the 
1990s, the strengthening ofboth Russian Communists led by Gennadi Zyuganov and 
ultra-nationalists led by Vladimir Zhirinovskii sent alarming signals and raised the 
possibility of a renewed military threat and Soviet/Russian hegemonic interests. 226 
The failed August 1991 coup showed that this scenario is not too remote and Hungary 
took it with great relief that the withdrawal of the Soviet troops stationed in Hungary 
had been completed two months before the coup took place. In addition, during the 
negotiations of the Soviet-Hungarian Basic Treaty in 1990-1991, the Soviet side 
223 See Dunay (1993), p. 135. 
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wanted to retain some kind of control of Hungarian sovereignty, for instance in the 
form of having a say in Hungary's future alliance formations.Z27 Some eight years 
later, after Hungary's accession to NATO, some influential Russian generals, most 
notably General Leonid Ivasov, leader of the Department of International Military 
Cooperation in the Russian Ministry of Defence, threatened to deploy harsh 
countermeasures, should NATO decide to station nuclear weapons on the territory of 
Hungary. 228 
The most significant military security predicament for post-Cold War Hungary has 
been the bloody civil war that took place in the neighbouring successor states of the 
former Yugoslavia.229 Indeed, this is the only major concrete threat, as opposed to the 
above described indirect or latent risks, that Hungary was confronted with throughout 
most of the 1990s. As Zellner and Dunay have argued, unlike other European 
countries, which intervened in the conflict, Hungary had a number of vital interest 
that were only partially or not at all safeguarded by the actions of the UN and NATO 
in the region: the maintenance of its territorial integrity, the protection of the ea. 
341,000 strong Hungarian minority in former Yugoslavia and the internal security and 
economic consequences of an influx of refugees.230 In order to safeguard these 
interests with the greatest possible effect, Hungary tried to keep itself out of the 
conflict and, at least nominally, attempted to maintain good relations with both the 
West as well as with the government in Belgrade. Thus, an official statement by the 
Hungarian government from the 31st May 1992 commenting on the introduction of 
sanctions against Serbia and Montenegro stated that the 
Hungarian Prime Minister has outlined his stand in several international 
talks, (. . .) that Hungary's participation in the sanctions would be determined 
by international solidarity and support for UN, CSCE and EC efforts on the 
one hand, and good-neighbourly ties, the situation of the Hungarians in the 
Vojvodina and Serbian attitudes on the other.231 
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Hungary's relations with Belgrade had already been strained, after it became public in 
January 1991 that Hungary, with the approval of then Foreign Minister Geza 
Jeszenszky, had sold some 10,000 guns and 20 million munitions to the Croatian 
militia, a transaction that has become known as the 'Kalasnikov-affair'.232 In this 
already hostile climate, the military threat from Yugoslavia materialised in two 
different ways. Firstly, there were numerous violations of Hungarian airspace and 
border territories by the Yugoslav army, which culminated in the apparently 
accidental bombing of the Hungarian town Bares near the Serbian border in October 
1991. Secondly, through various provocations, the Yugoslav government attempted to 
force Hungary into the conflict, for instance through false accusations that Hungary 
was pursuing a revisionist foreign policy with the aim of annexing Serbian territories, 
inhabited by the ethnic Hungarian minority. Furthermore, there were various threats 
of Serbian terrorists to attack key Hungarian industrial installations and businesses, 
such as Hungary's nuclear power station in the town of Paks and Hungarian Airlines 
MALEV.233 
Despite deep reservations about its unpredictable consequences, in October 1992, the 
Hungarian government approved the deployment of NATO-manned AWACS 
reconnaissance flights in Hungarian airspace, which were supposed to control the UN 
no-fly zone over Bosnia. However, Hungary's military security predicament 
intensified in spring 1994 with UN/NATO's air strikes on Serbian positions in Bosnia. 
The issue of a possible escalation of the military conflict in former Yugoslavia to 
Hungary revived at the end ofMarch 1999, when NATO, without the approval of the 
UN Security Council started an air campaign against Yugoslavia. This military 
predicament, however, compared to the previous ones between 1991-1994 had a very 
different qualitative characteristic. On the one hand, the possibility of a Yugoslavian 
retribution on Hungary or on the ethnic Hungarians could not be excluded, on the 
other, Hungary's freshly granted full membership of NATO put an end to the 
controversial issue of security guarantees. NATO's Article 5 collective defence 
guarantee applied fully to Hungary, which functioned as a sufficient deterrent to 
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Belgrade. Yet, suffice it to say that because of its geopolitical situation and the 
presence of ethnic Hungarians in Vojvodina, Hungary found itself militarily 
vulnerable during the 1999 NATO campaign against Yugoslavia. 
All of the above discussed military security predicaments have been generated by 
external influences. As for internal influences that have contributed to the emergence 
of security predicaments in the military sector, there has been very little evidence of 
the likelihood of a large-scale military confrontation in post-Cold War Hungary; the 
country's transition process towards democracy has been peaceful and has enjoyed the 
full backing of the military establishment. The only major internal conflict that could 
have escalated into a military confrontation took place in October 1990 in the wake of 
the Antall government's decision to increase petrol prices by 65 per cent. A large 
crowd of taxi drivers gathered in front of the Parliament's building and demanded the 
withdrawal of the measure. After the government rejected their demands, they set up 
barricades on roads throughout the country, bringing the country to a stand-still for 
three days. This so-called 'taxi drivers' blockade' quickly attracted wide support and 
there was a real danger of the country slipping into chaos, which the government tried 
to avert through the deployment of force against the movement.234 The then President 
Arpad Goncz alleges that heavy armaments of the Hungarian armed forces were 
already moving towards to capital with the aim of clearing the blockade and that he, 
exercising his constitutional power as Head of the armed forces, acted promptly to 
annul the orders of the government, by ordering the tanks back to their barracks.Z35 
The conflict was eventually resolved by political means, yet the occurrence of a 
military confrontation was only narrowly avoided. 
In addition, the increased activity of armed criminals has generated security 
predicaments throughout the 1990s and beyond. Most of these activities took place 
during the socialist-liberal coalition government's time in office between 1994-1998. 
These activities started in autumn 1995 with the assassination of a foreign national, 
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who made his living from the illegal exchange of currencies, continued throughout 
1996 and 1997 and reached their peak in February 1998, when media mogul Janos 
Fenyo was brutally assassinated.236 Most of these killings were aimed at settling 
scores between competing organised criminal gangs, yet, often innocent people fell 
victim. As a Hungarian newspaper put it in the wake of the Fenyo incident: 
"Nowadays, anybody can at any time be killed in public" .237 
6.2.2 The Political Sector 
In line with the above mentioned military security predicaments generated by factors 
from neighbouring countries and Russia, there has been a possibility of the spill-over 
of external political insecurity to post-Cold War Hungary as well. It has to be stressed, 
however, that this class of insecurity has remained only a theoretical possibility and in 
reality, there is little evidence for its materialisation. 
Nevertheless, there has been a likelihood of negative political effects from some of 
the surrounding countries, which have experienced a particularly troublesome 
transition process. This is true of Slovakia during the Meciar years and Romania until 
November 1996, when Emil Constantinescu was elected president and the democratic 
course was strengthened. In addition, political turmoil and instability in neighbouring 
Ukraine in 2001 bears the remote possibility of exerting a political security 
predicament in Hungary. 238 
There was also some evidence in early 2001 that the Russian Intelligence Services 
may exert some negative political influence on Hungarian domestic politics with the 
especial aim of retarding or even halting Hungary's already advanced process of 
accession to the EU. The London-based security and defence journal Jane's Intelligent 
Digest claimed in an article in February 2001 that events surrounding the asylum 
claims of numerous members of the Hungarian gypsy community in Strasbourg have 
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been "to a large extent engineered by Russian operatives" ?39 The report claimed that 
the gypsies 
have been encouraged to plead persecution and violation of human rights 
before the EU bodies and even request political asylum so as to make 
Hungary look much worse than it is during the crucial EU accession 
negotiations which are currently taking place. This perhaps is one of the most 
damaging methods employed by Moscow of late, one that was tried in the 
aspirant Czech Republic first and subsequently transplanted to Hungary. 240 
Commenting on the Jane's article, a Hungarian security expert, Gorka L. Sebestyen 
has argued that it is not in Russia's interest to hinder Hungary's accession to the EU, 
however, it has important commercial interests in the slowing down of the process.241 
A standing committee of the Hungarian Parliament is currently investigating this 
matter. 
As regards political security predicaments generated by internal processes, it has to be 
acknowledged at the outset that, in political terms, post-Cold War Hungary has 
proved to be one of the most stable transitional countries in the CEEn region. Since 
the first fully democratic elections held in April 1990, there have been two subsequent 
parliamentary elections, in 1994 and 1998, both of which took place under peaceful 
and democratic conditions (see figure 6-1). 
Furthermore, Hungary passed the so-called 'two-turnover test', that is the swinging of 
the political pendulum from right to left and back, a factor that, according to 
Huntington, indicates successful democratic consolidation. 242 Although in the 1994 
elections, a single party, the Socialists gained an absolute majority in Parliament, they 
invited the liberal SZDSZ party to form a coalition government, with the intended aim 
of strengthening democracy. 243 In addition, following the German example, a 
powerful Constitutional Court was set up in 1989, to which all citizens can have 
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access.244 Although Hungary has not yet drafted a new post-communist constitution, 
the text finalised in 1989/90, as a result of a complete overhaul of the 1952 text, fulfils 
its democratic functions satisfactorily.245 
Mikl6s Nemeth 
J6zsef Antallt 
Peter Boross 
GyulaHom 
Geza 
Jeszenszky 
Laszl6 Kovacs 
Lajos Fiir 
Gyorgy Keleti 
Viktor Orban Janos Martonyi Janos Szab6 
ABBREVIATIONS: 
FIDESZ-MPP: Alliance of Young Democrats- Hungarian Civic Party 
FKGP: Independent Smallholders' Party 
KDNP: Christian Democratic Peoples' Party 
MDF: Hungarian Democratic Forum 
MSZMP: Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party 
MSZP: Hungarian Socialist Party 
SZDSZ: Alliance of Free Democrats 
Figure 6-1 Hungarian governments since 1988 
Notwithstanding this evident progress, the strengthening of right-wing nationalism 
could have some destabilising impact on Hungarian politics. Shortly after the 1990 
parliamentary elections, some ultra-nationalist fractions became vocal in the ruling 
conservative MDF Party, which culminated in the publication of a highly 
controversial anti-semitic rhetorical tract on the situation of the country in August 
1992.246 The author of the tract, one of the MDF's vice-presidents, the playwright 
Istvan Csurka, who had already been known for his xenophobic and anti-semitic 
views, blamed in the tract the "world-wide Jewish-Bolshevik conspiracy" for the 
economic difficulties of the transition process.247 Fearing the MDF's unity and 
consequent inability to remain in power, Prime Minister J6zsef Antall did initially try 
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to cover up the Csurka-affair. Following domestic and international pressure, some 
ten months after the publication of the tract, however, he had no option left but to 
expel Csurka from the MDF. Also in 1992, the rise of the ultra-nationalist right and 
the inadequacy of the government action to stop it, became apparent, when a group of 
skinheads and members of a fascist movement prevented, by booing and whistling 
President Goncz from delivering his speech on 23rd October, the day of remembrance 
for the 1956 Revolution.248 Csurka and others expelled from the MDF formed in June 
1993 the MIEP Party, the Hungarian Justice and Life Party, which can be classified, 
as Nagle and Mahr put it, "as anti-democratic, and a possible future danger in a crisis 
situation" .249 
Since the 1998 parliamentary elections, Csurka's Party has its own 14-vote strong 
faction in the Parliament, which de facto supports the conservative Orban 
government. The prospect is therefore a real one that MIEP might join a future 
coalition government, should FIDESZ-MPP win the elections and need its support in 
order to be able to form a majority. Notably, just as Prime Minister Viktor Orban 
refused to join the EU-wide ostracism of Austria's government incorporating Raider's 
Freedom Party, he also refuses to rule out the possibility of a future FIDESZ-MPP-
MIEP coalition.250 Thus, a future shift of Hungarian politics towards far-right 
nationalism is not inconceivable, and such move could certainly pose a serious 
challenge to the future of Hungarian democracy and to political security. 
6.2.3 The Economic Sector 
A post-Cold War Hungary that lost its markets with the collapse of the Council for 
Mutual Economic Assistance and faced an almost total collapse of its state run and 
uncompetitive industry and agriculture, has found itself in a severe economic security 
predicament. With the country's GDP growing slightly throughout the 1980s (except 
for 1985 and 1988, when in both years the GDP suffered a slight decline by -0.1 per 
cent) the country's macroeconomic stability faced a watershed in 1990 and especially 
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in 1991, in which years GDP declined by 3.5 and 11.9 per cent, respectively (see 
Table 6-2). In the same years, the inflation rate spiralled up to 28.9 and then 35 per 
cent on an annual basis, respectively. Economic collapse brought about a sharp rise in 
unemployment, which itself was something that was virtually non-existent until the 
late 1980s. 
15.5 0.2 N/A 
+0.7 17.0 0.3 N/A 
-3.5 28.9 0.5 21.3 0.3 
-11.9 35.0 2.0 22.7 2.9 
-3.1 23.0 8.2 21.4 6.8 
-0.6 22.5 13.9 24.6 5.5 
+2.9 18.8 14.0 28.5 8.4 
+1.5 28.2 12.0 31.7 6.7 
+1.3 23.6 11.7 27.6 3.5 
+4.4 18.3 11.4 23.8 4.8 
+5.1 14.3 11.0 26.8 4.6 
+4.2 10.0 7.0 25.2 3.9 
+5.3 9.8 6.4 24.7 3.4 
*as a percentage of GDP 
Figure 6-2 Maiu Hungarian macroeconomic and fiscal indicators 1987-2000 
Source: Central Statistical Office (KSH) and Ecostat, Hungary. 
In addition to the economic and fiscal misery of the early 1990s, Hungary's economic 
security predicaments have intensified further with Russia's shift in 1992 from barter 
trade to world market prices for its energy exports.251 Since Hungary was heavily 
dependent on Soviet/Russian crude oil and natural gas as well as electricity supplies, 
there were growing fears during the period of the 1991 Moscow coup that the Soviet 
Union might cut back its supplies. This potential economic security predicament has 
continued to the present day, because Hungary remains heavily dependent on Russian 
energy supplies. Furthermore, the fact that the Moscow coup coincided with the 
outbreak of civil war in Yugoslavia, which caused the severing of supplies from the 
251 See Nagle and Mahr (1999), p. 103. 
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so-called 'Adria pipeline', Hungary's only alternative oil supply, intensified economic 
security predicaments. 252 
Unlike Poland, the Czech Republic and Russia, the first post-communist government 
opted for a gradualist approach to economic transformation. The Antall government 
believed that such an approach would be more appropriate to avoid social hardship, 
yet, as it turned out by 1994, the lack of a larger-scale 'shock-therapy'-type adjustment 
of economic and fiscal processes brought the country to the edge of bankruptcy.253 
The resumption of growth in 1994 was followed by rising and ultimately 
unsustainable imbalances in the current and trade accounts as well as by spiralling 
inflation and gross foreign debt. 254 This happened at the time, when the Mexican 
financial markets collapsed and IMF officials hinted on several occasions that 
Hungary might face a similar economic security predicament of the same scale.255 
The Horn government introduced harsh economic and fiscal austerity measures in 
1995 that helped prevent fiscal collapse, however, it could only happen at the price of 
slowing down economic growth. It is only since 1996 that Hungary has managed to 
reduce the possibility a large-scale economic security predicament significantly and 
improved all its economic and fiscal indicators. 
In the wake of the breakdown of communism, economic security predicaments have 
been experienced by many individual Hungarians as well. The high inflation rate, the 
rise in unemployment and the continuous decline in living standards have been 
evident in Hungary, just as in other post-communist CEEn countries. The financial 
insecurity of many increased further through the fragility of some of the freshly 
privatised banking institutions. For instance, in February 1997, rumours circulated 
about the financial mismanagement and dubious investment projects of Hungary's 
second largest bank, Postabank. In March and on several subsequent occasions, the 
government had to inject public money into the troubled bank to avoid its collapse, 
which might have had a devastating effect on thousands of its customers.256 
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Although Hungary has been particularly successful in post-communist CEE in 
attracting FDI, by the late 1990s, a reverse trend started to take shape. For example 
the German company Mannesmann is transferring its production of car radios from 
Hungary to China, claming that the "cost squeeze for aftermarket products had forced 
it to transfer production to a country with much lower wage costs"257 and General 
Motors is closing its automotive production line. With 80 per cent of Hungarian 
industry in private hands, most of which is owned by multinational companies, 
including key parts of the service sector, such as the telecommunications (62.8 per 
cent) and energy supply industries (21.4 per cent), the ability of the Hungarian state to 
intervene in crisis situations has become marginal.258 This became apparent in April 
2001, when the French Danone Consortium decided to close down its successfully 
operating Hungarian biscuit factory, which it had purchased only a year previously, 
thereby dissolving a company, which had more than a hundred years oftradition.259 
6.2.4 The Societal Sector 
Hungary, in contrast to some of its neighbouring countries, does not have any 
dominant national or ethnic minorities, with the exception of the Roma population, a 
factor that has given little scope for the emergence of security predicaments in the 
societal sector. However, as previously discussed, in the wake of WW1, a large 
number of ethnic Hungarians became citizens of other countries (see Table 6-3). 
Source: Government Office for Hungarian Minorities Abroad 
Figure 6-3 The number of ethnic Hungarians in the surrounding countries of Hungary in 1999 
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It is certainly true that in terms of national destiny, the clauses of the Trianon Peace 
Treaty of 1920 constitute some of the most catastrophic and irreversible turning points 
in modern Hungarian history. Not only did Hungary lose two-thirds of its territories, 
but it was also deprived of a large proportion of its citizenry.260 But how strong is the 
legacy of Trianon in contemporary Hungary? Although during communist rule the 
issue of Trianon and its implications for national identity was suppressed, after 1990 
when the freedom of expression was reinstated, it became an important matter both in 
the public domain and in intellectual circles in particular. As Schopflin put it, "in 
Hungary, the Treaty of Trianon is still regarded as a major catastrophe for which 
France is held responsible as the patron of the Little Entente ( ... )". 261 In this respect, 
the greatest societal security predicament in post-Cold War Hungary is generated by 
the legacy of a historic event more than 80 years past, something that created a painful 
precedent for severe societal damage caused by external influences. 
In recent years, the legacy of the Trianon Treaty has had an impact on the security of 
Hungary's neighbours: it is not surprising that after 1990, nationalistically minded 
conservative politicians ignited a debate about the meaning of the Hungarian nation, 
the boundaries of state responsibilities and the re-definition of Hungarian identity and 
self-consciousness, a debate that still bums fiercely (this will be discussed in more 
detail below in the section on security perceptions). As it has been suggested earlier, 
security predicaments can arise in combined manner across different sectors. This is 
certainly valid for this societal security predicament. As Griffiths has argued, 
despite Hungarian assurances that no effort will be made to change borders 
by force in an effort to solve the minority problem, anxiety about Hungarian 
intentions has risen (. . .), especially about whether politicians might resort to 
the 'nationalist card' if the country becomes engulfed in political and 
. t '1262 economzc urmoz . 
Thus, the presence of large groups of ethnic Hungarians created a societal (and to 
some extent even military) security predicament for Hungary's neighbours, which also 
has a negative impact on the security of Hungary itself. Thus, after 1990, Hungary 
260 See Kinily (2001), p. 42. 
261 SchOpflin (1993), p. 2. 
262 Griffiths, Stephen I wan (1993) Nationalism and Ethnic Conflict: Threats to European Security. 
Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 22. 
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itself became increasingly embroiled in protracted diplomatic quarrels with Romania 
and Slovakia, the countries that have proportionally the largest ethnic Hungarian 
groups, over the treatment and rights of the Hungarian minority populations. 
Within the territory of Hungary, the situation of the Roma population has become one 
of the most complicated social problems of the post-communist years and arouses 
some serious societal security concerns, such as the outbreak of inter-racial conflict, 
wide-spread inequality in education and employment and the destruction of the 
indigenous Roma culture. 263 In contrast to the generally ageing and declining 
Hungarian population, the Roma population shows a growing (see Table 6-4) and 
significantly younger trend. 264 
ml'l111i\1290,~~,rp' 
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Source: Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
Figure 6-4 The number of Roma living in Hungary 
Yet, both, the employment and education levels of Roma lags far behind the national 
average (see Table 6-5). Furthermore, they are subjected to widespread discrimination 
by the Hungarian majority. 
A report on the situation of Roma in Hungary from 2000 has found, that "Roma 
students suffer discrimination deriving from segregation and the inappropriate 
teaching methods employed in classes", and that "the Roma also suffer from 
discrimination in police procedures".265 Similarly, another study investigating Roma 
lives in post-communist Hungary has found that the regime change brought a 
tragic setback in the fortunes of the gypsy population(. . .). Once it is accepted -
and the fact is hard to dispute - that the greater mass of gypsies in Hungary 
are now living at the barest level of subsistence, forming the stratum that 
263 See Andor (2000), p. 92. 
264 See Doncsev, Toso (2000) (ed.) Measures Taken by the State to Promote the Social Integration of 
Roma Living in Hungary. Budapest: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Source: 
http://www .mfa.gov .hu!Hungary/angol/romaliving.htm [ 5/5/2001]. 
265 Doncsev (2000) 
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society at large is most prone to despise and regard as superfluous, then if 
what now amounts for centuries of co-existence between gypsies and the 
Hungarian majority population is to remain on a peaceful course, there is an 
urgent need for well considered change. 266 
28.8% 
42.5% 
51.2% 
Source: Doncsev; Kallai and Torzsok267 
Figure 6-5 Employment among the Roma and non-Roma population in 1993 and their 
participation in secondary education 
Furthermore, as in recent years, many Roma became victims of offences of violent 
and sometimes even fatal attacks by some members of the Hungarian population, a 
larger scale emigration of the Roma has begun, many successfully claiming asylum in 
Western Europe and Canada. 268 Describing the extent of disappointment among the 
Hungarian gypsies, a leader of the Hungarian gypsy community argued that the 
Hungarian government should be pleased that the Roma population has opted for 
emigration, rather than for arming itself. 269 
6.2.5 The Environmental Sector 
With the nuclear accident at Chernobyl in 1986 in the then Soviet Union, the issue of 
environmental security became a matter of importance to Hungary. As a result of the 
lack of environmental consciousness within former communist regimes, many of 
post-1990 Hungary's abandoned industrial plants and former Soviet military sites are 
ecologically in a disastrous state. The most prominent example of environmentally 
ignorant communist central planning is the case of the country's largest river, the 
266 Kallai and Torzsok (2000), p. 18f. 
267 Ibid; Kallai, Emo and Erika Torzsok (2000) (eds.) ARoma's Life in Hungary. Report 2000. 
Budapest: Bureau for European Comparative Minority Research, p. 39. 
268 See Andor (2000), p. 93. 
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Danube, which suffered some irreversible damage in the 1980s and 1990s. In 1977, 
Hungary and Czechoslovakia agreed to build a hydroelectric power system along the 
river, which involved re-routing a part of it and thereby destroying the eco-system 
along the original bed. Hungary, responding to the public outcry, decided unilaterally 
to halt the building works in 1989 and to annul the contract in 1992. However, it was 
already too late to prevent much of the ecological damage.Z70 Slovakia's decision to 
continue with the building work led Hungary to take the case to the International 
Court of Justice, as, in its view, the environmental impact was too severe. 
Furthermore, the unique hydro-geographical situation and climate of Hungary 
confronts it with the severe ecological challenges of flood and drought. A great part of 
the country's territory is situated in the lowest parts of the Carpathian Basin, where 
severe rainfalls often cause floods or, as a result of water scarcity and extreme dry, 
there is drought. The temporal variation in rainfall in Hungary is extreme, during 
summer time, dry periods of 70-80 days are no rarity. The majority of the sources and 
water supply areas of Hungarian rivers fall on the territory of neighbouring countries, 
thus on annual average, some 96 per cent of the surface water supplies stem from 
abroad.271 Consequently, the regulation of rivers and their water levels can only partly 
be controlled by Hungary. In addition, after 1990, scarce resources prevented the 
appropriate maintenance of the existing system of dykes and the building of new ones 
in danger zones, thus currently, only two-thirds of the dykes are in an acceptable 
condition. 
As a result of heavy rainfalls, coupled with the sudden melting of snow in the 
Carpathians Mountains and the general impact of global warming, in 1999 and 2000, 
Hungary experienced wide-scale flooding. Figure 6-6 demonstrates the steady rise of 
the water level of Hungary's second biggest river, the Tisza between 1962 and 2000 
and the sharp increase in recent years. 
269 See Magyar Nemzet, 5/8/2000, p. 2. 
270 See Nagle and Mahr (1999), p. 163. 
271 See Damjanovich and Radvanyi (1997), p. 35. 
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Figure 6-6 Level of the Tisza in the years 1962-2000 
Source: HVG, 22. April 2000, p. Ill 
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In 2000, as eight rivers reached record water levels, the government was forced to 
introduce a state of environmental emergency in the entire eastern part of the 
country.272 Overall, 15 villages had to be evacuated, 75 houses collapsed, 147 were 
deemed life threatening and, as a result, 366 people lost their homes.273 
The spring 2000 floods were followed by extreme drought with temperatures reaching 
record levels (38.8 Celsius), which destroyed much of that year's harvest.274 In 
addition to floods and drought, in February 2000, Hungary had to face another large-
scale environmental disaster: the cyanide pollution of the Tisza and its numerous 
tributary rivers, which was described by the BBC as the "greatest environmental 
trauma in the region for a decade".275 The ultra-nationalist Hungarian politician Istvan 
Csurka called the incident in a parliamentary debate an attack against the Hungarian 
nation and compared the cyanide pollution with a 'war without arms'.276 The cyanide 
spill originated from a decaying Australian-Romanian owned goldmine near the 
Hungarian border in Northern Romania, which travelled down the river Tisza, 
destroying 80 per cent of the fish, plankton and other micro-organisms in the bed and 
in the water. This ecological disaster caused irreversible damage to the ecosystem of 
272 See HVG, 22/4/2000, p. 116. 
273 See HVG, 23/12/2000, p. 94. 
274 See HVG, 24/6/2000, p. 123. 
275 See BBC News Online, 14/2/2001. 
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the Tisza, as some rare fish spices were wiped out.277 Since the hazardous goldmine 
has not been closed in the wake of the accident and continues to use poisonous 
cyanide, the reoccurrence of a similar accident of this kind is a distinct possibility. 
6.3 Security Perceptions of the Hungarian Public and its Political Elite 
In general, the Hungarian public and political elite hold similar attitudes to security 
predicaments as the public and elites elsewhere in CEE. As is typical for the region, 
the clearly identifiable trend in Hungary is that the public is much more concerned 
about non-military aspects of security than military aspects.Z78 However, given the 
unique geopolitical situation of Hungary bordering as it does on both the Balkans and 
Ukraine, there are some public and elite perceptions that differ considerably from the 
rest of the CEEn region. Furthermore, problems arising from the large number of 
ethnic Hungarians living outside of the country's territory, a unique phenomenon that 
in Europe is only shared by Russia, causes some security concerns among the 
Hungarian public and elite, which are generally atypical of the region as a whole. 
The fact that non-traditional security issues can arise in a wide range of sectors beside 
the military one have been acknowledged also by the Hungarian political elite. 
Resolution 94/1998 of the National Assembly on the 'Principles of the Security and 
Defence Policy of the Republic ofHungary' states: 
The Republic of Hungary takes a comprehensive approach to security. Besides 
the traditional political and military factors it comprises other dimensions of 
comprehensive security as well, such as economy and finances, human and 
minority rights, information, technology, environment and international law. 
In a world of global challenges, political and economic interdependence and 
of technoloftical progress, the security of the Euro-Atlantic region has become 
indivisible. 79 
276 See Nepszabadsag, 2113/2000. 
277 SeeDer Neue Pester Lloyd, 23/2/2000, p.lf. 
278 See Hann, Endre (1996) "Public Attitudes on Security in Central Europe: Hungary", in Smoke, 
Richard (ed.) Perceptions of Security. Public Opinion and Expert Assessments in Europe's New 
Democracies. Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, p. 79. 
279 Principles of the Security and Defence Policy of the Republic of Hungary (1998), section 1, 
(document reproduced in full in the Annexe). 
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By outlining the official security perceptions of the Hungarian political elite, this 
resolution further acknowledges that Hungary's security is influenced by domestic 
political, social and economic processes, which have partly been generated by the 
ongoing transition and consolidation processes. On the other hand, there is a range of 
global risks that can challenge the country's security and its citizens' lives. The above 
mentioned document lists the following factors as sources of insecurity: 
The transitory or permanent controversies between countries and groups 
resulting from differences in social development, economic, financial and 
social crises, ethnic and religious tensions, terrorism, organised crime, illicit 
drug and arms trafficking, demographic tension, mass migration and intense 
environmental problems constitute a growing risk. The proliferation of 
weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery and the possibility of 
attacks on information systems present an increasing challenge and danger. 
Besides, tensions between and armed conflict within states are ever persisting 
in Europe. Instability and unpredictability resulting from transformation and 
the fragility of democratisation are specific sources of danger in our region. 280 
In the following, we will outline some concrete security perceptions of the political 
elite and the public, which can be categorised in two blocs. Firstly, we will highlight 
security perceptions of external threats including Russia, the Balkans and other 
neighbouring countries. Secondly, we will analyse attitudes towards new, non-
military factors, such as democratic stability, minorities and the environment. 
6.3.1 Are Hungarians Afraid of External Military Threats? 
Contrary to expert opinions and surveys conducted in other CEEn countries (see 
chapter four), the clear majority of the Hungarian public does not perceive Russia as a 
threat to peace and security. 281 Although after the strengthening of Russian extremist 
forces, surveys recorded a higher level of insecurity among Hungarian respondents, 
this proved to be a temporary phenomenon (see figure 6-7). 
280 Ibid, section 2. 
281 See Haerpfer et al. (1999), p. 1001. 
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Figure 6-7 The perceived threat from Russia: percentage of respondents answering 'yes' to the 
question: 'Do you think Russia poses a threat to peace and security of Hungary?' 
Source: Haerpfer et al. (1999), p. 1001 
This public perception seems to be in some disharmony with the post-1990 political 
elites' perception of Russia. Former Foreign Minister Geza Jeszenszky, speaking 
about the Antall government's perception of Russia, acknowledged that between 
1990-1994, Russian domestic political development's and potential risks stemming 
from them, caused some serious concern among the government.282 Although the 
long-term occupation of Hungary did not generally arouse widespread hatred of the 
Russian people, nonetheless, there were serious misgivings and, to some extent, an 
apprehension about the intentions of Russian politicians.283 These fears intensified 
during the Soviet-Hungarian financial negotiations surrounding the withdrawal of 
Soviet military troops from Hungary, when the Soviet partners used blackmailing 
techniques in order to achieve a more favourable settlement. The particulars of these 
negotiations were not made known to the general public, thus, they could not 
influence the public's threat perceptions. Furthermore, as Jeszenszky pointed out, 
misgiving about Soviet/Russian intentions arose during the negotiations of the Soviet-
Hungarian Basic Treaty, when the Russian Deputy Foreign Minister wanted to retain 
a Russian veto over Hungary's ability to enter into future alliances. Also, subsequent 
experiences of the Hungarian government proved that Russian thinking concerning its 
right to impose its will over what it considered to be its sphere of interest had not 
entirely diminished with the collapse of the Soviet Union. As Prime Minster Antall 
282 Author's interview with Geza Jeszenszky, 3/4/1998. 
283 See GieBmann (1995), p. 170f. 
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expressed his perception of Russia back in 1992 metaphorically, 'once the Russian 
bear has had enough sleep, it might return'.284 Zoltan Rockenbauer, former chief 
foreign policy advisor to Prime Minister Viktor Orban has pointed out that the 'Russo-
phobia' in Hungarian political circles has decreased somewhat with the emergence of 
Ukraine.285 The perception of Russia as a potential source of threat diminished 
significantly during the Socialist government's term in office between 1994-98. This 
is not surprising, in view of the fact that many of the members of the Horn 
government had a communist past (including Horn), in contrast to the Antall 
government that grew out of a strong anti-communist and anti-Soviet tradition, many 
of its members having participated in the 1956 revolution. Thus, it can be argued that 
much of the 'Russo-phobia' of the early 1990s was generated mainly by historical 
legacies and ideological factors. By the late 1990s and especially in the wake of 
NATO membership, the fear of Russia among the political elite has diminished 
considerably. Although the perception of a direct threat from Russia is declining, 
there is an increasing perception of an indirect threat exerted via the intensifying 
Russian influence on Ukraine. This surfaced on the occasion of Prime Minister 
Orban's visit to Washington in April2001, when he voiced concerns about the future 
of Ukraine's independence with regard to Europe's security. He argued, "without the 
guaranteed independence of Ukraine, the whole post-Cold War security architecture 
ofEurope is in danger".286 
Also processes taking place in some of Hungary's neighbours have prompted the 
emergence of some apprehensive attitudes among the Hungarian elite and public. As 
Horn, who was Foreign Minister in 1989, recounts in his memoirs, in 1989, the fear of 
hostile Romanian intentions against Hungary intensified among members of the last 
communist government as well as among members of the emerging opposition 
parties.287 These fears deepened in the summer of 1989, when news emerged of the 
intention of Ceausescu's Romania to develop atomic weapons and medium-range 
missiles.288 With the disappearance of the Ceausescu regime and the emergence of a 
democratic system, these fears have diminished substantially. However, as Imre Mecs 
284 Quoted by Jeszenszky, in Author's interview with Geza Jeszenszky, 3/4/1998. 
285 Author's interview with Zoltan Rockenbauer, 2/4/1998. 
286 In The New York Times, 30/4/2001. 
287 See Horn, Gyula (1991) ColiJpok. Budapest: Kossuth, p. 258. (Stakes) 
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pointed out in 1998, the fact that a genume post-Cold War downsizing of the 
Romanian army has not yet materialised, raises some security concerns in Hungary. 289 
Furthermore, Jeszenszky referred to the fact that the post-1990 Romanian military 
press has published virulently anti-Hungarian articles, which have raised concerns 
among the Hungarian elite especially at times of elections and political and economic 
turmoil in post-communist Romania.290 Yet, it has to be acknowledged that the 
perceived Romanian threat, along with the above described Russian one, is mainly a 
subjective feeling of a potential hostility, in both cases generated, to a great extent, by 
negative historical experiences, most notably by the experience of Russian and 
Romanian occupations of Hungary in the 20th century and the fear of their possible 
reoccurrence. 
By contrast, as has been pointed out in the previous section on predicaments, the 
military threat from former Yugoslavia has been a more direct danger. This has also 
been clearly expressed by the Hungarian public and elite. 291 Various surveys collated 
from amongst representative samples of the population confirm that the perception of 
threats from neighbouring countries, specifically from the successor states of 
Yugoslavia, were very marked in Hungary in the 1990s. In 1992, 64 per cent of 
Hungarians expressed their concerns about such a threat. 292 Furthermore, the 'Gallup 
Kosovo Poll' revealed that during the 1999 NATO air strikes against Yugoslavia, 
some 55 per cent of the overall Hungarian population feared that the conflict might 
intrude into Hungarian territory, although there was a notable disparity in the level of 
threat perceived by males and females. 293 In the largest Hungarian town near the 
Serbian border, this figure reached 61 per cent (see figure 6-8). Subsequent surveys 
conducted in 1997 and 1999 revealed that, whilst in February 1997, only a minority of 
the Hungarian public expressed some serious worries about a potential attack against 
Hungary, this anxiety increased substantially in March 1999.294 
288 lbid; this has also been confirmed by Rockenbauer; In author's interview with Zoltan Rockenbauer, 
2/4/1998. 
289 Author's interview with Irnre Mecs, President of the Parliament's Defence Committee (1994-98), 
2/4/1998. 
290 Author's interview with Geza Jeszenszky, 3/4/1998. 
291 See Hann (1996), p. 82. 
292 Haerpfer et al. (1999), p. 1004. 
293 See Gallup Kosovo Pol11999, Source: 
http://www.gallup.hu/gallup/self/polls/kosovo/bombing/990415/bombing990415 en.htm [1 0/01/2001] 
294 See HVG, 3/4/1999, p. 9. -
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Figure 6-8 Percentage of the population fearing the spread of war to Hungary on selected dates 
in 1999 
Source: The Gallup Kosovo Poll1999 
In addition to the public apprehensiveness, the political elite feared that, by tying 
itself too strongly to NATO's actions, Hungary could make itself a target for Serbian 
revenge either in the form of a direct attack on Hungarian territory, or in the form of 
retributions on the ethnic Hungarians in the Vojvodina region.Z95 However, with 
Hungary's entry to NATO in March 1999, the perception of this fear declined 
substantially among the political elite. The importance of Hungary's NATO 
membership during the air strikes was echoed by all politicians on a daily basis, so, 
for instance, Prime Minister Orban maintained that, "although the possibility of 
incidents or malicious steps cannot be excluded, a military attack against a Hungary, 
that enjoys the full protection of NATO, would have no chance of success".296 
Furthermore, Foreign Minister Janos Martonyi commented in a German newspaper 
interview on Hungary's freshly achieved NATO membership in the context of the 
Alliance's action against Yugoslavia as "Gliick im Ungliick", that is, loosely, that the 
'cloud has a silver lining'.297 
295 See Zellner and Dunay (1998}, p. 366. 
296 Quoted in Der Neue Pester Lloyd, 14/4/1999, p. 1. (translated from the German by the author) 
297 Quoted in Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 2115/1999. 
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6.3.2 Non-military Security Perceptions 
As in most CEEn countries, the greatest potential non-military threat perceived by the 
public in post-Cold War Hungary is represented by the destabilisation of the internal 
political and economic situation.Z98 Although, according to a 2001 survey, the 
Hungarian public's satisfaction with the democratic system has overall improved 
between 1991-2001 (see figure 6-9), the majority still believes that, overall, life was 
better during the communist Kadar-regime.Z99 As regards financial security, an 
ECOSTAT opinion poll from April 2001 found that 56 per cent of the population 
regards its financial situation as average, but two-thirds does not believe that it will 
improve in the near future?00 Another survey revealed that two-thirds of the 
Hungarian population believed in 2000 that its real term income declined, 
furthermore, 60 per cent found that the level of inflation was 'unacceptable'.301 
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Figure 6-9 Percentage of respondents pronouncing themselves 'satisfied with democracy' in 
Hungary by year 
Source: HVG, 30. June 2001, p. 61. 
With regard to the population's perception of public security and order, diverse set of 
surveys have revealed that, since the mid-1990s, the clear majority of respondents 
298 See GieBmann (1996), p. 169. 
299 In HVG, 30/6/2001, p. 60. 
300 In Korridor, 29/4/2001; Source: http://www.korridor.hu 
301 See Gabos, Andras (2001) Elemzesek a Gazdasagi es Tarsadalompolitikai Dontesek ElOkeszitesehez 
20: December 2000. Budapest: TARKI, p. 4, (Analysis for the Preparation of Economic and Socio-
political Decision). 
176 
judged public security in Hungary to be either average or worse.302 After 1990 there 
was an improvement in public optimism, yet, after a series of incidents in the mid-
1990s, this process reversed and stabilised at an intermediate level. Perceptions of 
public security in Budapest, however, where most of the organised crime related 
incidents and bloody reckonings have taken place, show a clearly worsening tendency 
between 1994-1998 (see figure 6-10). 
Feb-98 
Dec-97 
Dec-94 
Figure 6-10 Perception of public security in Budapest by year 
Source: HVG, 21. February 1998, p. 12. 
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Also the political elite had to acknowledge that the public security in post-Cold War 
Hungary had serious shortcomings. In the wake of the above mentioned Fenyo 
assassination, Prime Minister Horn conceded in a press conference that "today in 
Hungary there is no public security". 303 Rockenbauer described Hungarian public 
security as catastrophic and compared it with circumstances characteristic of Chicago 
in the 1930s.304 
Furthermore, the rising level ofxenophobic, anti-Semitic, anti-refugee and anti-Roma 
tendencies in post-1990 Hungary constitutes a particularly severe example of a 
302 In News from the Ministry of Internal Affairs, 251111999; Source: http://www.b-m.hu 
303 Quoted in HVG, 2112/1998, p. 9. (translated from the Hungarian by the author) 
304 Author's interview with Zoltan Rockenbauer, 2/4/1998. 
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phenomenon that is prevalent not only within CEE but Europe as a whole (see figure 
6-11). 
% 
Figure 6-11 Fraction of respondents admitting to a 'dislike' ofRoma and Jewish populations by 
year 
Source: Gallup Hungary Ltd, Management Consulting and Public Opinion Polling in Hungary and in 
Central Europe: http://www.gallup.hu 
An annual population survey into perceptions of refugees has revealed that the 
number of those, who categorically oppose Hungary's acceptance of refugees, is on 
the increase (see Figure 6-12).305 
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Figure 6-12 Attitudes of Hungarians to reception ofrefugees by year 
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This group of people are also characterised by the surveyors as 'openly xenophobic'. 
At the same time, the number of those, who would welcome all refugees, the so-called 
'super-liberals', is diminishing. 
Meanwhile, a Hungarian survey conducted in early 2001 in selected schools revealed 
that 25 per cent of respondent teachers were of the opinion that Romany pupils should 
be taught in segregated classes and 25 per cent of teachers also believed that the low 
average performance of Romany pupils had genetic causes. 306 The same survey has 
also found that one out of four teachers believed, the Roma problem should be solved 
through displacement of the Romany population. Another survey conducted in 
December 2000 confirmed that the 'societal distance' between the majority Hungarian 
population and the gypsy minority is large. Some 66.7 per cent of the respondent 
Hungarians believed that the growing gypsy community poses a threat to societal 
security and 82.7 per cent agreed with the assumption that gypsies should be taught to 
live like the Hungarians. 307 Official political attitudes towards the gypsy minority are 
more reserved, none of the interviewed politicians shared the anti-gypsy or anti-
refugee views of the general public. However, a controversial statement of Prime 
Minister Orban, in which he recommended the Hungarian gypsies to "learn more and 
work more", reveals some biased attitudes and an ignorance about the actual root 
causes of the gypsies' problems.308 
As various analysts point out, environmental security issues ranked very highly in the 
perception of Hungarian society in the 1980s. This enabled the foundations of an 
environmentally conscious 'Green' politics to be laid for the coming years.309 In the 
1980s, environmental security concerns were reinforced by the nuclear accident at 
Chernobyl in 1986 and also by the communist government's plans for the construction 
of the Gabcikovo-Nagymaros hydroelectric power system along the Danube. In 1984, 
the Danube Circle, the first significant environmental pressure group was founded, 
which at its peak had around 10,000 supporters.310 In 1989, after the 'Law of 
306 InMagyar Hirlap, 7/3/2001. 
307 See Gabos (2001), p. 22ff. 
308 Quoted in Magyar Nemzet, 10/8/2000, p. 2. (translated from the Hungarian by the author) 
309 See, for example, Hajba, Eva (1995) "The Rise and Fall of the Hungarian Greens", in Cox, Terry 
and Andy Furlong Hungary: The Politics of Transition. London: Frank Cass, p. 180ff; Nagle and Mahr 
(1999), p. 163ff. 
310 See Hajba (1995), p. 181. 
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Association' was passed, the Danube Circle and some other organisations became 
legally recognised bodies. However, during the 1990s, as economic issues have 
become high on the political and personal agenda, the Hungarian public's interest in 
the environment has diminished substantially (see figure 6-13).311 
Furthermore, the clear majority of the Hungarian public would not accept financial 
sacrifices at the cost of the economy or its own financial welfare (see figures 6-14 and 
6-15). Rockenbauer confirmed the rather indifferent attitude of the Hungarian public, 
and claimed that society on the whole did not appreciate the importance of 
environmental security issues.312 A similar indifference seems to characterise the 
post-1990 political elite's attitude towards environmental security. Whilst the 1998 
document on the 'Principles of the Security and Defence Policy of Hungary' 
acknowledges the perceived environmental security risk, it fails to elaborate on the 
ISSUe. 
In addition to the aforementioned security perceptions, we will discuss m the 
following, how Hungarian politicians perceive and define the boundaries of the 
Hungarian nation. Although the direct link between this issue and security perceptions 
in general might not, at first sight, be apparent, a brief discussion here is worthwhile, 
since it provides valuable background information of the context in which foreign and 
security policy-outputs arise. 
After the April1990 election victory of the conservative opposition forces, the Antall 
government did not waste any time in seeking to revive the national self-
consciousness of Hungarians. Amongst issues, such as the replacement of the 
communist coat of arms by the traditional Hungarian one featuring the crown or the 
decreeing of national holidays marking major national historical events, the 
glorification of Hungarian history began. 
311 See Csagoly, Paul (1998) "Green Economics", Transition, 5:6, p.75. 
312 Author's interview with Zoltan Rockenbauer, 2/4/1998. 
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Figure 6-13 Public interest in the debate on the building of the Danube power station 
Source: Gallup Hungary Ltd, Management Consulting and Public Opinion Polling in Hungary and in 
Central Europe: http://www.gallup.hu 
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As Attila Agh put it, "the first freely elected government produced some return to the 
past, to the Golden Age that never was in Hungarian history" .1 In the debate on 
Hungarian history and identity, the re-definition of the boundaries of the Hungarian 
nation played a central role. In this vein, Antall, claimed in his prime ministerial 
inauguration speech that, 'in spirit', he felt responsible for ea. 15 million Hungarians, 
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including the ea. 4.5 million ethnic Hungarians living in neighbouring countries in 
addition to the ea. 10.5 million population of Hungary proper. 2 In his explanations, 
Antall referred to the Constitution, which indeed does have some provisions 
concerning Hungarians living outside the country's borders, yet the extent to which 
this constitutional duty should be pursued by the respective governments, is not 
defined further (see figure 6-16). 
Figure 6-16 Constitution of Hungary, Ch.l, Art. 6, Para. 3. 
It is not surprising that Antall's rather broad interpretation of this constitutional 
provision sent alarm signals to those neighbouring countries with large Hungarian 
minorities. Members of Antall's government shared his interpretation of the 
Constitution and managed to confuse their international partners with their 
nationalistic views. So, for instance, Defence Minister Erno Raffay reasoned in 1992 
that 
the Hungarian nation lives in Hungary and seven adjacent countries, 
altogether in eight countries. This is a unique situation in Europe ( ... ) It also 
means that (. . .) this dispersed entity of the Magyars does influence Hungarian 
foreign policy and Hungarian defence policy.4 
In 1994, when Socialist Horn became Prime Minister, the tone of government rhetoric 
changed considerably. With reference to Antall's controversial statement, he sent a 
clear message to the neighbouring countries, acknowledging, that his new government 
will be "the government of ten and a half million Hungarian citizens, but of course it 
will feel responsible for the fate of the ethnic Hungarians outside the country's 
1 Agh, Attila (2000) "Hungary: In the Midst of Systemic Change", in Kostecki, Wojciech, Katarzyna 
Zukorowska and Bodgan J. Goralczyk (eds.) Transformations of Post-communist States. Basingstoke: 
Macmillan, p. 151. 
2 See HVG, 26/12/1998, p. 10. 
3 Constitution of the Republic of Hungary, in The Rebirth of Democracy: 12 Constitutions of Central 
and Eastern Europe, Strasbourg: Council of Europe Publishing, p. 158. 
4 Quoted in Griffiths (1993), p. 22. 
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territory".5 Foreign Minister Kovacs confirmed the new government's shift in the 
perception of the historical past and of the boundaries of the Hungarian nation and 
argued that 
we have to acknowledge that Hungary's borders are permanent ones - the 
country's area is hardly more than 93,000 sq. km and that its population 
hardly more than ten million. Anyone who thinks in terms of other conditions 
is simply chasing illusions. We have to accept that querying those borders or 
even using intentionally vague or mysterious language about them places 
Hungary in mortal danger and is therefore quite impracticable. 6 
Since 1998, the conservative Orban government has, to a great extent, returned to the 
glorification of Hungary's historical past and, also, with regard to the meaning of the 
nation, revived sentiments about a Hungarian nation that go beyond the country's 
post-1920 borders. In a speech delivered at the 'Conference of the Association of 
World Hungarians' in 2000, Orban summed up the idea of his government as regards 
the future of the Hungarian nation as follows: "We proclaim a national re-unification 
without the actual changing of the borders".7 
The two competing perceptions represented by Hungarian national-conservative 
politics on the one hand and social-liberal politics on the other, demonstrate, how 
divided post-1990 Hungarian politics and society on the issue ofthe nation is. 
6.4 Foreign and Security Policy-responses in post-Cold War Hungary 
As our analyses of Hungarian security predicaments and perceptions have 
demonstrated, insecurities can occur in a range of military and non-military sectors. In 
line with this, the document on the 'Principles of the Security and Defence Policy of 
the Republic of Hungary' highlights a number of foreign and domestic policy areas in 
which responses need to be taken, in order to safeguard the country's security. 8 In the 
5 Horn (1999), p. 228. 
6 Kovacs, Usz16 (1995) "Does a Europe-compatible Hungary Make a Realistic Aim?", in Current 
Policy, 1995/2, p. 3f. 
7 Orban, Viktor (2000) "Beszed a Magyarok Vilagszovetsege Kongresszusan", 21. May 2000, Source: 
http:/ /www.meh.hu!kormany!kormanyfo/2000/05/000521.htm [ 10/8/2001 ]. (Orban's Speech at the 
Conference of the World Association of Hungarians) 
8 Principles of the Security and Defence Policy of the Republic of Hungary (1998) 
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following, we will look at a number of security policy-responses in two distinct areas, 
that is, in foreign and domestic policies. 
6.4.1 Foreign Policy-responses 
Already under Jeszenszky as Foreign Minister (1990-1994), the three major pillars of 
Hungarian foreign policy, which prevail up to the present, were defined. Accordingly, 
Hungarian foreign policy pursues three equal aims: firstly, the integration of Hungary 
into the Euro-Atlantic community, secondly, the establishment of good relations with 
its neighbours and, last but not least, support for the Hungarian community beyond 
national borders.9 
The security implications of the first two objectives are obvious, since NATO and EU 
membership functions as a stabilising factor. NATO membership with its security 
guarantee constitutes a concrete improvement of security and it also increases the 
subjective security perception of the public. Indirectly, NATO membership can also 
boost foreign investors' confidence and attract more FDI, and thus facilitate economic 
recovery.10 Meanwhile, Hungary's membership of the EU would help defuse, in the 
first instance, non-military security predicaments ('soft security' issues), although with 
the advancement of the EU's security and defence policy, the ESDP, the military 
security dimension ('hard security') has increased in importance as well. By 
considering "transatlantic co-operation a cardinal factor of European security" non-
EU member Hungary has already expressed its support for ESDIIESDP "within the 
framework of inter-Alliance cooperation" in the 1998 document on the Principles of 
the Security and Defence Policy.11 In addition, EU conditionality (the Copenhagen 
criteria for membership) impacts on Hungarian foreign policy as well, as it requires 
Hungary to stabilise its relations with its neighbours, as well as to adopt the EU's 
restrictive visa regime. 
9 See Somogyi (1997), p. 3; Kovacs (1995), p. 1. 
10 See Hyde-Price (1996), p. 248. 
11 Principles of the Security and Defence Policy of the Republic of Hungary (1998), section 7. 
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The security implications of the second foreign policy objective are apparent too: 
good-neighbourly relations clearly contribute to stability within Hungary's close 
vicinity. 
The intensity, however, with which the last objective is pursued, can have 
simultaneously stabilising and de-stabilising effects, as numerous examples of post-
Cold War Hungarian foreign policy have shown. Furthermore, as Zellner and Dunay 
pointed out, quite legitimately, the set of three foreign policy objectives bear amongst 
themselves a fundamental contradiction.12 The pursuit of Euro-Atlantic integration 
can, for instance, clash with the wish to support ethnic Hungarians, as Hungary's 
future membership of the EU might require the imposition of a visa-regime against 
some of Hungary's neighbours. Equally, the intensive support of ethnic Hungarians in 
surrounding countries could jeopardise good-neighbourly relations with the countries 
concerned. 
The greatest challenge to the realisation of these foreign policy priorities was 
represented by developments in former Yugoslavia: Hungary had to reconcile its 
major objective of NATO/EU membership with the maintenance of reasonable 
neighbourly relations with Yugoslavia and its successor states as well as with the 
commitment to support ethnic Hungarians in the Vojvodina. Thus, with the outbreak 
of war in the Balkans, post-1990 Hungarian foreign policy found itself in a delicate 
position, which posed a great challenge to, and required difficult decisions from, a 
politically and diplomatically inexperienced team. Firstly, after the June 1991 
dissolution of the WTO, Hungary formally became a non-aligned country and had to 
rely on its crumbling defence establishment to defend its sovereignty and territorial 
integrity. Although as early as in 1990-91, the desire of Hungary for NATO 
membership was raised by various politicians across party lines, Prime Minister 
J6zsef Antall acknowledged during a visit at the North Atlantic Assembly in 
November 1990 that the pursuit of full membership was, at that time, an unrealistic 
undertaking. 13 Although the option of neutrality was on the agenda for a very short 
time (many referred to Hungary's declaration of neutrality during the revolution in 
12 Zellner and Dunay (1998), p. 449. 
13 See Valid, Usz16 (1999) (ed.) A NATO: Tortenet, Szervezet, Strategia es Bovites. Budapest: 
Corvina, p. 159. (NATO: History, Structures, Strategy and Enlargement) 
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1956), two major events in 1991, the Moscow coup and the outbreak of war in 
neighbouring Yugoslavia proved that neutrality would not guarantee Hungary's 
security. 14 
Secondly, while Hungary embarked on a NATO-friendly foreign policy with the clear 
aim of attaining full membership of the alliance at the earliest possible date, it had to 
ensure for its own sake and the sake of the ethnic Hungarians in the Vojvodina that it 
maintained reasonable relations with Yugoslavia and its successor states. In the wake 
of the 1991-93 border violations, Hungarian Defence Minister Lajos Fiir proposed the 
initiative of 'open barracks' in the close vicinity of the borders, that is to open all 
military barracks within 50 kilometres of the border for mutual inspection. 15 More 
importantly, however, in March 1993, Prime Minister Antall asked the then NATO 
Secretary General Manfred Worner for security guarantees to remedy the security 
predicament generated by the employment of AWACS planes over Hungarian 
territory. This happened at a time, when the Milosevic-regime in Belgrade expressed, 
on several occasions, its dislike of the presence of AWACS planes in Hungarian 
airspace.16 Also in March 1993, Foreign Minister Jeszenszky reiterated the 
government's position in a speech at the Hungarian Parliament: "it is our firm 
intention to refrain from taking part in military actions ( ... ), because we consider this 
would jeopardise our security and the Hungarian minority living in the countries 
concerned". 17 Although NATO granted no formal security guarantees at this stage, at 
the same time, it sent a clear signal to Budapest. As Worner put it in May 1993: "It 
would be inconceivable that the international community would remain passive if a 
country suffered from aggressive action because of its support for UN-mandated 
operations" .18 
After Prime Minister Antall's death in December 1993, his successor Peter Boross 
advocated a harder line with regard to Hungary's role in the conflict and maintained 
that no AWACS flights should be allowed over Hungary while UN/NATO air strikes 
were taking place. Boross' main argument was to keep Hungary out of the conflict and 
14 Author's interview with lmre Mecs, 2/4/1998. 
15 See Dunay (1993), p. 131. 
16 See Vallci (1999), p. 160. 
17 Jeszenszky, Geza (1993) "Concluding Speech at the Hungarian Parliament on 2nd March 1993", in 
Current Policy, No.7/1993, p. 2. 
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to avoid ethnic Hungarians being taken hostage. He argued with regard to the 
UN/NATO action that "Hungary will not take part. We have to live with Serbia and 
the Serbian people for hundreds more years". 19 A similar debate ignited some five 
years later with regard to then full-NATO member Hungary's role in the bombing 
campaign against Serbia. 
For the sake of national security, the Horn government between 1994-98 followed a 
similar approach, manoeuvring to maintain a stance of Hungarian policy that was 
consistent with both Western policy and also with good-neighbourly relations with 
Serbia. Foreign Minister Kovacs declared in September 1995 that Hungary sought to 
maintain an impartial position in the Balkan conflict. 20 
The fear of a possible retaliation by the Serbs and of an escalation of the conflict to 
Hungary intensified in 1999, during the NATO intervention in Yugoslavia. Clearly, 
Hungary as a full member of NATO was, this time, drawn into conflict as an 'enemy' 
of Yugoslavia, as it allowed NATO allies to use its air bases not only for the AWACS 
planes but also for fighter aircraft starting bombing missions against Yugoslavia. The 
Orban government acknowledged on several occasions that the national interests of 
Hungary dictated that it should not take part in the conflict. Yet, the duties arising 
from the country's freshly granted membership of NATO required full Hungarian 
backing of and participation in the NATO actions.21 
As opposed to the official government line, members of the socialist opposition took a 
somewhat differing view on the degree of Hungary's participation in the NATO 
actions. Party leader and ex-Foreign Minister Kovacs proposed the drafting of a 
'positive message' addressed to the Serbian people, stating that the war was not fought 
against them, but for the enforcement of a political settlement of the conflict. 22 This 
request was rejected by all other parliamentary parties. By the beginning of May, 
however, the great majority of the parliamentary fraction of the Socialist Party 
proposed another resolution, according to which no bombing action would be 
18 Quoted in Zellner and Dunay (1998}, p. 366. 
19Quoted in Denton, Nicholas "Hungary Bans NATO Overflights by Awacs", in Financial Times, 
12/2/1994. 
20 See Current Policy, No.8/1995, p. 2. 
21 See HVG, 17/4/1999, p. 8 
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permitted to originate from Hungarian soil.23 This was a direct answer to the 
government's decision, which, with the effect of 24th March 1999 (two weeks after 
Hungary joined NATO), handed overall control of Hungarian airspace and of its 
airfields to NATO (including the country's sole International Airport 'Ferihegy' near 
Budapest), creating a legal basis for the launch of attacks against Yugoslavia from 
Hungarian airfields.24 One of the main defenders of the Socialist Party's resolution, 
former State Secretary in the Foreign Ministry, Csaba Tabajdi commented on 
Hungary's role in the conflict as follows: "We have reached the limit. We cannot take 
on any further roles in the conflict against Yugoslavia".25 This proposed resolution of 
the Socialist Party, like the earlier one, was rejected by all other parties in parliament. 
After these incidents, there were no further attempts in Hungary to distance itself from 
the NATO action in Yugoslavia and Hungary remained a faithful ally until the end of 
the campaign. 
As has been mentioned above, the war in Hungary's close neighbourhood, coupled 
with alarming political signals from Russia, represented important triggers for an 
energetic pursuit of NATO membership for the Antall government.26 As a result of 
NATO's procrastination to extend concrete security guarantees to its partner countries 
and the purely consultative role ofNACC, by 1993, the desire of full membership of 
NATO became one of the most important foreign and security policy objectives of 
Hungary.27 This had been officially proclaimed in the 1993 'Parliamentary Resolution 
on the Principles of the National Defence of the Republic ofHungary', which stated: 
"The aim of the Republic of Hungary is to become a full member of existing 
international security organisations, such as NATO and the WEU".28 During the 
parliamentary debate of this resolution, Horn, who was then the leader of the socialist 
opposition, raised, perhaps somewhat thoughtlessly, the need for a referendum in the 
matter of NATO membership, something that caused much anguish for his 
22 See Nepszabadsag, 3113/1999, p. 3. 
23 See Magyar Hfrlap, 271511999, p. 6. 
24 See Nemenyi, Uszl6 (1999) "NATO Membership, Humanitarianism and Nationalist Interests: 
Hungarian Politics During the Kosovo Crisis", East European Constitutional Review, 8:3, p. 69. 
25 Quoted in Die Zeit, 12/5/1999, p. 5. (translated from the German by the author) 
26 Author's interview with Geza Jeszenszky, 3/4/1998. 
27 See Vallci (1999), p. 161. 
28 Principles of the Security and Defence Policy of the Republic of Hungary (1998). 
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government in 1997.29 In principle, Horn was in favour of NATO membership, 
indeed, back in February 1990, in his position as Foreign Minister of the last non-
democratic government, he was among the first politicians who raised the possibility 
ofNATO membership.30 In the 1993 parliamentary debate he reasoned that, given the 
weight and the implications of NATO membership, the issue deserved a popular 
vote.31 Indeed, it was the Horn government between 1994-1998, which prepared, 
negotiated and practically achieved Hungary's admittance to NATO, even if official 
accession took place in 1999 during Orban's premiership. 
In general, the three post-1990 governments have agreed on the main principles of 
foreign policy, yet, they disagreed on the prioritisation of these goals. Whilst the 
Antall government paid special attention to Hungary's Euro-Atlantic integration, it 
pursued a confrontational foreign policy with its neighbours, in particular with 
Romania and Slovakia over the issue of ethnic Hungarians. At the peak of the 
resulting controversy, Hungary, which had already been a member of the Council of 
Europe since 1990, indicated that it intended to block Slovakia's and Romania's 
accessions to the organisation in 1993, until these countries improved their treatment 
of their Hungarian minorities.32 Only after Slovakia and Romania promised to comply 
with two recommendations of the CoE, did Hungary abstain from the vote, permitting 
Slovakia and Romania to join the council.33 It is not surprising that Hungary's 
confrontational foreign policy between 1990-94 did not achieve any of its proposed 
goals. The Euro-Atlantic integration of Hungary was still a distant prospect, 
Hungary's relations with Slovakia and Romania were anything but 'good-neighbourly' 
and, as the evidence clearly shows, the situation of the ethnic Hungarians worsened. It 
is very unlikely that, should Hungarian foreign policy have remained unchanged after 
29 See Juhasz, Erika (1999) "Magyarorszag NATO-csatlakozasa: Politikatorteneti Attekintes", in Glatz, 
Ferenc (ed.) A NATO es a Magyar Politika. Budapest: Magyar Tudomanyos Akademia. p. 21. 
(Hungary's Accession to NATO: A Politico-historical Overview) 
30 See Horn (1991), p. 207f. 
31 The contribution ofGyula Horn on 16/2/1993, Minutes of the Hungarian Parliament, Source: 
http://www.mkogy.hu/naplo34/271/271 0027 .html [1 0/8/2001]. 
32 See Szonyi, lstvan (1995/96) "Hungary as a Security Risk: No Major Concerns", in Bonvicini, 
Gianni, Maurizion Cremasco, Reihardt Rummel, Peter Schmidt ( eds.) A Renewed Partnership for 
Europe: Tackling European Security Challenges by EU-NATO Interaction. Baden-Baden: Nomos, p. 
117ff; Croft et al. (1999), p. 147. 
33 See Fisher, Sharon (1995) "Treaty Fails to End Squabbles Over Hungarian Relations", Transition, 
1:9, p. 2. 
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1994, Hungary would have qualified for NATO membership. NATO laid out its 
membership requirements in the 1995 'Study on Enlargement', which included: 
commitment to and respect for OSCE norms and principles, including the 
resolution of ethnic disputes, external territorial disputes including irredentist 
claims or internal jurisdictional disputes by peaceful means. 34 
The Horn government between 1994-98 realised that Hungary's security could only be 
enhanced and its main foreign policy objectives achieved, if the government changed 
its rhetoric and its conduct of foreign policy. In general, Foreign Minister Kovacs 
declared that the new government considered "other means and methods appropriate 
for attaining ( ... ) foreign policy objectives than the ones favoured by the last 
government". 35 In particular he condemned the use of pressure and argued "it would 
be hopeless to try and force things on them [Slovakia and Romania]".36 Referring to 
the Antall government's poor diplomatic record, during the mandate of which no 
prime ministerial meeting took place between Slovakia and Hungary, Kovacs 
maintained that the Horn government would pay special attention to constructive 
dialogue with all of its neighbours. 
Indeed, the new approach to conducting foreign policy proved to be successful on all 
fronts. During the Horn government's four years in office, substantial progress was 
achieved in relations with Slovakia, which was marked by the signing, in March 1995 
in Paris, of the 'Treaty on Good-Neighbourly Relations and Friendly Co-operation'. In 
addition, relations with Romania were normalised with the signing of the 'Treaty on 
Understanding, Co-operation and Good Neighbourhood' in September 1996 in 
Timisoara. Kovacs and his team managed to incorporate some favourable clauses on 
the situation of ethnic Hungarians in both treaties, in return, they agreed to the 
statement that Hungary did not have any territorial claims on Romania and Slovakia 
and it would not raise any such claims in the future (Article 3 and Article 4 in treaties 
with Slovakia and Romania respectively).37 Even if these treaties could not improve 
34 Study on Enlargement, NATO, September 1995, Source: http://www.nato.int/doculbasictxt/enl-
950l.htm, paragraph 72, [5/8/2001]. 
35 Kovacs (1995), p. 3. 
361bid. 
37 Treaty Between the Republic of Hungary and Romania on Understanding, Cooperation and Good 
Neighbourhood, Timisoara, 16th September 1996 (copy obtained from the Council of Europe); Treaty 
Between the Republic of Hungary and the Slovak Republic on Good-neighbourly Relations and 
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the strained relations between the countries overnight, they provided for a framework, 
in which controversies could be resolved by peaceful means. Thus, the conclusion of 
these treaties has undoubtedly had a stabilising impact on Hungary's security. 
Furthermore, NATO decided at its Madrid Summit in July 1997 to invite Hungary, 
along with the Czech Republic and Poland, to start accession negotiations with the 
prospect of an expedited progression to full membership. After this positive signal 
from NATO, the socialist government had no other option than to return to Horn's 
1993 assurance of a referendum on the matter of Hungary's NATO membership. This 
caused serious concerns not only among politicians in Hungary, but also in NATO 
member countries.38 Whilst all parliamentary parties clearly supported Hungary's 
accession to NATO, the public appeared ambivalent. Indeed, the March 1997 'Central 
and Eastern Eurobarometer' revealed that the Hungarian public was fairly divided on 
the issue: 32 per cent in favour, 17 per cent undecided and 23 per cent against.39 In 
addition, some non-parliamentary forces, most notably the Hungarian Socialist 
Workers' Party, the so-called Alba-Circle and the Foundation for a Neutral Hungary, 
opposed, for various reasons, Hungary's entry into NATO and fought a strong 
negative campaign. 4° Furthermore, NATO members feared that a potential negative 
outcome or a very tight 'yes'-vote might have an unfavourable impact on the attitudes 
of other CEEn countries.41 Eventually, on 161h November 1997, to the surprise and 
reliefofthe government and NATO politicians, the overwhelming majority (some 85 
per cent) voted in favour of Hungary's accession to NATO, although the turnout was 
low at 49.24 per cent (see figure 6-17). The day after, Foreign Minister Kovacs sent a 
letter of intent to Brussels, which enabled the launch of the official process of 
Hungary's NATO accession.42 
Friendly Cooperation, Paris, 19th March 1995, Current Policy, 1995/5, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 
Budapest. 
38 See Juhasz (1999), p. 34. 
39 Central and Eastern Eurobarometer: Public Opinion and the European Union (20 Countries' Survey), 
March 1997, European Commission, text figure 11. 
40 See Csapody, Tamas and Laszl6 Vit (1997) Amokfutas a NATO-ba. Budapest: Cartafilus. (Headlong 
into NATO) 
41 See Zellner and Dunay (1998), p. 201f. 
42 See Valki (1999), p. 176. 
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Figure 6-17 Results of the referendum on Hungary's NATO membership -16th November 1997 
In July 1997, the European Commission confirmed in a statement that Hungary was 
capable of meeting the requirements of European Union membership and was 
prepared to start accession negotiations to this end.43 Furthermore, Hungary's 
economic security was stabilised further with the country's admittance to the 
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), as the second 
member from CEE after the Czech Republic. 
After 1998, the Orban government completed Hungary's accessiOn to NATO 
successfully and thus realised the greatest achievement in post-Cold War Hungarian 
foreign and security policy. In the other main foreign policy undertaking, Hungary's 
goal of EU membership, there has been some substantial progress made in the last 
few years. By July 2001, Hungary, which is widely considered a frontrunner for EU 
membership amongst the candidate countries, had provisionally closed 22 out of the 
31 negotiating chapters, the highest number among all CEEn applicant countries, and 
it was ready to complete the negotiation process by the end of 2002.44 It is therefore 
very likely that the next Hungarian government (parliamentary elections are due in 
spring 2002) will complete Hungary's goal of Euro-Atlantic integration and will lead 
the country into the European Union. 
43 See Kovacs, Lasz16 (1997) "Hungary's Contribution to European Security", NATO Review, No. 5, 
Sept-Oct, p. 9. 
44 See Information of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Hungary on Hungary's EU Integration; Source: 
http:/ /www.mfa.gov.hu/euint/accneg_ d.html [19/6/200 1 ]. 
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With regard to its foreign policy towards the ethnic Hungarians beyond the country's 
physical border, the conservative Orban government returned to the historically 
biased 'nation-focused' approach, which was previously practiced by the Antall 
government.45 With NATO membership achieved and EU negotiations well under 
way, strategically speaking, Orban has been in a more favourable position for 
concentrating on policies with regard to the ethnic Hungarians. In June 2001, the 
Parliament adopted an 'Act on Hungarians Living in Neighbouring Countries' (widely 
known as the 'Status Law'),46 which has caused some serious turbulence in relations 
with the governments of some of the surrounding countries, in particular with 
Romania and Slovakia. The general purpose of the Act is to provide some concessions 
to ethnic Hungarians when they visit Hungary and, at the same time, to provide 
support, mainly in cultural fields, within the country of residence. In order for ethnic 
Hungarians to take advantage of these concessions, they will be provided with a so-
called 'Hungarian-card', an official document to be issued by the Hungarian 
government. Both Romania and Slovakia oppose the use of such cards on their 
respective territories. In addition, they maintain that utilisation of concessions for the 
ethnic Hungarians in their country of residence would be discriminatory towards the 
majority populations.47 It is to be feared that the debate on the 'Status Law' in 
Slovakia and Romania may whip up nationalistic tendencies in the respective 
countries and could have an adverse effect on Hungarian and CEEn security. 
6.4.2 Domestic Policy-responses 
As the 1994 Foreign and Security Policy Programme of the Horn government stated, 
the "size and strength of Hungary's armed forces are insufficient" to guarantee 
national security.48 Although since 1994 the situation of the defence establishment has 
changed substantially, it is still far away from being a modem, efficient force. It is 
important to stress, however, that the current major shortcomings lie not in the control 
structures of the armed forces, but mainly in its management, the scarcity of its 
45 In Nepszabadsag, 9/7/1998. 
46 See The Government Office for Hungarian Minorities Abroad; Source: http://www.htmh.hullaw.htm 
47 InMagyar Nemzet, 30/7/2001, p. 9. 
48 Foreign and Security Policy, Government Programme 1994, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Budapest, 
p.l. 
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resources and its decaying infrastructure. According to the constitution, the president 
is commander-in-chief of the army, the government (via a civilian Minister of 
Defence) exercises oversight of the day-to-day running of the armed forces and, since 
1990, the parliament exerts control over defence policies, the long-term development 
of the armed forces, the defence budget as well as the deployment of the military at 
home and abroad. 49 
In general, this control structure is in accordance with the democratic civil-military 
structures of Western democracies, with one major exception that appears to be a 
uniquely Hungarian phenomenon: the status of the Defence Staff as an independent 
institution, not subordinated to the Ministry of Defence. The separation of the 
Defence Staff from the Ministry of Defence took place in 1989 and was ordered by 
the last communist government in order to prevent a potentially dangerous 
concentration of the controlling power over the military. Since then, despite a general 
agreement of all parliamentary parties on the issue, none of the three governments has 
yet managed to achieve the merger of the Defence Staff with the Ministry of 
Defence.50 It has to be acknowledged, however, that the current Orban government 
has pursued this issue more rigorously than its predecessors. In 1999, it practically 
removed the anti-integrationist Chief of the Defence Staff Ferenc Vegh, and 
appointed a replacement, General Lajos Fodor, who subsequently committed himself 
to carrying out the government's programme regarding the merger. 51 By August 2001, 
the merger has still not taken place, yet a parliamentary resolution in the preceding 
June ordered the achievement of the Defence Staffs integration into the Ministry by 
the end of 2001, in order to abolish parallel structures and establish full democratic 
control. 52 
In addition to the failed merger of the Defence Staff with the Ministry of Defence, 
both the Antall and Horn governments fell short of developing a coherent strategy for 
the institutional reform of the armed forces. 53 Although they carried out substantial 
49 See Szenes, Zoltlin (2001) "The Implications ofNATO Expansion for Civil-Military Relations in 
Hungary", The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics, 17:1, p. 78f. 
50 See Sherr, James (2000) NATO's New Members: A Model for Ukraine? The Example of Hungary. 
Sandhurst: Conflict Studies Research Centre, p. 9. 
51 See Szab6, Matyas (1999) "Hungarian Army Chief Resigns", RFE/RL Newsline, 1617/1999, Endnote. 
52 See Magyar Hirlap, 19/6/2001. 
53 See Sherr (2000), p. 7. 
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reductions in the size of the defence establishment from 155,700 in 1989 to 60,000 in 
1999, they failed to develop the basis for the creation of modem, well-trained and 
effective forces that can provide for the country's security. In addition, the lack of 
political attention to the crumbling military infrastructure and ageing equipment 
(including the air force, to which remained only 27 MIG-29 non-NATO interoperable 
fighter aircraft) left Hungary virtually defenceless throughout the 1990s. 
The arrival of the Orb an government brought fresh impetus to the deadlocked reform 
process of the defence establishment in many ways. First, Orban set up a National 
Security Government, which was designed to ensure high level coordination of 
national security and defence policies between the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs, the Defence Staff and last but not least, Orban's powerful empire, 
the Prime Minister's Office. In fact, two separate defence staffs were established, each 
attached to the Prime Minister's Office, whose strength and high competence was 
supposed to counterbalance the striking weakness of the Ministry of Defence that, 
according to the coalition agreement between Orban's FIDESZ-MPP party and its 
junior partner the FKGP - Smallholders' Party, was headed by an FKGP Minister, an 
agricultural lawyer without any knowledge of security and defence matters. 54 
The Division of Security and Defence Strategy within the Prime Minister's Office, 
headed by Peter Sikl6si, was in charge of drafting a document on 'Principles of the 
Security and Defence Policy of the Republic of Hungary'. Although the Parliament 
did approve a similar document in April 1993, Hungary's outstanding NATO 
accession and other important changes in its security environment required a complete 
overhaul of the 1993 document. Sikl6si's team embarked on the drafting in September 
1998 and in December 1998, the document was approved by Parliament.55 In 
addition, also in December, Parliament approved the government's 'NATO legal 
package' (Washington Treaty and other basic NATO documents, status of force 
agreements as well as amendments to laws), which legally prepared Hungary for 
NATO membership. 56 
54 Author's interview with Peter Sik16si, Senior Security Advisor to Prime Minister Viktor Orban, 
20/4/2000. 
55 Ibid. 
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After laying the foundations of a comprehensive security and defence policy, Sikl6si 
and his team started to draft a National Security Strategy in January 1999, a detailed 
executive framework document. The finalisation of this document was held up by the 
launch of a comprehensive Strategic Defence Review in mid-1999. 
The launch of the Strategic Defence Review was triggered by the realisation after the 
Kosovo conflict that the Hungarian defence forces, due to their technical and human 
resources are incapable to respond to conflicts rapidly.57 This became apparent, when 
Hungary struggled for six weeks to provide a 300-man strong contingent for KFOR. 
The Strategic Defence Review resulted in the launching of a complex transformation 
process of the Hungarian Defence Forces to occupy a ten-year period between 2000-
2010 (see figure 6-18). 
Phases offorce modernisation and restructuring process 
1 2ooo-3 
Quantitative and 
structural 
improvements 
~ >1 2oo1-1o > 
Establishment of 
capabilities-based 
force 
Modernisation of 
military assets 
and equipment 
Figure 6-18 Phases offorce modernisation and restructuring process 2000-2010 
Source: Transformation of the Hungarian Defence Forces, Ministry of Defence, Hungary 
This process will be implemented in three stages: first, between 2000-03, 
restructuring, redeployment and reduction of forces will take place. Second, between 
2004-06, the building of a capabilities-based force will be completed and NATO 
training structures introduced. Third, between 2007-10 the modernisation of military 
assets and equipment will be carried out and other outstanding issues resolved. 58 With 
the introduction of this extensive reform process, the Orb an government demonstrated 
56 See Sherr (2000), p. 11. 
57 See HVG, 3/7/1999, p. 7. 
58 Transformation of the Hungarian Defence Forces 2000-2010, Ministry of Defence, Budapest. 
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its commitment to the establishment of modern, efficient and fully NATO-compatible 
defence forces. 
Whilst the Horn government placed less emphasis on the reform of the defence 
establishment, it proved to be successful in treating Hungary's mounting economic 
security predicament in 1995. In March, Horn appointed a well-known banker, Lajos 
Bokros, Minister of Finance. He immediately introduced a set of austerity measures, 
which later became known as the 'Bokros-package'. These measures included drastic 
cuts in social security expenditure, an acceleration of structural reforms, in particular 
privatisation, a strengthened income policy, an immediate devaluation of the national 
currency by 9 per cent and the introduction of a continuous monthly devaluation of 
the currency, a pre-announced crawling peg regime. In addition, a temporary 8 per 
cent surcharge was introduced on imported goods. 59 This set of stabilisation measures 
was compounded by continued fiscal retrenchment in the coming years and thereby 
managed broadly to achieve its short-tenn aims. The fiscal deficit and the deficit of 
the current account were reduced substantially by the end of 1996. Furthermore, the 
Horn government managed to reduce the gross foreign debt sharply and restore 
foreign investors' confidence in the country's fiscal and economic management. Thus, 
Hungary's most difficult economic security predicament since the regime change was 
treated successfully. In addition, in February 1998, the Horn government managed to 
repay all its liabilities to the IMF. This was an important act, as, since Hungary joined 
the IMF in 1982, it was the first time that it was not indebted to the organisation. 
Consequently, as Prime Minister Horn put it, Hungary's long-enduring dependency 
upon the often harsh conditions ofthe IMF was abolished.60 
As regards internal security, the policies of the Horn government in combating crime 
were anything but successful. The consequences ofthe 'Bokros-package' worsened the 
already precarious financial situation of the police forces and border guards in the 
mid-1990s. In 1995, the US State Department opened its International Law 
Enforcement Academy in Budapest, the so-called FBI-Academy, which was designed 
to train CEEn policemen in issues, such as combating terrorism, drug-related 
59 See Joint assessment of Hungary's Medium-Term Economic Policy Priorities (1997), p. 5. 
60 See Nepszabadsag, 17/2/1998. 
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criminality, international economic crime etc.61 The Horn government and leaders of 
the Hungarian police warmly welcomed the opening of this school. In order to combat 
organised crime, the Horn government decided in 1998 to allow the tapping of mobile 
phone networks. 
Nevertheless, tough effective policies against crime were not introduced until mid-
1998, when the Orban government took office. One of the major election pledges of 
Orban was to rid the country of organised criminal groups and to stop the escalating 
cycle of violence, assassinations and occasional bomb attacks affecting Hungary and 
Budapest in particular. Indeed, since 1998, both his Interior Minister and Minister of 
Justice have pursued a tough line against crime. The legislation punishing drug 
possession and drug trafficking was tightened and cooperation with Europol 
intensified.62 After two years of intensive negotiations, Hungary will become a full 
member ofEuropol in autumn 2001.63 Whilst the Horn government failed to introduce 
appropriate measures for safeguarding Hungary's eastern borders, the Orban 
government made funding available for the deployment of a thermal-imaging system. 
The financial situation of the police force has also been improved in the last three 
years, which has already borne fruit with more police in the streets providing for 
better public security. 
In the matter of improving the situation of the Roma population, all post-communist 
governments have produced substantial articles of legislation and embarked on 
implementation of the new policies. However, there have been few immediate results. 
A main legislative breakthrough was the approval of the 'Act on the Rights of the 
National and Ethnic Minorities' of 1993, which actually allows in some areas 'positive 
discrimination' in favour of the minority groups. This law set up a system of minority 
self-government at local and national levels giving the minority groups limited self-
determination in managing their social, educational and cultural affairs. A report of 
2000 has concluded that 
61 See Silddeutsche Zeitung, 7/111999. 
62 See Die Presse, 10/3/2001. 
63 See Nepszabadsag, 17/3/2001. 
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the minority self-government system in Hungary is a functional, efficient 
means of interest representation, guaranteeing the minorities wide-ranging 
participation in local and national affairs that affect them. 64 
However, the full-scale implementation of this regulation was hindered by 
bureaucratic incompetence and by a lack of adequate resources. Although by 1997, 
some 400 Roma councils had been established, scarce resources and a lack of 
cooperation from local and national governments have limited their effectiveness. 65 
Additionally, the 'Act on the Protection of Cultural Goods' of 1997 introduced 
important legislation on the preservation of the cultural traditions of the national and 
ethnic minorities and provided better funding to this end. In accordance with the 
Constitution and an Act of 1993 on the Parliamentary Commissioner for civil rights, 
the office of the parliamentary commissioner for the protection of national and ethnic 
minority rights was established. The minorities' ombudsman is in charge of 
investigating any kind of abuse of the rights of national or ethnic minorities and of 
initiating general and individual measures for its remedy. 
Despite the legal framework now in place, the situation of the Roma population has 
not improved substantially. The major challenge to any post-communist government 
is how to implement legislation adequately and to diminish latent and institutional 
racism. Also triggered by mounting criticism from the EU, the Orban government 
adopted a medium-term Roma action programme in April 1999 that aims at 
improving the societal security of the Roma by providing specific support m 
education, culture, housing, employment health and anti-discrimination. For the 
implementation of this programme, ring-fenced budgetary resources of 19 million 
euro were made available, however, as the EU Progress Report on Hungary (2000) 
pointed out, "concrete results from the action programme can only be expected in the 
medium term. In the meantime, the situation of the Roma population continues to be 
difficult". 66 
64 See Doncsev (2000) 
65 See Nagle and Mahr (1999), p. 160. 
66 Regular Report from the Commission on Hungary's Progress towards Accession, November 8, 2000, 
Source: http://europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report _11_ 00/index.htm [0115/2001 ]. 
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In the area of enhancing environmental security, much has been achieved through the 
improvement of the institutional and legal framework of Hungarian environmental 
policy. In this respect, the greatest legislative achievement was in 1995, when 
Parliament passed Hungary's new environmental framework law. This embodies the 
general principles for developing environmental protection legislation, in accordance 
with EU environmental standards. Parliament set a 1998 deadline for the completion 
of all additional legislation. Consequently, in 1996, the Hungarian Parliament 
approved the laws on regional development and physical planning, in 1997 on animal 
protection, man-made environmental issues and nature conservation and in 1998, on 
the handling and storage of dangerous substances, accident prevention and 
contingency planning.67 In order to comply with EU regulations, Parliament approved 
a 'National Environmental Programme' in 1997, which aimed at focusing on the most 
problematic areas, such as improving water quality, air quality and handling waste 
management.68 Despite the advanced legal framework, in 1998, out of the four 
Visegnid states, Hungary spent the smallest sum, 1.1 per cent of the GDP, on the 
environment. The European Commission's 2000 'Regular Report on Hungary's 
Progress Towards Accession' acknowledged that some progress was achieved in the 
alignment of environmental legislation with EU policies, however, overall, Hungary 
had not yet met this criteria in 2000.69 This is not surprising, as the Ministry of 
Environmental Protection, which is in charge of aligning Hungarian environmental 
legislation with that of the EU, became the battlefield of party politics and in 2000, it 
was headed by three different ministers. Foreign Minister Martonyi maintained in 
February 2001 that this negligence would be corrected by the end of March 2001.70 
Indeed, by June 2001, Hungary managed to close provisionally the chapter on 
environment, whilst four of its derogation requests were approved by the EU. 
Although more stringent environmental legislation has been put into place since 1990, 
the question remains, as to whether the Hungarian public and the political elite will be 
willing to provide the resources necessary for its implementation. In addition, 
67 Ministry of Environmental Protection, Hungary. 
68 See Nagyhazi, Gyorgy and Tamas Perjes (1998) Requirements and Framework for Environment and 
Transport Telematics. European Commission, DG XIII, p. 2. 
69 See Regular Report from the Commission on Hungary's Progress towards Accession (2000). 
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the Hungarian Positions (in Hungarian); Source: 
http://www .rnfa.gov .hu/Szovivoi/200 1/MartonyiJ/0228EU .html [05/08/200 1] 
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adequate implementation will depend on the building of an administrative and 
monitoring capacity, which does not yet exist. Progress is unlikely in either domain, 
until the general public and the political elite have developed the necessary 
environmental consciousness. 
6.5 Conclusion 
This chapter has analysed security predicaments, perceptions and policy-responses in 
the case of post-Cold War Hungary. In doing so, it has focused primarily on those 
issues that appear to be unique for Hungary within the wider CEEn context. Thus, 
many ofthe security issues that Hungary has in common with other CEEn states, have 
not been repeated here, so that, in order to gain a fuller picture of the Hungarian 
security situation, the conclusions of this specific case study should be complemented 
by the general findings of chapters three to five. 
In general it can be argued that Hungarian post-Cold War security predicaments have 
been dominated by a mixture of military and non-military challenges, in which the 
military element has been more strongly emphasised here than in other parts of CEE, 
with the possible exception of the Baltic states. It has been pointed out that Hungary's 
geographical situation, its proximity to the war in former Yugoslavia, generated a real 
military security predicament throughout the 1990s. This was clearly perceived by the 
majority of the public and its political elite. The pursuit of NATO membership and 
the preceding nervous requests for security guarantees from the Alliance all suggest 
that the military security issue has prevailed in post-communist Hungary. Since 
Hungary's admittance to NATO, both the military predicament and the perception of 
military insecurities have diminished significantly. 
Whilst the general public has not perceived a major threat from Russia, the political 
elite proved to be more apprehensive in this respect. This was especially true during 
the first four years of democracy in Hungary, when the conservative Antall 
government, prompted partly by sentiment and the burden of history and partly by 
alarming political developments in Russia, expressed some 'Russo-phobic' feelings 
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and anxieties. Since then, these feelings have declined substantially and have, to some 
extent, been replaced by apprehension about a new Russian threat via Ukraine. 
The large proportion of ethnic Hungarians resident in former Hungarian territories in 
neighbouring countries generates a uniquely Hungarian security predicament. As it 
has been explained, post-Cold War Hungarian politics and society is engaged in a 
debate on the definition of the Hungarian nation in general and on the borders of the 
nation in particular. This debate and its consequences have generated serious 
confrontations with Slovakia and Romania in addition to the argument about the 
treatment of the Hungarian minority in these countries. Although the conclusion of 
basic treaties has lessened tensions considerably, this issue will remain a major factor 
of insecurity in the near future. The simultaneous integration of all countries 
concerned into the European Union would provide a solution for the minority issue, 
yet it is very unlikely that this would happen. 
Many of the domestic security predicaments, perceptions and policy-responses of 
post-communist Hungary are identical with those of other CEEn states. Challenges 
generated by the complex transition process, including political instability, economic 
insecurity and internal/public insecurity dominate the agenda. At the same time, 
environmental security issues are paid less attention. In general it can be argued that 
environmental security issues dominate the public domain only when there is a major 
catastrophe, as exemplified by the floods in 1999 and 2000 and the cyanide pollution 
of the Tisza in 2000. Although the establishment of legislation conforming to EU 
norms is under way, its implementation is hampered by the scarcity of financial 
resources and the lack of appropriate administrative expertise. 
This observation is certainly valid for the situation of the Hungarian defence 
establishment, which lacks substantial resources. However, up until 1998, a lack of 
political commitment and inadequate institutional structures also delayed the 
implementation of comprehensive reform initiatives for the reform of the armed 
forces. With the launch of a ten-year reform programme in 2000, the current 
government is determined to establish efficient, modem and fully NATO-compatible 
armed forces. 
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Rising intolerance towards foreigners and the Jewish and, in particular, the Roma 
populations creates a real societal and political security challenge for both majority 
and minority populations in post-Cold War Hungary. Although the problem has been 
identified by the political elite and much has been achieved in providing an 
appropriate legal framework for minority rights in recent years, the scarcity of 
resources has again hampered the successful implementation of the policies. Thus, 
more has to be done to alter the Hungarian majority's attitude towards the Roma 
minority and to combat every-day racism, before it escalates into a major conflict. 
The effectiveness of the policies introduced by the various post-Cold War Hungarian 
governments aimed at improving the country's security has been mixed. All post-
communist governments have treated Hungary's integration into NATO and the EU as 
important stabilising measures and thus pursued these policy goals vigorously. 
Hungary's admittance to NATO in 1999 marked both a success of post-Cold War 
foreign and security policy and a new era in the country's national security. Similarly, 
successive governments have achieved much progress towards Hungary's full 
membership of the EU, which is regarded mainly as an important stabilising measure 
in the areas of 'soft security'. As explained above, successive post-cold War 
Hungarian governments employed highly contrasting policies towards Hungary's 
relations with neighbouring countries, some of which had an adverse effect on the 
country's security. Nonetheless, by the late 1990s, Hungary stabilised its previously 
often severely strained relations with both Romania and Slovakia and, thus, 
contributed to the improvement of security in the CEEn region. 
As regards domestic policies, the gulfbetween the establishment of legislation and its 
effective implementation is more apparent. Issues, such as the improvement of the 
situation of the Roma population, the fight against organised crime and environmental 
security, amongst others, are identified as important stabilising measures. Policies 
can, however, only be effective, if Hungarian governments and the society they serve 
are willing to provide appropriate resources for their successful implementation. 
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7 Conclusion 
The thesis has attempted to describe, to investigate and to explain the changing 
character of security in post-Cold War CEE in general and in Hungary in particular. 
For the pursuit of this complex task, an analytical framework was developed in 
chapter two, focused around three main aspects: predicaments, that is the set of 
objective risks and vulnerabilities; perceptions of security held by the CEEn publics 
and their political elites; and policy-responses to real and perceived threats. It is only 
right to acknowledge here that, at times, it has proven to be difficult to draw a clear 
division between these three areas, since predicaments are interconnected with both 
perceptions and policy-responses and perceptions have an impact on both 
predicaments and policy-responses. Yet, the threefold division has appeared to be 
useful for a variety of reasons: firstly, it offered a systematic frame of reference for 
the study of the complex phenomenon of post-Cold War security that has proven 
equally well-suited to the analysis of the CEEn region as a whole as well as to the 
geographically narrower case of Hungary. Secondly, its comprehensive definition of 
security has permitted the opening up of the analysis to a range of military and non-
military factors and has proven to be adequate for capturing post-communist realities. 
Thirdly, the inclusion of the cognitive dimension of security into our study, that is the 
perception of risks and vulnerabilities by the CEEn publics and their political elites, 
has attempted to demonstrate that security is not only about objective realities but also 
about the subjective attitudes of individuals (publics and policy-makers). In other 
words, as we have argued throughout the thesis, insecurities can arise from objective, 
concrete sources of danger (e.g. the spread of war from the Balkans to neighbouring 
countries), but they can also be generated by more subjective feelings (e.g. the 
acquired picture of a historically hostile Russia). Hence, there is the need for the 
analysis of perceptions over and above the consideration of predicaments. Finally, the 
last dimension of the framework, that of policy-responses, has allowed the extension 
of the analytical perspective to the practitioners and permitted a consideration of the 
impact ofthe policy-makers in tackling security issues. 
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In order to summarise the findings of the thesis, we shall now return to the research 
questions raised in chapter two and address them in light of the outcome of the study 
on CEE and of the Hungarian case study. 
This study has attempted to demonstrate that a synthesis of various IR schools of 
thought is indeed possible and, moreover, useful for the study of security 
predicaments in CEE. We have attempted to reconcile distinct features of the realist, 
liberal, constructivist and widening schools and developed a comprehensive 
framework that is broadly based on the premises of the Copenhagen School. In our 
view, the main advantage of this framework is that it is able, without being caught up 
in ideological debates, to meld military and non-military or traditional and new 
factors of security. The division of the analysis into military, political, economic, 
societal and environmental sectors underlines the significance of new security issues 
beside the military one. In addition, the inclusion of new levels of analysis, which are 
either beyond or below the traditional state-level, has expanded the scope of the 
analysis. It has to be acknowledged, however, that the rigidity of the five-sectoral and 
multi-level framework has, at times, proven somewhat restrictive. This has been the 
case especially at times, when there has been an interconnectedness between sectors 
and levels. Thus, admittedly, this framework is less suited to the examination of 
global phenomena, such as, for example, borderless environmental issues, where a 
unique level of impact is difficult to determine. Equally, a rigid sectoral analysis can 
disregard the fact that some insecurities can spill over from one sector to the other, as, 
for instance, minority problems that can initially crop up in the societal sector, can 
however, spill over to the political and military ones. We have attempted to remedy 
these shortcomings in chapter three by discussing factors that can appear on different 
levels together and by cross-referencing phenomena that can crop up in different 
sectors. 
A clear advantage of the utilisation of the comprehensive analytical framework has 
been also that it allows for an equal consideration of security predicaments in all five 
sectors, without prioritising any of them over the others (unlike realism, which, in 
general, focuses on military security or constructivism, which addresses mainly 
identity related issues). This does not mean, however, that security predicaments in all 
five sectors are of the same magnitude in post-Cold War CEE. Indeed, as we have 
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demonstrated in chapter three, in the transitional region of CEE, military 
predicaments, although still present, are diminishing, while non-military 
predicaments, such as minority problems economic instability, political turmoil and so 
on, are rising to the fore. Whilst geopolitical thinking contributed to the emergence of 
security predicaments not only in the Balkans but also in other parts of CEE 
throughout the 1990s, its importance appears to be diminishing in the 21st century and 
the region is now governed by peaceful democratic regimes. 
Whilst major parts of Western Europe are characterised by deepening political and 
economic integration, post-communist CEE has experienced disintegration and the 
revival of nation-states. As a result, insufficient cooperation and a lack of integration 
into subregional formations with adequate competences have contributed to the 
emergence of security predicaments in CEE. This anti-integrationist trend within the 
region has inhibited the joint prevention of global economic and environmental 
challenges and the neutralisation of regional diplomatic and ethnic tensions. However, 
these predicaments too have diminished significantly in recent years. Also, the 
advancement of the CEEn countries' integration into the EU and NATO and their 
membership of the CoE and the OSCE have contributed to the decline of isolationist 
tendencies within the region, even though a 'security community' in the constructivist 
sense has not yet emerged in CEE. In fact, as Andrew Cottey has argued, in security 
terms, there is no common region in CEE, but there are many "fuzzy and hardly 
settled sub-regions". 71 
The liberal assertion, according to which regime type affects the likelihood of war and 
cooperation, is certainly valid for the CEEn region. Indeed, one of the major 
contributors to the emergence of security predicaments and apprehensions among 
publics and politicians is the fear of the destabilisation of the fragile political systems 
and of unconsolidated democracies. This factor appears to be the main trigger for the 
prevalence of a possible threat from the East, in particular from Russia proper or via 
Russian influence from Ukraine. In this vein, the strengthening of democracy in CEE 
and in its neighbouring countries, particularly Russia and the CIS and the Balkan 
71 Cottey, Andrew (1998) "Central Eastern European Security Concepts!Theoretical Approach", Paper 
Presented at the East European Security Research Group Meeting at the University of Birmingham on 
17. June 1998. 
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states, will contribute to the overall stability of CEE. On the other hand, the 
disappearance of authoritarian rule has also opened up CEEn states for new non-
military security predicaments, such as organised crime, drug related crime, drug 
trafficking, economic corruption to name a few, which are sadly commonplace in 
long-established democracies. 
As regards security perceptions, the utilisation of cognitive analytical factors in our 
framework has proven to be very useful in explaining and understanding the 
emergence of apprehensive attitudes in CEE. These often neglected factors have 
helped elucidate some of the current security predicaments, which have deep-seated 
historical roots and are often generated, to a great extent, by biased prior knowledge, 
rather than by material reality. We have demonstrated, for example, that many of the 
post-Cold War minority related tensions are consequences of long lasting historical 
controversies between countries in CEE. In other words, CBE is still haunted by its 
historical legacy of occupations and division throughout centuries. We have referred 
to the fact on several occasions that the post-WW1 and WW2 peace settlements not 
only redrew Europe's map, but also made many nationals citizens of states that were 
previously foreign to them. Consequently, in parts of CEE, the term 'nation' does not 
correspond with the term 'state'. We have expounded in the Hungarian case study, the 
impact of the Trianon Treaty of 1920 on Hungary, which resulted in its losing two-
thirds of its territories to its neighbouring countries, together with a large proportion 
of its ethnic Hungarian population. The evaporation of communist rule, which 
rigorously suppressed ethnic tensions and neighbourly disputes, has reopened old 
disputes between some CEEn states and placed the contentious debate about the 
definition of nation and state in the public domain. 
The negative impact of historical legacies is also prevalent in the apprehensive 
perception of Russia held by major parts of the CEEn public and its political elites. 
Post-WW2 Russian occupation and the brutal crushing of the revolutions in 1956 and 
1968 in Hungary and in Czechoslovakia, respectively, are vivid memories of many in 
contemporary CEE and these past experiences clearly impact on current images and 
attitudes. For similar reasons, substantial parts of the Polish and the Czech publics 
still express some resentment towards Germany, which only demonstrates that 
historical grievances heal slowly and that their impact on current perceptions can be 
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strong. In light of these historical events, Hungarian Prime Minister Viktor Orban's 
words in 2001 concerning the impact of the 20th century on his country's fate are not 
surprising: "Hungarians are happy and optimistic exactly because the past is over, the 
twentieth century is finally over. This was a tough century on us".72 
The deployment ofthe cognitive analytical dimension has also helped explain some of 
CEEn politicians' security perceptions and their subsequent policy-responses. Biased 
interpretation and manipulation of historical legacies by nationalistically minded 
politicians led to the outbreak of civil war in the Balkans and also generated severe 
security predicaments in CBE. As we have argued, much of the foreign policies of the 
first post-communist democratic government in Hungary towards its neighbours were 
overshadowed by the burden of history and indeed, led to the emergence of some 
security predicaments. Belligerent demands of the Hungarian government concerning 
the improvement of the situation of the ethnic Hungarians in Slovakia and Romania 
produced a greater level of instability in the relations between Hungary and the 
respective countries than any tangible positive results. The subsequent MSZP-SZDSZ 
coalition government between 1994-98 broke away from the tendency to the 
glorification of a great Hungarian past and managed successfully to defuse most of 
the tensions between Hungary and its neighbours. In changing Hungary's attitude 
towards its neighbours, the Hungarian public and, first and foremost, its political elite 
needs to come to terms with the country's history and its present identity, in other 
words, as the then Foreign Minister Laszl6 Kovacs put it in 1995, "Hungary needs to 
learn how to be small".73 The conservative Orban government since 1998 has returned 
to a more comprehensive definition of the Hungarian nation, particularly through the 
draft of the Status Law in 2001, and has attempted to revive some historical images of 
a glorious Hungary. Their long-term effects on neighbourly relations and, 
consequently, on the stability of the region remains to be seen. 
As regards foreign and security policy-making, the governments of CBE need to 
adopt an approach based on constructive cooperation and mutual understanding. As 
we have argued earlier, some of the security predicaments could be defused via strong 
72 Prime Minister Viktor Orban Address at the Folger Shakespeare Library, Washington, 30/4/2001, 
Source: http:/ /www.meh.hu/Kormany/K.ormanyfo/200 1/04/010430 2e.htm [1 0/07/2001 ]. 
73 Kovacs (1995), p. 3. -
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regional and subregional collaboration. This is particularly important, since it is now 
very unlikely that all CEEn applicant countries will be admitted to the EU 
simultaneously and the EU Association Agreements are insufficient to cushion the 
disadvantages of a delayed full membership. NATO, on the contrary, has its PfP and 
EAPC frameworks, which appear to be valuable platforms of cooperation with those 
CEEn countries, which were excluded from the first wave of enlargement and, indeed, 
function as stepping-stones to full membership. Thus the consequences of an 
exclusion from the first round of NATO enlargement have not been as severe as 
consequences of a potential exclusion from EU enlargement could be. Indeed, a 
partial enlargement of the EU will only increase the already strong developmental 
differences between individual countries in CEE, which could lead to a further 
fragmentation ofthe region and the emergence of non-military security predicaments. 
It has to be acknowledged that the first steps towards the creation of a more stable 
CBE have been achieved with the establishment of a number of subregional 
organisations. But if they are to be more than pro forma institutions, they need to be 
allocated appropriate funding and endowed with meaningful and responsible roles in 
order to be able to address security predicaments effectively. In future, these 
subregional organisations could also play an intermediary role between those 
countries, which get into the EU first and those that will be excluded from the first 
round of enlargement. 
We have also argued that the security and foreign policy-making mechanisms in post-
Cold War CEE are still largely influenced by top-down processes, whereby a small 
group of elected and non-elected politicians determine most policy outcomes. This 
results partly from the continuation of 'traditional' practices, whereby policy-making 
had been the 'privilege' of the elite and society at large had been 'de-politicised', and 
partly from the fact that the CEEn countries have not yet managed to install a civil 
service that is competent enough and sufficiently trained to take decisions on a lower 
level. Although the process of civilianisation of CEEn Defence Ministries has largely 
been completed, there is a lack of available security and defence expertise with 
NATO-compatible thinking and satisfactory foreign language skills. As we have seen, 
this is also valid for new NATO member Hungary, which, partly as a result of the lack 
of expertise and funding, has only recently (in fact a year after it gained membership 
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of NATO) started to reorganise its defence establishment and to draft fundamental 
legislation, such as a national security strategy and a defence doctrine. 
The Hungarian case study has also demonstrated that established decision-making 
procedures can be supplemented and indeed by-passed through the strengthening of 
the competencies of the Prime Minister's Office, which is run by mainly non-elected 
government advisors. On the one hand, this centralised agency can, admittedly, speed-
up the production of overdue reform legislations, as it happened under Orban's 
premiership on several occasions, but, on the other, it raises serious concerns about 
accountability. Furthermore, an overly strong Prime Minister's Office can undermine 
the authority of the Ministry of Defence and the Defence Staff and cause ambiguity in 
the defence control mechanisms. In addition, constitutional ambiguity concerning the 
allocation of presidential and governmental competencies caused some uncertainty in 
some countries of post-Cold War CEE, these, however, were resolved with the 
adaptation of new or the amendment of existing constitutions. 
At last, we shall conclude with some basic observations, which, in light of the studies 
on CEE and Hungary appear to be particularly relevant in our context. Firstly and 
most strikingly, the end of the Cold War represents everything in CEE but the end of 
history that had been forecast by Francis Fukuyama in 1989.74 Indeed, as Hyde-Price 
has argued, for CEE it has rather meant the rebirth of history. 75 The rebirth or re-
invention of history has had severe security implications in post-Cold War CEE, 
which resulted in all-out war in the Balkans and significant diplomatic tensions in 
other parts of the region. Secondly, as a result of the appreciation of history, minority 
and ethnic related conflict has become a real security predicament in large parts of 
post-communist CEE. Thirdly, the Balkans aside, despite the tremendous challenge 
posed by the complex transition process, the CEEn countries have remained peaceful 
since the collapse of communism. Although there have been apprehensions of an 
external military threat among parts of the CEEn publics and their political elites, 
these have not materialised. Fourthly, in terms of regional cooperation, CEE may well 
be characterised by fragmentation and isolationism. It is, however, unified by the 
74 See Fukuyama, Francis (1989) "The End ofHistory", National Interest, 16, pp. 3-18. 
75 See Hyde-Price (1996), p. 4, see also Glenny, Misha (1990) The Rebirth of History: Eastern Europe 
in the Age of Democracy. London: Penguin. 
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common foreign and security policy aspirations of the individual countries: the desire 
to become a part of the Euro-Atlantic integration process, that is full membership of 
the EU and NATO at the earliest possible date, furthermore, to maintain good-
neighbourly and peaceful relations. Finally, with direct military challenges 
diminishing, a range of non-military security predicaments have intensified in post-
Cold War CEE, many ofwhich can be treated more efficiently in a joint regional and 
pan-European manner. Therefore, it is not only the CEEn countries' responsibility but 
also that of established democracies to use the historically unique opportunity and 
build a stable Europe within the framework of existing institutions, such as the EU 
and NATO. 
It is only natural that a thesis of this kind, which is limited in scope and time, cannot 
capture an issue as complex as post-Cold War CEE security in all its details. Indeed, 
we have tried to limit the perspective of our analysis in chapters three, four and five to 
the application of our analytical framework and to determine general trends in CEEn 
security predicaments, perceptions and policy-responses. Even though the Hungarian 
case study in chapter six elaborated on a number of pertinent issues in greater detail, it 
has been impossible to encapsulate all concerns and to answer all questions. Indeed, a 
fast moving target, like the security situation of a transitional region raises new 
concerns and questions on a daily basis. This is a challenge that all scholars 
investigating contemporary political issues face. 
There are a number of issues that could be pursued in future research projects. On the 
theoretical level, this could involve the further systematisation of the 
interconnectedness between sectors and levels of security predicaments. Since, as our 
analysis has demonstrated, this is a weak point of the Copenhagen School framework, 
some theoretical work would be desirable to accommodate this challenge effectively. 
Similarly, to the knowledge of the author, there is, at present, no modem theoretical 
work done on the significance of cognition on security perceptions and policy-making 
in the CEEn context. On the analytical level, a number of studies would follow on 
logically from this project. Because of the constraints on space, we could only pursue 
the case of Hungary in more detail; other country case studies could be carried out 
along the lines laid out in the analytical framework and their findings compiled in a 
comparative work. 
Appendix 
Resolution 
94/1998. (XII. 29.) OGY 
ofthe National Assembly 
on the Principles of the Security and Defence Policy 
of the Republic ofHungary 
The National Assembly hereby 
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1. approves the Principles of the Security and Defence Policy of the Republic of 
Hungary; 
2. invites the Government to report to the National Assembly on the implementation 
of the tasks relating to security and defence policy at least once a year. 
3. This resolution shall enter into force on the day the Article 2 of the Act on the 
accession of the Republic of Hungary to the North Atlantic Treaty and the 
promulgation of the text to the Agreement enters into force. Simultaneously, 
Resolution 11/1993. (111. 12) OGY on the Principles of the Security Policy of the 
Republic ofHungary and Resolution 27/1993. (IV. 23) OGY on the National Defence 
Principles of the Republic ofHungary shall be revoked. 
Principles of the Security and Defence Policy 
ofthe Republic ofHungary 
During recent years a fundamental change has taken place in the external security 
situation of Hungary, essentially because of the achievements made in the field of 
Euro-Atlantic integration. By attaining NATO-membership and the advancement of 
the process of accession to the European Union, the country has become a part of the 
institutional framework of the community of democratic, developed and stable 
countries of the Euro-Atlantic region. These factors require the review of the security 
and defence policy principles of the Republic of Hungary. 
1. The Republic of Hungary takes a comprehensive approach to security. Besides the 
traditional political and military factors it comprises other dimensions of 
comprehensive security as well, such as economy and finances, human and minority 
rights, information, technology, environment and international law. In a world of 
global challenges, political and economic interdependence and of technological 
progress, the security of the Euro-Atlantic region has become indivisible. 
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2. Compared to the period of the bipolar international system, the threat of a global 
armed conflict has been reduced to the minimum. At the same time, however, the 
scope of risks and sources of danger have significantly increased and grown more 
complex. Hungary's security is being influenced primarily by the security trend of the 
Euro-Atlantic region and the political, social and economic processes taking place in 
that part of the world, but the country cannot exempt itself from the sources of global 
dangers. Its engagement in an alliance system creates greater responsibility and 
expanded possibilities in the management of these sources of dangers. 
The transitory or permanent controversies between countries and groups resulting 
from differences in social development, economic, financial and social crises, ethnic 
and religious tensions, terrorism, organised crime, illicit drug and arms trafficking, 
demographic tension, mass migration and intense environmental problems constitute a 
growing risk. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of 
delivery and the possibility of attacks on information systems present an increasing 
challenge and danger. Besides, tensions between and armed conflict within states are 
ever persisting in Europe. Instability and unpredictability resulting from 
transformation and the fragility of democratisation are specific sources of danger in 
our regwn. 
It is a peculiarity of our security environment that new and traditional challenges often 
surface simultaneously and amplify each other. 
3. The main objectives of the security policy of the Republic of Hungary are: 
- to guarantee the independence, sovereign statehood and territorial integrity of 
the country', 
- to create appropriate conditions for enforcing the principles laid down in the 
Constitution, to promote the predominance of the rule of law, the unperturbed 
functioning of democratic institutions and market economy and to contribute to the 
internal stability of the country; 
- to promote the full respect of civil and human rights and the rights of 
national and ethnic minorities in the Republic of Hungary; 
- to create appropriate conditions for the assurance of personal, material and 
social safety of people living on the territory of the Republic of Hungary and the 
preservation of national assets; 
- to contribute to the implementation of what has been laid down in the North 
Atlantic Treaty and to the security of its Allies; 
- to facilitate the preservation of international peace and the enhancement of 
the security and stability ofthe Euro-Atlantic region, Europe and its neighbourhood; 
- to contribute to the assurance of appropriate conditions for the international 
economic, political, cultural and other relations and co-operation of the Republic of 
Hungary. 
4. The Republic of Hungary wishes to realise the above objectives in accordance with 
the Constitution, the norms of international law, with special respect to the principles 
and obligations enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations Organisation, in the 
documents of the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in Europe and the 
Council of Europe, in the North Atlantic Treaty and, furthermore, in compliance with 
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its obligations undertaken in other relevant international documents, regional and 
bilateral agreements. 
5. The Republic of Hungary considers no country an enemy and it treats all actors of 
the international politics who abide by the principles of international law as its 
partners. Hungary intends to settle disputes in accordance with international law, 
taking into account the European practice. 
6. The Republic of Hungary builds its security on two pillars: its national resources on 
the one hand, Euro-Atlantic integration and international co-operation, on the other. 
7. The Republic of Hungary intends to permanently provide for its security, the 
prosperity of its citizens as a member of the democratic community of Euro-Atlantic 
states. 
The Republic of Hungary could maintain its security most effectively as a member of 
the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (hereinafter. the Alliance), As an integral part 
of the political and military structure of the Alliance, Hungary assumes all the tasks 
deriving from the common defence. Hungary considers its constructive participation 
in the consultative and decision making system of the Alliance as the means that 
allows for its contribution to the enforcement of the Euro-Atlantic region's security 
and stability as well as to the effective assertion of its national interests. Hungary 
considers transatlantic co-operation a cardinal factor of European security in the long 
run as well. In the framework of intra-Alliance co-operation, Hungary supports the 
development of a European security and defence identity which constitutes a major 
element of Hungary's integration policy. 
Since its inception, European integration (and the European Union being its most 
important frame) has established the economic and political bases of the security of its 
member states. It is a realistic goal of the negotiations pending with the European 
Union for the Republic of Hungary to become, while watching to its national interests, 
a full member of the European Union and to take part in the shaping and 
implementation of the Union's common foreign and security policy. 
As a part of its Euro-Atlantic strategy, Hungary strives to achieve full membership in 
the Western European Union as well, which it considers an important tool in dealing 
with regional challenges of the future. 
8. The Republic ofHungary continues to assume an active role in the activities of the 
United Nations Organisation, the Organisation for Security and Co-operation in 
Europe, the Council of Europe, the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development, as well as of international arms control and non-proliferation regimes. 
These organisations and forms of cooperation serve as important frameworks of the 
implementation of the goals of Hungarian security policy in the field of establishing 
norms and standard, security and confidence building, conflict prevention and 
management, as well as the permanent monitoring of the implementation of 
international obligations. Hungary attaches great importance to regional and 
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subregional as well as traditional bilateral forms of co-operation in guaranteeing the 
security of the Republic of Hungary. 
9. International co-operation can only be productive if backed by an effective national 
participation. For this reason, national efforts will continue to play a very important 
role in guaranteeing the country's security. The active participation, support and 
generosity of citizens is a factor of crucial importance in guaranteeing the security of 
the Republic of Hungary. 
Hungarian security policy and its set of institutions shall function in a way to enable it 
to timely realise and assess in a continuous and reliable manner the factors threatening 
the country's security. On this basis, it should be able to take the decisions required for 
the anticipation and prevention of dangers and to implement the measures arising 
from them in due time. 
10. The Republic of Hungary asserts it security policy goals principally through the 
foreign, economic and defence policy. 
11. Besides Euro-Atlantic integration, Hungarian foreign policy focuses on its 
neighbourhood policy and the welfare of the Hungarian communities living abroad. 
Hungary is a stable point of the Eastern Central European region and it takes an 
initiative role in extending security in the region. Hungary thrives to maintain 
good-neighbourly relations with all countries in our region and to develop regional 
and subregional co-operation. The enhancement of co-operation between the countries 
of the region in the fields of economy, culture, human rights (including minorities) is 
of utmost importance from the point of good-neighbourly relations. 
The Republic of Hungary wishes to build its relations with other countries in the 
region on the basis of Euro-Atlantic values, norms and standards of international law 
and on mutual interests. It is interested in seeing its neighbours themselves become 
members of the Euro-Atlantic organisations as soon as possible, provided they 
comply with the criterion of membership. Hungary lends an active support to their 
respective endeavours and to the maintenance and reinforcement of their 
Euro-Atlantic commitment. 
The Republic of Hungary pays distinguished attention to the situation of Hungarians 
living abroad and to the assertion of their rights in accordance with the norms and 
standards of international law. By the same token, Hungary attaches crucial 
importance to the full implementation ofthe rights of national minorities living in the 
territory of Hungary. Hungary believes that assertion of the rights of national 
minorities is a factor contributing to security, while intolerant and aggressive 
nationalism, endeavours for assimilating national minorities and forced alteration of 
the ethnic composition of the population are contrary to these rights. 
Human rights and thus the situation of national and ethnic minorities cannot be 
considered an exclusively internal affair of any country. In Hungary's view, the issue 
of national and ethnic minorities is an organic part of good-neighbourly relations and 
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Euro-Atlantic integration should be settled in conformity with the standards of the 
Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe and of the Council of Europe, 
and on the basis of European practice. 
12. The aspirations of the Republic of Hungary in the field of security policy can only 
be realised on the basis of a sound and advanced market economy. National economy 
should be able to provide the economic foundations necessary for the achievement of 
the security and defence policy objectives of the Republic of Hungary. 
The Republic of Hungary intends to pursue an economic policy that observes the 
requirements of balance, stability and European integration, purposing a sustainable, 
society and environment friendly economic growth, based on permanently improving 
competitiveness and creating employment and thereby (parallel to the dominance of 
economic and social cohesion and solidarity) steadily assures the prosperity of the 
country's citizens and the continuous improvement of living standards and quality of 
life. 
Preparing the economy for defence is a government duty. In the process of its 
realisation it is of great importance that the functioning of the market be perturbed to 
the least extent possible. 
13. The Republic of Hungary will further need armed forces providing reliable 
defence and contributing to the common security of the Alliance, and the conception 
permitting the effective use of such armed forces as a device of its security policy. 
The defence policy of the Republic of Hungary is based on the unity and interlacing 
of alliance, co-operation, prevention and defence. 
The Republic of Hungary considers national defence a common national affair based 
on the display by the citizens of their common responsibility. The national defence 
system has been built on the unity of rights and obligations arising from the North 
Atlantic Treaty, the self-respect and responsibility of citizens consciously accepting 
the defence requirements of the Alliance, an economy capable of satisfying the 
material needs of the armed forces and defence, a government structure prepared for 
defence, armed forces capable of managing the military tasks of the defence, 
democratic and civil management and control of the armed forces, a civil defence 
safeguarding the population and the material assets, as well as on the support from the 
widest strata of society. 
14. Hungary identifies itself with the principles of collective security and defence of 
the Alliance. It maintains and develops its ability to repel military attacks in 
conformity with the principles enshrined in the North Atlantic Treaty. The main task 
of its armed forces is the defence of the sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Hungary and (pursuant to the North Atlantic Treaty) contribution to the Alliance's 
collective defence. It is further assigned to contribute to other jointly perceived allied 
missions, engage in peacekeeping and humanitarian actions carried out under the 
auspices of international organisations and in the elimination of major industrial, 
man-made and natural disasters. In all these fields the Strategic Concept of the 
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Alliance is authoritative m the drafting of which Hungary has been actively 
participating. 
The Republic of Hungary realises the fact that there is a continuing need to preserve 
the Alliance's credible defence capabilities in order to counter the challenges to 
security evolving in the Euro-Atlantic region. This capability is based on the full 
scope of defence capacities displayed by the member countries and on the adequate 
distribution of these defence capabilities in the territory of the Alliance. In compliance 
with its obligations undertaken, and in the interest of common defence, Hungary is 
ready to make available the required military force and will contribute to the other 
missions ofthe Alliance to the extent of its possibilities. 
15. The structure of organisation and disposition, the strength, the proportion of 
internal complement, weaponry and equipment of the armed forces of the Republic of 
Hungary will be established in agreement with the Alliance, in conformity with the 
realistically anticipated dangers, the defence needs of the country, the obligations 
undertaken in the Alliance, as well as in conformity with the material and financial 
resources. Hungary will assure the harmony between the objectives set, and the armed 
forces, as well as the resources designated for their operation and development, 
respectively. 
16. The new challenges, risks and dangers has the specific feature of surfacing in a 
complex manner and have transboundary effects. Countering these challenges requires 
close international co-operation beyond the areas of foreign, economic and defence 
policy. To that end, the Republic of Hungary actively participates in both the bilateral 
and multilateral framework in international efforts aimed at the prevention and 
handling of these challenges and risks, with special regard given to the field of justice, 
interior affairs, customs, protection of the environment and disaster relief, as well as 
to the activities of other bodies. 
17. The National Assembly of the Republic of Hungary will ensure the conditions 
pertaining to the implementation of tasks arising from this document. The 
Government of the Republic of Hungary assumes responsibility for the development 
of the national security strategy and of the national military strategy, and for their 
revision as required, as well as for the implementation ofthe tasks arising from them. 
(Sgd) Dr. ADER Janos 
Chairman of the National Assembly 
(Sgd) HERENYI Karoly (Sgd) MAD AI Peter 
Clerk of the National Assembly Clerk of the National Assembly 
This is NOT an official translation! 
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